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ABSTRACT
In Defense of Sufficiency as the Distributive Ideal for Political Power
by
Dustin Tune

 Many people think that political equality is obviously a good thing, an ideal toward 
which any decent political system should strive.  Despite this – or perhaps because of it – some 
basic questions about political equality remain unanswered.  What is political equality?  What is 
good about it?  Could some other ideal(s) take its place?  My aim here is to answer each of these 
questions.
 In regards to the first question, I argue that political equality obtains when political power 
is distributed equally.  Two people are political equals if, and only if, they have the same amount 
of political power.  By ‘political power’ I mean (roughly) the ability to get what one wants in the 
political arena.  Conceiving of political equality in this way allows us to accommodate both the 
moral and amoral dimensions of politics.
 What is good about political equality, so conceived?  Political equality is good insofar as 
it leads to the equal advancement of everyone’s interests.  There are several reasons to think that 
advancing everyone’s interests equally is important.  It may be a fundamental requirement of 
morality, a principle of social justice, or a necessary condition of political legitimacy.   
 Of course, an equal distribution of political power is not unique in its ability to advance 
people’s interests equally.  Indeed, I argue that an unequal distribution of power will almost 
always lead to a more equal advancement of everyone’s interests.  This is because different 
         
people have different interests, and, depending on the circumstances, different amounts of power 
may be needed in order to advance different sets of interests to the same degree.  Thus, it is a 
mistake to assume that an equal distribution of power will lead to the equal advancement of 
everyone's interests.  If the equal advancement of interests is our ultimate goal, then political 
power should be distributed in accordance with a principle of sufficiency, not equality.  Everyone 
should have whatever amount of political power they need in order for their interests to be 
advanced to the same degree as everyone else’s.
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PREFACE
Many take it for granted that political equality is a good thing, an ideal toward which any decent 
political system should strive.  But there is little explanation of why this is so, or even of what 
exactly is meant by ‘political equality.’  My aim in this project, therefore, is to answer the 
following questions: (1) What is political equality?; (2) Is it an attractive ideal?; and (3) What 
alternative ideal(s) might take its place?.  
 The notion of equality certainly occupies a prominent place in the political rhetoric of this 
country (“all men are created equal”) and others (“Liberty, Equality, Fraternity”).  We often view 
reform movements through the lens of political equality.  Consider the women’s suffrage 
movement or the civil rights movement.  Reformers justified their positions by appealing to the 
ideal of equality, and, looking back, we say that these movements were successful insofar as they 
actually brought about greater political equality.  
 Despite the prominence of political equality, philosophers and political scientists have 
only recently begun to focus on how arguments about political equality relate to other arguments 
about equality – in the area of distributive justice, for instance.1  And this attention has not led to 
much lucidity.2  Part of the problem is that ‘political equality’ means different things to different 
         
1 Harry Brighouse notes: “[Philosophers] have largely neglected a dimension of equality traditionally thought by 
many egalitarians to be central to their project: political equality, or democracy.  Egalitarian political movements (as 
opposed to philosophers) have not distinguished the demand for more democracy and that for more material equality 
as separate demands…Yet most contemporary egalitarian philosophers have either ignored democracy as a 
dimension of equality, or have claimed that it has only a dependent or instrumental role…I argue, contrary to most 
of the positions within the contemporary debate, that political equality has a central place within 
egalitarianism” (1996, p. 118).
2 As Robert Dahl has observed, “the existence of political equality is a fundamental premise of democracy.  Yet its 
meaning and its relation to democracy, and to the distribution of resources that a citizen can use to influence public 
decisions, are not…well understood” (2006, p. ix). 
people.   Some take it mean equality before the law.  Others take it to refer more narrowly to the 
principle of one person, one vote.  Yet others simply equate it with democracy.  For still others, 
political equality will be achieved only when there are no more social relationships based on 
dominance or exploitation.  I think each of these views tells us something about political 
equality, but none of them is the whole story.  
 So, if we want to make progress on the concept of political equality, what should we do? 
I suggest that we look to the on-going debates within normative ethics and political philosophy 
about the moral (dis)value of equality in various contexts.  (Is equality an attractive ideal for the 
distribution of welfare, resources, capabilities for functioning, or whatever?)  More specifically, I 
suggest that we think of political power as a good that is subject to distributive principles. 
Political equality can then be understood as equality of political power.  Once it is so understood, 
however, the ideal of political equality begins to look less attractive.  In the end, I argue that 
sufficiency, not equality, is the most plausible distributive ideal for political power.  If I am right 
about this, then all that matters from the point of view of morality is that each person have 
enough political power.  And something less than equal can be enough.3 
 Here is a chapter-by-chapter outline of my project.  In Chapter 1, I survey various 
conceptions of political equality and argue that the best one is equality of political power.  (By 
‘political power’ I mean (roughly) the ability to get what you want in the political arena.)  Next, I 
shift my focus to the question of how political power ought to be distributed.  Many have argued 
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3 The classic formulation of sufficientarianism comes from Harry Frankfurt: “what is important from the point of 
view of morality is not that everyone should have the same but that each should have enough”  (1987, p. 134).  More 
recently, Roger Crisp (2003, 2004, and 2006)  has argued for a version of sufficientarianism.  There is also a 
recognizably sufficientarian position in Joseph Raz (1986, Ch. 9).  Although others have gestured toward a 
specifically political form of sufficientarianism – e.g., Ronald Dworkin (2000), Philip Pettit (1997), Elizabeth 
Anderson (1999), and Ian Shapiro (1999) – no one has, as far as I know, developed a sufficientarian approach to the 
distribution of political power.
that it ought to be distributed equally.  Call this view political egalitarianism.4  In Chapter 2, I 
criticize arguments that seek to ground political egalitarianism in the demands of moral equality. 
Such arguments say that each person must be treated with equal concern and respect, and that to 
have anything less than an equal share of political power is to be treated with less than equal 
concern and respect.  I try to show that political equality is not a necessary condition of moral 
equality; we can have the latter without the former.  In Chapter 3, I turn to arguments for political 
egalitarianism that appeal to legitimacy.  These arguments claim that an institution cannot be 
legitimate unless all the people living under it have an equal share of political power.  I argue that 
these arguments from legitimacy, like the arguments from moral equality, overstate the moral 
significance of equality: the reasons they give in favor of political equality support some other 
ideal just as well.  My main positive argument comes in Chapter 4, where I make the case for 
political sufficientarianism – the view that inequalities of power are not problematic, as long as 
everyone has enough power.  My argument, in short, is that sufficientarianism is better equipped 
than egalitarianism to treat all persons as moral equals.  Finally, in Chapter 5, I reply to the most 
serious objections to my view.
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4 The label comes from David Estlund (2000).
Chapter 1: What is Political Equality?
       
We cannot say whether political equality is an attractive ideal until we get clear on what it is.  So, 
the task of this chapter is to clarify the concept of political equality.  I will argue that political 
equality is best understood as equality of political power.  Since the concept of political power is 
itself quite obscure, however, I will spend the second part of the chapter explaining how I 
understand it.
I.
A natural starting point in our effort to understand political equality is the principle of one 
person, one vote.5  This principle captures the idea that elections, which are a central aspect of 
political life in most countries, should be free and fair.  And, no doubt, a system that grants each 
voter a single, evenly weighted vote is (in some sense) based on political equality.  But there is 
more to politics than casting a ballot, and we are looking for a conception of political equality in 
general, not just equality in the voting booth.  We need to add something to the above principle. 
Intuitively, political equality also involves things like the right to run for and hold elected office, 
freedom of expression, freedom of association, and other civil liberties.  With these additions in 
place, we might say that political equality is achieved when each citizen has the same procedural 
rights and basic political liberties.  Call this the formal equality conception of political equality. 
 This formalistic approach is certainly part of our ordinary understanding of political 
equality.  One need look no further than the United States Constitution for proof of this.  The 
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5 As a group of political scientists recently observed: “Ask [the average person] what political equality means and 
she is likely to reply ‘one person, one vote’” (Liu, Kaplan, and Schroeder, p. 83). 
Fourteenth Amendment extends to all citizens the “equal protection of the laws,”  including the 
liberties enumerated in the Bill of Rights.  The Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments grant the 
right to vote to all adult, non-felon citizens.  One could also look at the Voting Rights Act of 
1965, the primary aim of which is to ensure that each citizen’s vote is weighted equally. 
Moreover, the formal equality conception is implicit in many discussions of political equality. 
Consider news reports about voter suppression on election day.  These are often framed in terms 
of political equality, and they assume that the requirements of political equality are fully captured 
by the Constitution, the Voting Rights Act, or some other document. 
 One advocate of a formalistic conception of political equality is Friedrich A. Hayek 
(1960).  According to Hayek, any more robust sense of political equality is incompatible with 
individual liberty and, therefore, has no place in a free society.6  His argument for this claim 
begins with the observation that people differ widely in their natural talents and inclinations.  If 
the legal system treats everyone the same, given this diversity of talents and inclinations, an 
unequal distribution of opportunities and resources – including political opportunities and 
resources – is inevitable.  Hence, the only way to achieve equality in the distribution of 
opportunities and resources is for the legal system to treat some people differently than others. 
But a society in which the legal system treats some people differently than others – one in which 
people are not “equal before the law”  – is not a society based on liberty: “The great aim of the 
struggle for liberty has been equality before the law” (Hayek 1960, p. 85).  And, for Hayek, 
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6 “Equality of the general rules of law and conduct…is the only kind of equality…which we can secure without 
destroying liberty” (1960, p. 85).  Although Hayek may have been the first, he is not the only person to adopt a 
formalistic conception of political equality; many libertarians (e.g., Robert Nozick (1974) and Jason Brennan 
(2011a)) do so as well.
whatever value political equality has comes from its instrumental role in securing liberty.7  (He 
assumes that the only non-instrumental good in the political sphere is individual liberty.)  The 
upshot is that we should think of political equality as nothing more, and nothing less, than 
equality before the law.   
 This view has the advantage of being, in one way, uncontroversial: whatever else political 
equality requires, surely it requires equal formal rights and liberties.  No one denies that equality 
before the law is necessary for political equality.  The question is whether equality before the law 
is sufficient for political equality.  I claim that it is not.  Why not?  Because procedures aren’t 
everything; outcomes matter too.  
 Formal equality is compatible with significant inequality of outcomes; most importantly, 
inequalities of political influence.  Even in the absence of procedural unfairness or legal 
discrimination, some people – through no fault of their own – will have less influence than 
others.  There is virtually no limit to how large these inequalities can grow.  And, at some point, 
it becomes difficult to believe that political equality still obtains, even if everyone enjoys equal 
protection under the law.  Imagine two citizens with the exact same legal rights and protections, 
as well as the exact same bundle of talents and ambitions.  The only difference between the two 
is that one is very rich and the other is very poor.  According to Hayek, these two people are 
political equals; they must be, since they have the same legal rights and protections.  How 
plausible is this claim?  Not very, given how unequal the two are in terms of political influence. 
In (almost) every political system, money is an important source of influence.  The more money 
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7 In his own words: “From the fact that people are very different it follows that, if we treat them equally, the result 
must be inequality in their actual position, and that the only way to place them in an equal position would be to treat 
them differently.…Our argument will be that, though where the state must use coercion for other reasons, it should 
treat all people alike, the desire of making people more alike in their condition cannot be accepted in a free society 
as a justification for further and discriminatory coercion” (Hayek 1960, p. 87).
you have, the greater ability you have to bring about the outcomes you want.  Now, there is 
nothing logically contradictory about the claim that the rich man and the poor man are political 
equals, their inequalities of influence notwithstanding, but it does run counter to some of my 
strongest intuitions about what it means for two people to be political equals.
 Here’s another way of putting my worry about the formal equality conception of political 
equality: by its lights, a plutocracy could count as a society of political equals.  As long as 
everyone has the same set of legal rights, we have no grounds to criticize the political 
arrangements of that society for lacking in political equality.  It does not matter that the few 
people who have most of the money always get the political outcomes they want.  As long as the 
rich do not take away anyone’s formal protections (e.g., the civil liberties protected in the Bill of 
Rights), it could still be a society of perfect political equality.  This is a strange result because, 
intuitively, one of the main problems with plutocracy is that it allows a few to have too much 
influence and everyone else to have too little.  When outcomes become so unequal, it is hard to 
accept that there is no political inequality.       
 In response to this worry, Hayek would likely insist that any attempt to make the pattern 
of distribution more equal would limit the liberty of some individuals or groups in a morally 
unacceptable way.  That may be so, but it’s irrelevant to the question at hand.  We are looking for 
the best conception of political equality, not a theory of the moral limits of state action.  The 
point I am making is that Hayek’s equality-before-the-law conception of political equality is 
inadequate.  It is inadequate because it is compatible with tremendous differences in political 
influence, and my intuition is that such differences are a sign of a lack of political equality.
 I think we need a more substantive conception of political equality, one that looks at the 
distributive outcomes of the political process.  If we care about distributive outcomes, it is 
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reasonable to try to unpack the concept of political equality in terms of the distribution of some 
good.  But what good?  Is there some good which, if two people had an equal share of it, they 
would be political equals?  I believe there is: political power.  Hence, my proposed conception of 
political equality is as follows: For two citizens to be political equals, each must have equal 
political power.8  I will say much more below about what political power is shortly; for now, we 
can think of it as the ability to influence the political decisions of one’s society. 
 Why think that political equality is best understood as equality of political power? 
Because conceiving of political equality in this way allows us to capture two important 
intuitions.  The first is one we have already encountered: distributive outcomes matter morally. 
If some distributive inequalities (e.g., the inequalities of influence we saw in the case of the rich 
man and the poor man) are incompatible with political equality, then political equality requires 
something more than equal formal rights.  The second intuition that this conception of political 
equality captures is that we are not merely passive recipients of benefits and burdens.  Power is 
an ability.  Someone with an ability can decide for himself whether and how to exercise it.  You 
may have more actual influence than I do because, for example, you care more about politics 
than I do.  Someone else may have more power than both of us because she is able, through 
rational argument, to bring all her neighbors over to her side on political issues.  These are 
inequalities that result from people making free choices.  To try to eliminate such inequalities is 
to deny that people should be held responsible for the consequences of their choices.  One has no 
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8 For formulations of the view that political equality is best understood in terms of equality of political power, see 
Joshua Cohen (2009, pp. 270-9); Estlund (2000, pp. 127-31); Knight and Johnson (1997); and Harry Brighouse and 
Marc Fleurbaey (2010).  
grounds for complaint if one’s lack of influence results from one’s own choice not to exercise it.9 
Thus, if political equality is understood as equality of political power, we see that two people can 
be political equals even if they have unequal amounts of actual influence on political decisions. 
Inequalities of actual influence are consistent with political equality when they are the result of 
free choices.
 The second of these intuitions – that political agents should be regarded as free and 
rational – has led some to try to explain political equality solely in terms of moral equality.  Such 
a conception of political equality takes different forms, depending on the view of moral equality 
being employed.  If you thought that moral equality were best understood in terms of equal 
consideration of interests, then you would say that two people are political equals insofar as their 
interests ought to be given equal weight (taken equally seriously) in the making and evaluating 
of our decisions.  Or you could take a more Kantian approach, saying that two people are 
political equals insofar as they ought to be treated with equal concern and respect.  Call this the 
moral equality conception of political equality.  
 Ronald Dworkin has defended a version of the moral equality conception.  He says that 
“the government [must] treat all those in its charge as equals, that is, as entitled to equal concern 
and respect”  (1985, p. 190).10  On Dworkin’s view, two people are political equals if and only if 
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9 As J. Cohen says, “ [I]t is unreasonable to demand influence irrespective of one’s own actions or of the considered 
convictions of other citizens.  That demand is unreasonable, because a compelling interpretation of the idea of 
political equality must ensure a place for individual responsibility.  Members of a democratic society are represented 
as free and equal.  As free, they are to be treated as responsible for their political judgments and conduct.  So if I 
demand influence irrespective of the judgments of other citizens, then I deny the importance of such responsibility. 
Once we accept it, then we accept, too, that a regime with equal opportunity for effective influence is almost certain 
to be associated with inequalities of actual influence” (2009, p. 274).
10 In earlier works, Dworkin always spoke of “equal concern and respect”; more recently, this has been shortened to 
“equal concern.”  For instance: “If a community is genuinely egalitarian…it accepts the imperative that a 
community collectively must treat its members individually with equal concern” (Dworkin 2000, pp. 209-10).  I 
don’t know why respect has dropped out of the more recent formulations, but I do not think it marks a substantive 
change. 
we (the state and the broader political community) should give their interests equal consideration 
and we ought to regard them as rational agents with lives of their own to lead.  Of course, the 
demand that each citizen ought to be treated with equal concern and respect can itself be given 
many different interpretations.11  This need not detain us, however, since all we are concerned 
with at the moment is the plausibility of the claim that the concept of political equality can be 
fully cashed out in terms of moral equality.  A rough and ready understanding of equal concern 
and respect – equal consideration of interests plus treatment as a rational agent – is good enough 
for this purpose. 
 The worry I have about the moral equality conception of political equality is that it 
ignores the amoral dimension of politics.  Some political action is best understood in terms of 
self-interest or group-interest, not morality.  We do not always blame political agents for acting 
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11 Dworkin unpacks this notion by describing what a society organized around the principle of equal concern and 
respect (an “egalitarian community”)  would look like.  He assumes that an egalitarian community will be a 
democracy.  The question “What political institutions and processes should an egalitarian community have?” thus 
becomes “What form of democracy is most appropriate to an egalitarian community?”.  Dworkin’s answer to the 
latter question is: 
“[T]he best form of democracy is whatever form is most likely to produce the substantive 
decisions and results that treat all members of the community with equal concern.  On [this 
conception of democracy], the main features of a democracy––near-universal suffrage, free 
speech, and the rest––are justified because a community in which the vote is widely held and 
speech is free is more likely to distribute material resources and other opportunities and values in 
an egalitarian way.  So it recommends, when controversial cases arise about the best detailed form 
of democracy, that a consequentialist test be used: Which decision of these controversial issues 
seems most conducive to advancing or protecting these substantive egalitarian goals?” (2000, p. 
186).
So, in the end, political equality is unattainable without an egalitarian distribution of various goods.  (For Dworkin’s 
account of what makes a distribution of goods egalitarian, see Dworkin 1981b.) Two citizens are political equals 
when they are treated with equal concern and respect, and they are treated with equal concern and respect when they 
receive a (roughly) equal share of the resources and opportunities that their society has to distribute.  
on purely self-interested reasons.12  You do everything you can to get the most for you and yours; 
I’ll do the same for me and mine.  Many lament this; they think that politics should be 
transformed into a more moralized exercise.13  And perhaps it should be, but, up to and including 
the present, there has been a gap between the rules of morality and the rules of politics.  Most of 
us accept that people will be concerned with things other than the demands of morality when 
making political calculations.  Consider the efforts of elected representatives to funnel money 
and jobs to their districts.  It is hard to find a moral justification for these efforts, but they do not 
(always) strike us as morally objectionable.  They’re just part of the game.  The upshot is that the 
existence of a moral dimension to political equality does not entail that political equality just is 
moral equality.  I think Dworkin wrongly conflates the two.  In later chapters, I will argue that 
two people can be treated as moral equals without being political equals.  All I am saying now is 
that although we want a conception of political equality that is more moralized than the purely 
formal conception, we do not want one that is fully moralized.          
 Let us briefly recap where we’ve been so far.  We are looking for a plausible conception 
of political equality.  We started with the formal equality conception, according to which two 
people are political equals if they have the same set of formal rights and liberties.  The problem 
 8

12 I agree with Thomas Nagel on this point: “At present self-interest is expected to play a major role in democratic 
politics, only modestly qualified by impartial concerns.  It would be a drastic change if the personal interests of 
voters were to come to have only a minor influence on their behavior, and only a minor role in the appeals of 
politicians campaigning for election.  A division between personal and impersonal motivation which confined the 
personal almost entirely to individual rather than public choice seems, from the vantage point of the present, an 
unattainable dream” (1991, p. 91).  And David Estlund: “[P]olitics is not, and probably could never be, mainly a 
matter of the impartial exchanging of reasons” (2008, p. 184).  And Joshua Cohen: “[P]olitics is in (perhaps large) 
part a struggle for power and a strategic pursuit of personal and group interests” (2009, p. 1).
13 This is clearly Nagel’s view: “Instead of morality being like politics in its sensitivity to the balance of power, we 
should want politics to be more like morality in its aim of unanimous acceptability” (1991, p. 46).  But even he 
acknowledges that ethics cannot fully replace politics: “The demands of impartiality are so great that…[they] 
threaten to require an inordinate takeover of the individual’s life in their service––a form of general mobilization 
which fails to leave enough scope for the personal standpoint” (ibid., p. 54).
with this conception is that it ignores the distributive outcomes of the political process.  Formal 
equality before the law is compatible with vast economic inequalities, for instance; and it is hard 
to swallow the claim that a very rich man and a very poor man are truly political equals, given 
their different levels of ability to influence the political process.  This led us to consider whether 
the concept of political equality can be understood in terms of the distribution of some good.  I 
suggested that political equality be thought of as equality of political power.  This conception of 
political equality is preferable to the formal equality conception because it recognizes the moral 
significance of outcomes as well as processes.  In other words, the equality of political power 
conception recognizes that there is a moral dimension to political equality.  But, unlike the moral 
equality conception, the equality of political power conception does not try to reduce political 
equality to moral equality.
 If all we wanted was a plausible conception of political equality, we could stop here: 
political equality is equality of political power.  But my ultimate aim is to argue against the view 
that political power ought to be distributed equally, not to defend a particular conception of 
political equality.  Why, then, did we go through this discussion of political equality?  For a 
couple of reasons.  First, finding a plausible conception of political equality is important in its 
own right.  People talk so much about political equality that it is nice to have an idea of how that 
concept is best understood.  Second, the above discussion points up at least one reason why the 
distribution of political power matters morally.  It matters because the distribution of political 
power affects individual well-being.  Political power is the ability to affect (among other things) 
the distribution of burdens and benefits.  
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II.
If we are going to explain political equality in terms of political power, we need to say something 
about the concept of political power.  And, as you will soon see, this turns out to be quite 
difficult.  Different people have meant very different things by ‘political power’.  Many speak as 
though only governments and governmental agents can wield political power.14   Others take 
political power to be synonymous with political authority.15  Given the myriad uses to which the 
concept of political power can be put, I will not try to show that any one understanding of the 
concept is the best one.  Since it plays a central role in this project, however, I do want to spell 
out what I will mean by ‘political power’ in subsequent chapters.  
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14 In other words, they treat ‘political power’ and ‘state power’ as interchangeable.  Consider Allen Buchanan: “[T]o 
wield political power is to attempt to exercise a monopoly, within a jurisdiction, in the making, application, and 
enforcement of laws,” and “it is the state that wields political power through a system of laws that permits or enables 
various institutional spheres of control” (p. 690).  And John Rawls: “[P]olitical power is always coercive power 
backed by the government’s use of sanctions, for government alone has the authority to use force in upholding its 
laws” (2005, p. 136).
15 Consider Locke: “Political Power… I take to be a Right of making laws with penalties of death, and consequently 
all less penalties, for the regulating and preserving of property, and of employing the force of the community, in the 
execution of laws, and in the defense of the commonwealth from foreign injury, and all this only for the public 
good” (Second Treatise of Government, Bk. II, ch. I, §3).  And Michael Walzer, who insists that political power 
requires authority: “As there are, in principle at least, things that money can’t buy, so there are things that the 
representatives of sovereignty, the officials of the state, can’t do.  Or better, in doing them, they exercise not political 
power properly speaking but mere force; they act nakedly, without authority.  Force is power used in violation of its 
social meaning.  That it is commonly so used should never blind us to its tyrannical character” (1983, p. 282).  See 
also Habermas (1996, pp. 131-7).  
 Political power, on my view, is the ability to get what you want in the political arena.  A 
bit more precisely, it is the ability to make political outcomes conform to one’s will, even in the 
face of resistance.16  
 This needs a lot of unpacking.  But before we begin that task, I want to note three things 
about my definition of political power and silence a potential worry.  The first thing to note is 
that, on my definition, political power is not restricted to public officials.  Private citizens (both 
individually and collectively17) can have a share of it.  The second is that thinking of political 
power in this way allows us to view it as a distributional good – i.e., as something that can be 
subject to distributive principles.18   The third is that, strictly speaking, my definition is 
incomplete.  To have power is not merely to have an ability; it is to have an ability, and not be 
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16 For now, we can think of political outcomes as those having to do with the composition or activities of 
government.  This is a slight modification of Goldman’s (1974) and Kliemt’s (1981) definitions of social power.  My 
definition of political power also closely resembles those of C. Wright Mills and Max Weber.  Mills: “By the 
powerful we mean…those who are able to realize their will, even if others resist it” (1947, p. 152).  Weber: “Here, 
by ‘power’ we shall understand, very generally, a person’s or a plurality of persons’ chance to impose their own will 
in the context of a social activity, even against the resistance of other participants” (1922, p. 631, quoted and 
translated in Zimmerling 2005, p. 31, n. 42).  The ‘even’ here is crucial.  As Ruth Zimmerling notes: “It is 
remarkable that Weber’s very famous definition is frequently misquoted in translations, by omitting the word 
‘even’ (auch).  Weber has therefore often been misinterpreted as an author who holds that power situations 
necessarily involve resistance and that where such resistance is absent one cannot speak of power.  This view is 
untenable if Weber’s definition is read correctly.  Rather, he must be classified among those who hold that for power 
to exist (and even to be exercised) the actual presence of resistance is not necessary; all that is needed is that the 
power-holder could impose his will if he met resistance” (pp. 31-2, n. 42). 
17  For now, we can treat groups as individual agents.  Eventually, I will have much more to say about the 
complicated relationship between individual power and group power.  Is the collective power of a group simply the 
sum of the power held by each of its members?  What (if any) are the relevant differences between well-organized, 
hierarchical groups such as corporations and informal, unorganized groups defined in terms of various demographic 
categories (e..g, race, gender, age)?.  For a discussion of these and related issues, see Goldman (1972, pp. 170-5)  and 
Morriss (2002, pp. 109-15).  We will return to these questions, in Chapters 4 and 5, where we will have to decide 
what role (if any) group membership should play in determining whether an individual has enough political power. 
All I am trying to do in the present chapter is spell out a particular conception of political power so that we can then 
turn to the question of how such power ought to be distributed.  So, for now, everything said about the power of 
individuals applies to groups as well.
18 I am not the first to see political power as a distributional good.  Others include: Dahl (1968); Kliemt (1981); 
Walzer (1983); Christiano (1996); and Brighouse and Swift (2006).  
hindered from exercising it.  Power is ability in a suitable context.  In what follows, I will 
assume, for the sake of simplicity, that the lack-of-hinderance condition is met – i.e., that there is 
nothing preventing someone with an ability from exercising it, if he chooses to do so.   
 Now for the worry.  The worry is that my definition overlooks an obvious answer to the 
question, What is political power?.  The obvious answer goes like this: Political power is not an 
ability; it is money, or votes, or the authority to pass and enact legislation, or some other simple 
thing.  But the simplicity of such an answer comes at the price of conceptual confusion.  There 
are many sources of political power – money, votes, elected office, social connections, rhetorical 
skill, celebrity, public demonstrations, political art, good looks, threats, bribes, rational 
arguments, and others.19  But these are merely sources of political power; they are not power 
itself.  You can have power without money, for example, or money without power.  One person’s 
power comes from de jure authority while someone else’s comes from rhetorical skill or ruthless 
arm-twisting.  
 It is a mistake, then, to identify power with one or all of its sources.  It is to commit the 
“vehicle fallacy.” 20 This fallacy involves thinking that dispositional concepts refer to things. 
Consider the claim that political power is money.  Many sociologists and political scientists talk 
 12

19  Dworkin (1987b) notes that political power can be measured on both vertical and horizontal dimensions. 
Horizontal measurements compare the amount of power held by a private citizen or group of private citizens with 
that of another private citizen or group of private citizens.  Vertical comparisons, by contrast, are between individual 
private citizens and individual elected officials.  We must also distinguish between impact and influence.  A citizen’s 
impact on the political process is “the difference he can make, just on his own, by voting for or choosing one 
decision rather than another” (191).  One’s influence is “the difference he can make not just on his own but also by 
leading or inducing others to believe or vote or choose as he does” (191).  Thus, measurements of influence have to 
take more factors into consideration.  Once political power is understood in terms of influence rather than mere 
impact, it becomes clear that the sources of political power are great in number and diversity.
20 Morriss (2002) adopts the term from Anthony Kenny (1975).  
as though this were true.21  But it cannot be true, since money alone makes no difference in 
politics.  Imagine two billionaires with the exact same amount of wealth.  The first billionaire has 
one driving passion at this point in her life: get politicians she agrees with elected to public 
office.  And, largely because of her support, her favored politicians usually do get elected.  The 
second billionaire has been interested in abstract art, and only abstract art, her entire life; she 
devotes most of her time and money to expanding her collection of paintings and sculptures. 
Clearly, the first billionaire has much more political power than the second, and this would 
remain true (at least for a while) even if the second were to suddenly develop a strong desire to 
get her favored political candidates elected.  Why?  Because making a difference in politics 
requires a certain amount of expertise, and our second billionaire lacks this entirely.  What this 
case shows is that even though an agent’s power can be increased greatly by material resources, 
the resources themselves are not power.  Power requires an agent who knows where and how to 
use resources effectively.  It takes an agent to turn money into political power.  In short, we 
should not confuse the sources of power with power itself.     
 Let us now look at each element of my proposed definition of political power, beginning 
with the claim that political power is an ability.  Why should we think of power as an ability? 
Because being powerful is a dispositional property – like being soluble or flammable.  The 
alternative to a dispositional analysis is what I will call the actual causal role analysis.   The 
classic formulation of the actual causal role analysis of power comes from Robert Dahl: “For the 
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21  See, e.g., Dahl 1957, Parsons 1963, and Bartels 2008.  Even philosophers sometimes commit this fallacy. 
Goldman (1972) appears to commit it when he says: “In saying that outcome e would occur if S were to perform 
certain acts, we do not indicate which facts about the world, which resources possessed by S, make this conditional 
true.  Nevertheless, there must be some such facts or resources.  Indeed, we may construe our subjunctive 
conditionals as asserting their existence.…We may say, therefore, that resources such as wealth, authority, 
reputation, attractiveness, friendship and physical location play the same sort of role vis-a-vis power as molecular 
structure plays vis-a-vis solubility.  It is the possession of such resources that confers power, or, if you like, that is 
power” (p. 163).  
assertion ‘C has power over R’, one can substitute the assertion, ‘C’s behavior causes R’s 
behavior’”  (1968, p. 46).  Those who, following Dahl, have adopted such an analysis have done 
so largely because it seems to make power a scientifically respectable concept.  The language of 
causation is the language of science, and observable effects on behavior seem like the sort of 
thing we can study empirically.  But, scientific or not, the actual causal role analysis of power 
should be rejected, for at least two reasons.  For one, it cannot account for some paradigmatic 
cases of power in which there are no observable effects.  A bomb that never goes off has no 
observable effects, but this in no way diminishes its explosive power.22  A second reason to reject 
a causal analysis of power is that, unlike talk of causes, talk of power often has little (if any) 
explanatory power.  “A caused B to fall”  is an explanation of why B fell.  (Or at least an answer 
to the question, What made B fall?)  But the observation that “A has the power to make B fall” 
may explain nothing about what actually happened to B.23    
 So, power is an ability and, as such, should be analyzed as a dispositional concept. 
Because power is a dispositional concept, facts about the actual world cannot tell us everything 
we want to know about power.  Many statements about power will refer to counterfactual 
scenarios.  Consider the statement, “A has the power to Φ”.  This statement may be true even if 
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22 Peter Morriss makes the point about dispositions in general: “[D]ispositions can remain forever unmanifested: a 
fragile cup remains fragile throughout its existence, even if it never breaks; a sample of sulphuric acid has the power 
to dissolve zinc, even though none is ever put into it; the Congress has the power to pass bills vetoed by the 
President (by passing them with a two-thirds majority), even if the President vetoes no bills.  So a dispositional 
property can exist and yet never give rise to anything that actually occurs.  A sentence about a dispositional property 
…often refers to a hypothetical event – and hypothetical events are by definition unobservable” (2002, p. 17).
23 This too applies to all dispositional concepts.  As Helmut Kliemt notes: “[T]he concept of a counterfactual 
proposition seems to be necessary to an understanding of power.  This seems to be quite clear because a person 
influences something causally only if without the person it did not happen.  However, counterfactual conditionals 
enter the stage in a different sense.  Power as an ability depends on ‘what would happen if…”, and thus has to be 
measured over a whole set of possibilities, most of which never will become reality.  The problems associated with 
[a causal analysis of power] cannot be avoided [until] power is taken to be what it really is – an ability, potential, or 
disposition.  Dispositional concepts like ‘power’ necessarily involve considerations of merely possible events, 
considerations about ‘what would happen if…’” (1981, p. 55).
A never has Φ-ed and never will Φ.  What matters for the truth-value of this statement is whether 
A has the ability to Φ, should she choose to do so.  A may have this ability even if she never 
chooses to exercise it.  Thus, when we want to make a judgment about A’s power, we look at 
both her actual desires and her counterfactual desires, and we hold (almost) everything else 
constant.24   (We will also need make whatever counterfactualizations are logically or 
nomologically entailed by the initial counterfactualization of the desires.)  But, importantly, we 
do not counterfactualize the desires or actions of anyone other than A, unless those desires or 
actions would be affected by the difference in A’s desire.  This is important because we are trying 
to determine how much (if any) power A has.  In order to isolate the effects of A’s desires on the 
relevant outcomes, we treat A’s desires as the experimental variable and hold everything else 
constant.  
 Power’s status as an ability is key to resolving an apparent puzzle about the power (or 
lack thereof) of persistent minorities.  Persistent minorities are not necessarily ethnic or racial 
minorities; they are anyone whose views are consistently in the minority on political issues. 
Their favored candidates never win, the bills they support never pass, and so on.  The puzzle is 
that, on my view, it is possible for persistent minorities to be simultaneously powerless and 
powerful.  They must be powerless if they never get what they want, never influence any 
outcomes.  But an individual member of a persistent minority could still be quite powerful – 
because he has a lot of money and connections, say.  What is going on here? 
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24 As Goldman puts it: “The possession of power…depends on the truth of certain subjunctive conditionals, 
conditionals whose antecedents specify desires or preferences and whose consequents specify corresponding 
outcomes.  Now a person’s desires or preferences do not ordinarily influence an outcome directly; rather, it is his 
actions that influence it––such actions as casting a ballot, making a campaign contribution, threatening reprisals, or 
requesting a favor.  But a person’s actions are determined by his desires or preferences.  Thus, although in principle 
we are interested in conjunctions of conditionals of the form ‘If S wanted e, then S would perform actions A1…, An, 
and if S performed actions A1,…, An, then outcome e would occur,’ we may for simplicity delete the reference to 
actions and use conditionals of the form ‘If S wanted outcome e, then outcome e would occur” (1974, p. 233).
 The sense of puzzlement should go away as soon as we remember that power is the 
ability to influence political outcomes, not actual influence over outcomes.  The fact that 
someone never influences political decisions does not entail that he does not have the ability to 
do so.  Thus, persistent minorities are not powerless – they can donate money, make speeches, 
lobby their representatives, etc.  It is still true, of course, that persistent minorities (including 
those with great wealth) have less power than their non-minority counterparts.  This is because, 
in order to achieve their desired ends, persistent minorities have to overcome more resistance 
than others would, which decreases their chances of influencing the political outcomes of their 
society.25  
 To recap what we’ve seen so far in this section: power is an ability, neither a thing (a 
material resource) nor an event (an actual exercise of power).  An agent has political power only 
if her desires either actually do or counterfactually would make a difference to political 
outcomes.  And if she does have some power, we determine how much she has by looking at 
how much of a difference her desires do or would make. 
 The next element of my definition of political power in need of some defense is the claim 
that power is the ability to affect outcomes.  Some social scientists hold that power is necessarily 
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25 The issue of persistent minorities raises complex questions about how political power ought to be distributed, 
which we will discuss in Chapters 4 and 5.  As we will see there, individuals who are persistently in the minority on 
political issues may very well be entitled to a greater share of power than they would otherwise be.  Every member 
of the persistent minority is at a disadvantage (in terms of power)  because of his minority status; so, when we are 
distributing political power, we take this into account.  If someone has great wealth (or charisma, or social 
connections, etc.), these may more than compensate for the disadvantages that come with being a persistent 
minority. But if the individual does not have anything to offset this advantage, he should have proportionally more 
power than his non-minority neighbors.  Why?  Because otherwise the minority’s interests would be (at greater risk 
of being) negatively impacted by the political system.  Their interests are likely to be either actively set back or 
simply ignored.
exercised over other people – i.e., that the “object”  of exercises of power is the behavior of other 
people.26  Peter Morriss summarizes the case for adopting this approach as follows: 
When we are concerned with social power, it is natural to suppose that a person 
(rather than a thing) must be affected by the power.  The only way that the English 
language allows ‘power’ to be followed by a word for a person is by talking of the 
power being over the person.  Ergo, it seems, all social power becomes power 
over someone. (2002, p. 32, emphasis in the original)  
Plausible as this line of reasoning may seem, there is good reason to reject the power over 
behavior approach.  The power over behavior approach rules out the possibility that power could 
be exercised on anything besides other people’s behavior.  It thus closes, at the conceptual level, 
what should be an open question.27  If it turns out that, as a matter of fact, power always affects 
behavior in some way, this would be an interesting finding; but this would not show that all 
power necessarily affects behavior. 
 How could political power be exercised on something other than behavior?  It can be 
exercised on attitudes, for example.  We can change people’s attitudes, and changes in attitude do 
not necessarily lead to changes in behavior.28  Suppose Bill had always wanted to travel to 
Poland.  One day Adam tells Bill of a miserable visit that Adam once had there.  Bill no longer 
wants to go to Poland.  Adam’s action leads Bill to change his attitude about visiting Poland. 
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26 Robert Dahl: “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise 
do” (1957, p. 202).  Steven Lukes: “[T]he absolutely basic common core to, or primitive notion lying behind, all talk 
of power is the notion that A [an agent] in some way affects B [another agent]” (1974, p. 26).  Felix Oppenheim “P 
has power over R [with respect to] his not doing x iff P has influence over R’s not doing x or prevents R from doing 
x or P makes R unfree to do x” (1981, p. 21).
27 As Morriss observes, “even…if it is a fact that power is always exercised over people, this is not a reason for 
defining power so that it can only be exercised over people.  If conflict is indeed omnipresent within society, then a 
neutral definition will surely discover it” (2002, p. 34). 
28 As Mill (1861, Ch. 1)  notes, “[O]pinion is itself one of the greatest active social forces.  One person with a belief 
is a social power equal to ninety-nine who have only interests.”  And Lukes (1974): “A may exercise power over B 
by getting him to do what he does not want to do, but he also exercises power over him by influencing, shaping or 
determining his very wants” (p. 23). 
Even if this change in attitude never affects Bill’s behavior (because he never will be able to 
afford the plane ticket to Poland, say), there is certainly a sense in which Adam has exercised 
power over Bill.     
 My preferred approach – the power over outcomes approach – is neutral on the question 
of what the proper object(s) of power might be.  An outcome is simply a state of affairs.  Thus, 
on the power over outcomes approach, anything that is part of a state of affairs is an object upon 
which power could be exercised.  Behavior will be part of most outcomes, but they will also 
include the mental states (beliefs, attitudes, etc.) of the agents involved and other facts about the 
world.29  Assuming we have a sufficiently broad conception of outcomes, then, the power over 
outcomes approach will subsume the power over behavior approach.  That is the main to reason 
to favor the power over outcomes approach: everything that can be explained in terms of 
behavior can be fully explained in terms of outcomes, and there are some things that can be 
explained in terms of outcomes that cannot be fully explained in terms of behavior. 
 This will not persuade everyone to adopt the power over outcomes approach, of course. 
Many who adopt a behavioral account of power do so because they want to protect their theory’s 
scientific respectability.   The basic idea is that to be scientifically respectable a theory must deal 
in things that are observable and describable in purely physicalistic terms, and behavior looks 
like the sort of thing that can meet these qualifications.  So, at least for those who want to talk 
about power in a rigorous, scientific way, behavior begins to look like the natural object of study. 
But the power over behavior approach faces a serious problem: it may not be able to explain all 
the relevant phenomena.  In light of cases such as the one involving Bill’s attitude about Poland, 
it certainly seems possible that some actions that do not affect other people’s behavior are 
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29 Both Goldman (1972 and 1974) and Kliemt (1981) favor a conception of outcomes along these lines.
exercises of power nonetheless.  If we take this possibility seriously, then we should not adopt a 
definition of power that ignores it.  This is especially important in the context of political power, 
since the ability to change people’s minds can be one of the most direct ways of influencing 
outcomes.  If we adopt the power over behavior approach, however, we could not count such an 
ability as power unless it had some affect on someone’s behavior.  This is a high price to pay in 
the effort to make the social sciences mimic the “hard”  sciences.  In the case of power at least, 
science worship begets bad theories.       
 Upshot: we should take outcomes rather than behavior to be the proper object of power 
because the power over outcomes approach can explain everything the power over behavior 
approach can, and potentially much more.  
 Moving on to the next element, I define political power in terms of political outcomes. 
How do I propose to distinguish political from non-political outcomes?  Political outcomes are 
those that affect, or are affected by, the composition or operation of government in some way.  Of 
course, the qualifier ‘in some way’ leaves open the question of where, exactly, the political 
sphere ends and the non-political sphere begins.  One’s answer to this question depends upon 
how narrowly or broadly one conceives of politics.  On a narrow conception of politics, the 
political sphere has definite boundaries – some aspects of human interaction are definitely non-
political.    Such views go back at least to the natural rights theories of Locke and Kant.  On a 
broad conception of politics, by contrast, politics pervades every aspect of our lives – as Ian 
Shapiro puts it, “no domain of human interaction is beyond politics”  (1999, p. 6).  This is not a 
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new view; it can be found in the writings of Plato, Aristotle, and Marx.30  (I do not want to make 
it sound as though there were a clear distinction between narrow and broad conceptions of 
politics.  There is not.  Most conceptions of politics fall somewhere on a continuum that runs 
from narrow to broad.  They are more or less narrow, not either narrow or broad.)  
 I favor a relatively broad conception of politics.  It is broad because I think that any 
boundary we draw around the political sphere will be somewhat arbitrary.  But it is only 
relatively broad because I think that we can still make some meaningful distinctions within the 
political sphere.  Even if everything is political in some sense – i.e., there is no non-arbitrary 
personal/political distinction – we can still point to various phenomena which are more political 
than most.  Some examples of paradigmatically political phenomena include enforcing laws with 
coercive force, casting a ballot in an election, and campaigning for public office.   
 In the past few decades, very broad conceptions of politics – according to which 
everything is political, or at least has a political aspect – have become quite popular.31  And if 
one adopts such a conception, my “relatively broad” approach probably seems naïve at best.  If 
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30 Shapiro (1999, pp. 8-10) notes that each of these otherwise diverse political theorists endorses some version of the 
idea that the personal and the political are inseparable.  See, for example, Plato’s discussion (in Books II and III of 
the Republic) of the need for the communal rearing of children in the ideal republic.  Similarly, Aristotle (in the 
Politics and Nicomachean Ethics) argues that political concerns ought to play a role in such things as education and 
household management.  And Marx is even more explicit about the way that politics does (or at least should) 
permeate every aspect of our lives: “Only when the actual, individual man has taken back into himself the abstract 
citizen and in his everyday life, his individual work, and his individual relationships has become a species-being, 
only when he has recognized and organized his own powers as social powers so that social power is no longer 
separated from him as political power, only then is human emancipation complete” (from “On the Jewish Question,” 
quoted and translated in G. A. Cohen (2008, p. 116)). 
31 For a sense of the various forms such views can take, see Lukes 1974, Foucault 1980, and Habermas 1985. 
Defenders of broad conceptions of politics often appeal to the pervasiveness of power and power relations.  For 
example: “Power must be analyzed as something which circulates, or rather as something which only functions in 
the form of a chain.  It is never localized here or there, never in anybody’s hands, never appropriated as a 
commodity or piece of wealth.  Power is employed and exercised through a net-like organization.  And not only do 
individuals circulate between its threads; they are always in the position of simultaneously undergoing and 
exercising this power.  They are not only its inert or consenting target; they are always also the elements of its 
articulation” (Foucault 1980, p. 93).
politics really does reach into even the most personal of our relationships, the attempt to isolate a 
single kind of power – political power – and ask how we ought to go about distributing it begins 
to look deeply confused.  
 My response is two-fold.  First, I would point out that different people use the term 
‘power’ to refer to many different things.  So, even when defenders of very broad conceptions of 
politics appear to be making observations about political power, these often are irrelevant to the 
sort of power relations I’m interested in.32   More importantly, I worry that a very broad 
conception of politics distorts our intuitive notion of politics beyond all recognition.  I do not 
deny that power plays an important role in many (if not all) interpersonal relations.  But I reject 
the claim that we cannot make some distinctions between different types of power; because I 
think we do, in fact, make such distinctions all the time.  The assumption that if power is present, 
we must be in the realm of the political strikes me as absurd.  Perhaps there is not a neatly 
isolable subset of power relations properly called “political power,”  but surely there is a 
difference between power relations that have some effect on the operations of government, say, 
and those that have none.  I take it that there is a significant difference, along the dimension of 
political power, between the act of calling the office of your Senator and that of buying a turkey 
sandwich.  We can agree (can’t we?) that a trusted advisor to the President wields much more 
political power than an average dentist does.  Thus, even if there are political aspects to 
everything we do, we should not ignore our intuitions that some things have many more such 
aspects than others.  Some things (e.g., giving money to a candidate for public office) are deeply 
political, others (e.g., watching a baseball game) are only peripherally so.
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32 This is even more of an issue when we’re dealing with translations, especially those of Foucault.  Morriss (2002, 
pp. xvi-iii)  argues – persuasively, I believe – that English-speakers have been misled into thinking that Foucault said 
much more about power than he in fact did.  Morriss attributes this to a confused translation of the French terms 
pouvoir and puissance.
 What’s at stake here?  I have suggested that we think of political power as the ability to 
get the things one wants even if there are other people around who want different things.  The 
things in question are political outcomes.  This leads to the question, Which outcomes are 
political outcomes?  Our answer determines how much political power we think there is in the 
world.  The more outcomes that count as political, the more political power there is.  The fewer 
political outcomes there are, the less political power there is.  Although I have indicated which 
conception of the political sphere I find most plausible, I do not need to settle this issue here.  My 
overall project does not depend on any particular view of the scope of  politics.  Rather, the 
scope of my project tracks the scope of politics.  The more broadly one conceives of politics, the 
more far-reaching my arguments about the distribution of political power will be.  Suppose we 
adopt a very broad conception of politics.  We hold that the realm of politics extends into the 
family, the workplace, and voluntary associations like churches and social clubs.  Suppose 
further that we have discovered how much political power Smith ought to have.  In order to 
figure out how much power Smith actually has (and thus whether she ought to have more or less 
than she does now), we will have to look at not only Smith’s potential influence on the 
lawmaking process of her community but also at her potential influence on the decisions in her 
household, office, and so forth.  In short, as the sphere of politics gets larger, the more outcomes 
will count as political outcomes and thereby fall within the purview of my account. 
 Turning now to the next element of my definition of political power, the idea that power 
allows one to bring outcomes into conformity with one’s will.  I use ‘will’ here as shorthand for 
an agent’s desires, preferences, and considered judgments.33   Outcomes conform to one’s will 
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33 Why not define political power in terms of interests rather than desires, preferences, etc.?  Why not say that power 
is the ability to advance one’s interests, even in the face of resistance?  Because I want to leave open the possibility 
that a powerful person could exercise that power in a way that does not advance his own interests.  I think there are 
people with a lot of power who do not exercise it well, in terms of their own self-interest. 
when one’s desires, etc. are satisfied – i.e., when one gets what one wants.  Conformity can come 
in degrees.  The degree of conformity between one’s desires and the relevant outcomes is a 
matter of the degree of resemblance between the relevant (actual and counterfactual) outcomes 
and one’s preferred outcomes.34  Measuring the degree to which an outcome resembles one’s 
desires becomes important when we turn to the issue of measuring how much political power 
one has, which we will do shortly.
 Finally, I say that power is the ability to bring outcomes into conformity with one’s will, 
even in the face of resistance.  The notion of resistance is important because whether one realizes 
one’s preferred outcomes will depend in large part upon the preferences of other agents.  If we 
only looked at cases where everyone was in agreement about which outcome ought to be brought 
about, it would be impossible to figure out how large (or small) a role any particular agent played 
in bringing about the outcome.  By considering cases in which wills pull in opposite directions, 
we can see who has the ability to make outcomes conform to his or her will.  To see why, 
consider an example from Alvin Goldman:
Jones and I are both standing next to an open door.  Jones is a muscular 250-
pounder and I a 145-pounder.  Let E be the issue of whether or not the door 
remains open.  If both Jones and I rely on raw strength alone, it is pretty clear that 
he has more power than I do [with respect to] E.  For there is a sequence of basic 
acts Jones can perform that would ensure that the door will be closed, no matter 
what basic acts I perform.…Thus, assuming Jones has the requisite beliefs, the 
door would stay open if Jones wanted it open, no matter how I felt about it and the 
door would be closed if Jones wanted it closed, no matter how I might feel about 
it.  Should Jones and I have opposing preferences, then, Jones’s preferred 
outcomes would be the one to occur. (1972, p. 176)
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34 Ruth Zimmerling puts the point this way: “[T]o say that someone has ‘great’ power with respect some specific 
issue means that, whatever the preferences of other agents may be, this agent’s own preference – again: whatever it 
may be – can ‘make a great difference’ for the outcome; and, analogously, to say that he has ‘little’ power over it 
amounts to asserting that, ceteris paribus, the constellation of his preference can at best ‘make a small difference’ for 
the outcome.  In the limit, that someone has absolute power (i.e., fully control)  over an issue accordingly means that 
if his preference concerning the issue is a, then he can make the outcome be a, but should his preference change to 
b, he could also make the outcome be b” (2005, p. 52).
So, only cases of opposing preferences help us determine who has power and how much they 
have.  This link between power and resistance has led some to claim that power cannot be 
exercised in the absence of actual resistance, to build such resistance into their definition of 
‘power’.35  This is a mistake, however.  The link between power and resistance is epistemic, not 
metaphysical.  Resistance allows us to figure out who has power, but it is not a necessary 
condition of someone actually having power.  Even if it is impossible to know how much power I 
have when both Jones and I want the door to be closed, this is not a fact about how powerful 
either of us is.  It’s not as though Jones and myself would each become powerless simply 
because we happened to agree on the position of the door.  The mere presence or absence of 
resistance does not determine whether a particular case involves the exercise of power. 
 Now that we have seen why I say that political power is the ability to make political 
outcomes conform to one’s will, even in the face of resistance, let us turn to the question of 
measurement.  A complete account of how we could measure precisely the amount of power each 
individual or group has is beyond the scope of this project.  All I am trying to show here is that 
there is nothing incoherent about the notion of measuring political power in a rigorous way. 
Even if we are not in a position to assign a precise numerical value representing an amount of 
power to anyone36, we can still make sense of how such measurements are possible.  
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35 Dahl (1957) conceives of power in explicitly conflictual terms: “A has power over B to the extent that he can get 
B to do something that B would not otherwise do” (p. 202).  Lukes (1974, p. 31) endorses a similar view of power. 
36 I follow Kleimt here: “To state precisely what it means to have influence on social outcomes according to one’s 
preferences, we should look for a measure of similarity between preferences and social outcomes.  Such a measure 
should indicate degrees of similarity between the individual preferences and the social outcomes in a way that comes 
close to our intuitions about similarity between individual desires and overall social outcomes.…[M]easuring power 
seems to presuppose some assessment of how close social outcomes are to individual wants, and this, in turn, seems 
to demand a measure of similarity between individual preferences and social outcomes.  Without such a similarity 
measure we could only state that some influence has been exerted on social outcomes and we could not discriminate 
between different ‘intensities’ of influence” (Kliemt 1981, pp. 53-4).
 On my conception of political power, the amount of power one has is determined by the 
degree of similarity between one’s preferences and a given set of outcomes.  The outcomes could 
be those that actually did occur or those that, counterfactually, would have occurred.  The more 
closely the outcomes resemble one’s preferences, the more power one has over those outcomes. 
(An important question that I do not even try to settle here: What is the best measure of 
“closeness”  (degree of similarity) between a mental state and a state of affairs?)  In practice, of 
course, it will be extremely difficult to measure how much political power anyone has.37  One 
reason for this is the difficulty in trying to measure how similar a set of outcomes is to a set of 
preferences.  In trying to do this, we face epistemic barriers that prevent us from knowing what 
preferences other people have, and we often cannot specify the content of even our own 
preferences with much precision.38  
 Measurement is further complicated by my counterfactual analysis of power.  For all but 
the most simplistic outcomes, we would have to consider a staggering number of (counterfactual) 
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37 Dahl states the problem clearly: “A drastic limit on the rigor of concepts like power and influence is…set by the 
unhappy fact that no satisfactory quantitative measure of power or influence has yet been devised.  Consequently the 
distribution of power in actual systems can be described only in qualitative terms.…If our task were to compare the 
distribution of income or wealth in different systems we could often use acceptable quantitative indicators.  But 
since even reasonably satisfactory quantitative indicators do not exist for power and influence, in practice we must 
rely on qualitative descriptions that are inherently highly inexact” (1989, p. 273).  For a sense of the difficulties 
specific to an ability-based conception of political power, see Knight and Johnson 1997, pp. 299-310.
38 As Amartya Sen points out, we should neither ignore nor regret this fact: “The need to admit incompleteness in 
inequality evaluation is inescapable, and there is much to be said for addressing that question explicitly rather than 
in grudgingly implicit ways.  The incompleteness may be due to the nature of the concept itself (e.g. the idea of 
equality may incorporate substantial ambiguities), or because of the absence of information (e.g. data may be 
lacking that would permit some comparisons to be made), or due to the need to respect residual disagreements 
among the parties involved (e.g. this would relate to the acceptance of plurality as a part of an approach to fairness 
and justice).  To ‘complete’ partial orderings arbitrarily for the sake of decisiveness, or convenience, or order, or 
some other worthy concern, may be a very misleading step to take.  Even when the partial ranking is quite 
extensively incomplete, the case against ‘forcing’ completeness may be quite strong.  Babbling is not, in general, 
superior to being silent on matters that are genuinely unclear or undecided” (1992, p. 134).
conditionals.  And we would need to assign truth-values to each of these, which would likely be 
an impossible task.39  
 Beyond the practical limits on the information available to us, there is the question of 
what to counterfactualize and what to hold constant.  Recall that when we are interested in 
power, we have to look at hypothetical as we all as actual preferences.  A person’s power consists 
in his ability to get not only what he actually wants but also in his ability to bring about various 
outcomes he could possibly want.  I have the power to flip the light switch even if I don’t want to 
flip it.  I have a great deal of power over the position of the light switch because if I want it on, it 
will be on; and if I want it off, it will be off.  In most cases of political power, however, no one 
can single-handedly determine the outcome; rather, several agents’ preferences and 
corresponding actions contribute to bringing about a particular outcome that none of them could 
achieve alone.  This raises the question of whose preferences to counterfactualize and whose to 
hold constant when we’re trying to determine how much power each individual has with respect 
to the outcome.  Obviously, we must counterfactualize the preferences of at least those people 
whose power we are concerned with.  But should we counterfactualize the preferences of only 
those people?  No, because this yields counter-intuitive, even inconsistent, results.  
 Suppose a group of 10 people jointly owns a rain-making and rain-preventing machine.40 
They vote on how and when to use their machine.  A holds the most stock in the machine and has 
five votes.  B has two votes.  Everyone else (C, …, J) has only one vote, making a total of fifteen. 
The majority of the 15 votes determines how and when the machine is used.  Suppose we want to 
know how much power A and B have over whether it will rain tomorrow at noon.  Assume that 
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39 See Goldman (1974, p. 237).
40 The example comes from Goldman (1974).
C, …, J all prefer rain tomorrow at noon.  If we counterfactualize the preferences of only A and 
B, we get the result that they have zero power.  (Because the preferences of C, …, J guarantee 
that there will be a majority of votes in favor of rain; thus, A and B make no difference.)  But this 
is a strange result, since A and B are the two largest stockholders and together are a single vote 
shy of a controlling majority.  And things only get worse for this method of counterfactualization 
if we ask how much power each of the ten individual members have.  When we counterfactualize 
the preferences of all ten members, we get the result that A and B are indeed the most powerful 
members (with A more than twice as powerful as B, and B twice as powerful as any of C, …, J). 
This is the intuitive result; unfortunately, it is inconsistent with the previous one, according to 
which A and B have zero power.  So, we cannot adopt the general strategy of counterfactualizing 
the preferences of only those people whose power we are trying to measure.  But, then, what 
should we do?  The only way that I can see to avoid the above problematic results is to 
counterfactualize the preferences of everyone who could possibly, either individually or 
collectively, affect the outcome.  The drawback of this approach is that it is practically 
impossible: we have neither the time nor the computing power to calculate all the ways in which 
anyone could possibly affect the outcome.  But, rather than ignore this practical limitation, we 
should acknowledge that it may very well distort our results.41
 The upshot of all this is that it will be difficult (if not impossible) to know precisely how 
much political power any individual or group has.  None of this means that we cannot make any 
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41 For a more detailed discussion of the complexities of the relevant counterfactualizations, see Goldman (1974, pp. 
235-8).  
measurements, however.42  First, there is the possibility of indirect measurement.  We can look to 
other things (e.g., money, political office, group membership) as indicators of how much political 
power someone has.  Indirect measurement has its limitations, no doubt; but it is better than 
nothing.  (We can be pretty sure that a wealthy person who belongs to multiple civic 
organizations will have more power than a pauper or a hermit.)  Our prospects for measuring 
how much political power someone has improve even further if we make some simplifying 
assumptions.  The measurements become much more manageable if we assume, first, that 
everyone is concerned with the same set of outcomes and, second, that every agent has a 
determinate preference about every outcome in that set.43  With these assumptions in place, it 
becomes much easier to determine the distance between an agent’s preferences and the relevant 
outcomes.  The less distance there is, the more power she has.  
 Lack of precision in our measurements of power may actually be a good thing.  There is a 
risk of over-precision here.  We should be suspicious of claims such as “A has 17 units of power; 
B has 62; C only 3.” 44  After all, an individual’s store of power is not static.  The amount of 
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42 See Sen 1992, pp. 46-9.  Arneson makes the same point about interpersonal comparisons of welfare: “In actual 
political life under modern conditions, distributive agencies will be staggeringly ignorant of the facts that would 
have to be known in order to pinpoint what level of opportunity for welfare different persons have had.  To some 
extent it is technically unfeasible or even physically impossible to collect the needed information, and to some 
extent we do not trust governments with the authority to collect that needed information, due to worries that such 
authority will be subject to abuse.  Nonetheless, I suppose that the idea is clear in principle, and that in practice it is 
often feasible to make reliable rough-and-ready judgments to the effect that some people face very grim prospects 
for welfare compared to what others enjoy” (1989, p. 87).
43 These are both idealizations; one more so than the other.  The first assumption is not too much of a stretch: at least 
in the context of politics, most people do have preferences about (roughly) the same set of outcomes.  (Though this 
may be decreasing with the ever-diversifying sources of political news.)  The second is a bit further removed from 
reality, since we are often indifferent to many outcomes and our preference sets are often internally inconsistent.  For 
a discussion of why we make these assumptions rather than others, see Kliemt (1981, pp. 54-5).
44 Sen makes the same point about measurements of well-being: “An approach that can rank the well-being of every 
person against that of every other in a straightforward way, or one that can compare inequalities without any room 
for ambiguity or incompleteness, may well be at odds with the nature of these ideas.  Both well-being and inequality 
are broad and partly opaque concepts.  Trying to reflect them in the form of totally complete and clear-cut orderings 
can do less than justice to the nature of these concepts” (1992, p. 48).
power an agent has can change from one time to another.  As issues and preferences shift, so 
does one’s share of power.  A further reason why a lack of precision in the measurement of 
power may not be a serious problem is that, on my view of how political power ought to be 
distributed (a version of sufficientarianism), what matters is that each person have enough power, 
however much that happens to be.  We may not need to know exactly how much power someone 
has to know whether she falls above or below the relevant sufficiency threshold.  It is often clear 
enough that someone has too little power.  Imagine someone who does not speak the dominant 
language of the country in which she lives.  Even if she had the same formal rights and 
protections as everyone else, she may have all sorts of trouble in actually participating in the 
political process: she cannot follow the media coverage; when it comes time to vote, she does not 
understand most of the words on her ballot; and, since she is a member of a very small minority 
group, no politician is too interested in making her life better.  On any metric, this woman does 
not have enough political power.  It is often equally as clear that some person or group has too 
much power.45  Suppose we were to find out that every piece of legislation signed into law over a 
session of Congress was actively supported by Interest Group X.  Up to a point, this might not be 
too troubling.  (Perhaps if much of the legislation were uncontroversial, or if Interest Group X 
were simply very good at predicting which legislation had the best chance of being successful.) 
But let us suppose that the situation is a little less innocent.  Interest Group X has enough 
resources and connections to ensure that the only pieces of legislation that have a chance at 
succeeding are those that will benefit X in some way.  Most of us would object to such a 
situation, regardless whom or what X is lobbying for.  By any measure, Interest Group X has too 
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45 This claim may seem out of place from a defender of the sufficiency view – since, traditionally, such a view is not 
concerned with the gaps within distributions, nor with just how well off those at the top of the distribution are.  But 
things change when we’re dealing with a competitive good such as political power.  If someone has too much power, 
then someone else must not have enough.  More on this below.   
much political power.  Our intuition is that, in a properly-functioning system, no one should win 
all the time.  We do not need a precise measure of political power to find out that someone is 
winning all the time.  
 To sum up our discussion of the measurement of power: If we conceive of political power 
as the ability to make political outcomes conform to one’s will, we can measure how much of it 
someone has, but not very precisely.  
 I will close this chapter with a brief discussion of the competitive aspect of political 
power.  Since this idea will play a significant role in the arguments of the following chapters, it is 
worth taking some time to get clear on what it means to say that political power is a competitive 
good.  Put most simply, it means that how much power I have depends in large part upon how 
much others have.46  (This is why it is rarely helpful to say something like “A has an absolute 
power score of 17,”  without reference to how much power anyone else has.)  If I were the only 
person in the world, my power would be limited only by my own physical and mental 
limitations.  My will would determine the outcomes.  But as soon as other people enter the 
picture, their preferences and actions begin to affect my ability to bring about my preferred 
outcomes.    
  One might think that political power’s status as a competitive good entails that power is 
a constant-sum (or “zero-sum”) good.  But that is not true: a competitive good need not be a 
constant-sum good.  A good is constant sum if there is a fixed amount of it –  i.e., the overall 
amount can neither increase nor decrease.  Assuming there are only two people competing, if X’s 
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46 In this respect, political power is what Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift (2006) call a positional good.  David 
Estlund (2000, pp. 134-5) also makes the point that political power is a competitive good.  This means that if the 
power of one individual or group increases, then the power of some others must decrease; and if one’s power 
decreases, then another’s must increase.  Though, as we shall see, this does not entail that political power is a 
constant-sum good.
share of a constant-sum good increases by five, then Y’s the share of the good must decrease by 
exactly five.  What about political power?  Can someone become more powerful without anyone 
else becoming less powerful?  We often talk as though this were impossible – i.e., as though 
political power were a constant-sum good.  After all, many of the most publicized political 
events involve a fixed number of people competing for a scarce resource.  Take an election, for 
instance.  Supposing that neither candidate is the incumbent, whoever wins the election will 
likely see a dramatic increase in his power.  But corresponding to this increase will be the 
decrease in power felt by the office-holder being replaced and by the losing candidate(s).  Why 
do such cases not prove that the distribution of power is constant sum?  Because political power 
is an ability, not a resource.  (Remember the vehicle fallacy.)  Even if the resources that affect 
political power are constant sum (e.g., elected offices), political power itself may not be.  And, in 
many cases, the number of agents competing in the political sphere is not fixed: the total number 
of participants in any given decision-making process can rise or fall.
 Whether we think political power is a constant-sum good depends on whether we think 
ability itself is constant sum.  Suppose an agent – call him First – has the ability to turn on the 
lights in a room.  Now suppose another agent – call him Second – enters the room.  Second has 
all the same physical and cognitive tools that First has.  Either First or Second, if he were alone 
in the room, is clearly able to put the light switch in the On or Off position.  The issue of whether 
ability is constant sum hinges on how we answer the following question: Is either agent less able 
to turn on the lights simply because he is not alone in the room?  If yes – i.e., the presence of 
additional agents decreases the ability of each individual agent – this suggests that ability (and, 
by extension, political power) is constant sum; it suggests that the total amount of ability in the 
world can neither increase nor decrease.  But if no – i.e., each individual agent remains just as 
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able to achieve his desired result despite the presence of additional agents – this suggests that 
ability (and, by extension, political power) is not constant sum; it suggests that the total amount 
of power increases as the number of agents increases.47 
 The question is, Does the ability of an agent to do something decrease with the addition 
of other agents who have the same ability, or does each agent retain the same level of ability 
regardless of the number of similarly-abled agents present?  To answer this question, we need to 
take a closer look at the concept of ability.  I suggest that we adopt John Greco’s (2009) analysis 
of ability.48  Greco’s basic idea is that we cash out talk of ability in terms of prospects of success 
in nearby possible worlds.  An agent has the ability to achieve some result if he has a high rate of 
achieving that result in nearby possible worlds.  As Greco puts it: “S has an ability A(R/C) 
relative to environment E = Across the set of relevantly close worlds W where S is in C and in E, 
S has a high rate of success in achieving R”  (p. 22).  On this account, whether the agent (S) has 
an ability (A) obviously depends on how we specify the situation: which possible worlds (W) are 
relevantly close, what result (R) we are interested in, what the conditions (C) are, and what the 
agent’s environment (E) is like.49  And that seems right, since our willingness to attribute an 
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47 Why do I say ‘suggests’ rather than ‘entails’?  Because there is room for someone to say that each additional agent 
decreases the ability of existing agents somewhat, without saying that the total amount of power does not increase at 
all.  In other words, someone could say that each additional agent decreases the ability of the initial agent(s) to some 
degree, but  that there is still more ability overall than there was initially.
48 Greco’s analysis arises in the context of virtue epistemology, but I believe it still fits the sort of case we are talking 
about here. 
49 The reason we have to consider all of these variables is that abilities are dispositions: “to say that someone has an 
ability to achieve some result is to say both more and less than that they have a good track record with respect to 
achieving that result.  This is because abilities are dispositional properties: to say that S has the ability to achieve 
result R is to say that S has a disposition or tendency to achieve R across some range of relevantly close worlds. 
Actual track records can be the result of good luck rather than ability.  Likewise, actual track records can be the 
result of bad luck rather than lack of ability.  Again, to say that S has an ability is to say that S has a high rate of 
success across relevantly close possible worlds” (Greco, p. 22).
ability to someone does depend on the details of the situation.50  But we still need a strategy for 
filling in each of these variables in a particular case.  If we want to know what effect Second’s 
presence has on First’s ability to turn on the lights, which possible worlds do we need to look at? 
Which aspects of First’s environment are relevant?  (Does the temperature in the room matter? 
What about the location of Second relative to First?)  Greco proposes that we look to the broader 
context for guidance here – what hangs on the question, whether we should err on the side of 
generosity or stinginess in our ability-attributions, and so on.  In other words, we cannot give an 
unqualified answer to the question whether First’s ability to turn on the lights is affected by 
Second until we fill in the relevant details about the environment, the circumstances, etc.; and we 
cannot know how to fill in those details until we know why we’re interested in the question and 
how important it is for us to get the right answer.  Therefore, rather than run through all the 
permutations of the case that would yield a positive answer to our initial question – “Does 
Second’s presence affect First’s ability to turn on the lights?”  – and all of those that would yield a 
negative answer, I will sketch one of each and spell out its implications for our discussion of 
political power. 
 Let us begin with the what would make us answer yes – i.e., say that First’s ability to turn 
on the lights is not affected by Second’s presence.  How would we have to fill in the details of 
the case to make this claim true?  We have to say that Second is not a relevant part of First’s 
conditions (C) or environment (E) in all the possible worlds (W) near enough to the actual world 
to matter.  Whatever else may affect First’s rate of success in turning on the lights (e.g., the 
height of the switch, the type of switch, whether the bulb is burnt out), Second does not.  If we 
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50 As Greco puts it: “abilities in general are always relative to environments.  For example, Derek Jeter has the 
ability to hit fastballs relative to normal environments for playing baseball.  He does not have that ability relative to 
an active war zone, where he would be too distracted to focus on the ball.  In general, when we attribute an ability 
we have in mind some relevant environment, as well as relevant conditions, etc.” (Greco, p. 21).
say this, then First still has just as much ability to turn on the lights as he did before Second 
entered the picture.
 What would this commit us to in regards to political power?  If First’s ability to turn on 
the lights is not affected by Second, then political power is not a constant-sum good.51  It is not 
constant sum because we could increase the total amount of power in the world.  As the number 
of agents with power increases, so does the total amount of power.  The presence of additional 
agents may decrease the other agent’s actual influence, but that is beside the point.  We are 
concerned with ability to influence – i.e., power – not actual influence.52  
 Let us now consider what we would have to say to answer no – i.e., say that Second’s 
presence does affect First’s ability to turn on the lights.  In order to make this claim true – and 
thereby support the idea that political power is a constant-sum good – we would have to say that 
a possible world (W) in which Second interferes with First’s attempt to turn on the lights is not 
very distant.  Second does not change anything about First’s physical or cognitive tools, but he 
changes the conditions (C) or environment (E) in a way that makes it less likely that First will 
succeed at putting the light switch in the position he chooses.  If we say any of these things, we 
are saying that the presence of an additional agent makes the initial agent less able.  An agent’s 
power decreases with the introduction of every additional agent.  Regardless of what the 
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51 This is the view defended by Peter Morriss (2002, pp. 91-2), who argues that, because it is an ability, power 
cannot be constant sum.
52 This is why we cannot increase your power by making other people have the same preferences you do.  The fact 
that ten people rather than two agree with you does not make you more powerful.  Why not?  Because we have to 
counterfactualize other people’s desires to determine how powerful you are; so, it does not matter what they happen 
to want at any given time, but rather what they could want and how this would affect your ability to realize your 
preferred outcome.  (Note well: This shows that political power is not a constant-sum good; it does not show that 
political power is not a competitive good.  Political power is competitive because how much I have still depends on 
how much you have, but it is not constant-sum because we could all end up with more than we stated with.)
additional agents actually want, their preferences could conflict with those of the initial agent, 
thus frustrating his attempts to get what he wants.  
 How does this relate to political power?  If we say that each individual agent remains just 
as able to achieve his desired result despite the presence of additional agents, this suggests that 
political power is constant sum.  The total amount of power remains the same as the number of 
agents increases.          
 I will not try to settle the issue of whether political power is constant sum by defending a 
particular interpretation of the First/Second case, but I will explain why it matters.  The question 
of whether political political power is a constant-sum good matters because in subsequent 
chapters we will be looking at various claims about how political power ought to be distributed. 
Suppose one says that Smith ought to have more power than she currently does.  If power is a 
constant sum, then giving Smith more of it will necessarily involve taking that same amount of 
power from some other individual(s) or group(s).  But if political power is not constant sum, then 
it may be possible to increase Smith’s share without decreasing anyone else’s.
 I will say just one more thing about my conception of political power.  In the following 
chapters, I treat political power as a distributional good – i.e., as a good that can be distributed in 
accordance with some principle(s).  The reader might worry that there is something strange going 
on here.  We don’t usually think of political power as the sort of thing that can be (re)distributed 
in the way that, say, money can be.  Nevertheless, I think it is at least intelligible to treat political 
power as a distributional good.  For one, (re)distributing political power is no more mysterious 
than (re)distributing primary goods, welfare, or capabilities for functioning.  In this respect, then, 
my view is on par with many others.53  Secondly, political power requires various other goods – 
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53 Cf. Rawls (1971 and 2005); Dworkin (1981a and 1981b); G.A. Cohen (1989); Arneson (1989); Sen (1992).
e.g., wealth, education, access to media.  Thus, we can alter the distribution of political power by 
altering the distribution of these other goods.  To be sure, some aspects of political power are a 
matter of brute luck; how charismatic, rhetorically gifted, or physically attractive one is is (for 
the most part) beyond anyone’s control.  But the distribution of power depends in various ways 
on social institutions; because of the way the judicial system is set up, for example, a member of 
the United States Supreme Court has more political power than a federal prosecutor; the 
prosecutor has more power than a local justice of the peace; and each of these public officials has 
more power than most citizens.  So we can change the way power is distributed by changing the 
way our social institutions are structured.  
III.
We began this chapter by trying to understand what political equality is.  I argued that any 
plausible conception of political equality should be able to account for both the moral and the 
amoral dimensions of politics.  I suggested that political equality is best understood as equality of 
political power.  This led us to look more closely at political power.  I proposed that we think of 
political power as the ability to make political outcomes conform to one’s will, even in the face 
of resistance.  We thus arrived at a conception of political equality according to which two 
people are political equals insofar as they have equal ability to influence political outcomes.  
 Our discussion of political power was worthwhile not only because that notion plays a 
key role in my conception of political equality but also because we will soon be focused on the 
question of how political power ought to be distributed.  The most common answer to this 
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question is “equally.”   And it is to arguments for an equal distribution of political power that we 
now turn. 
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Chapter 2:  Arguments from Moral Equality
 

Once we have a conception of political equality in hand, we can ask whether it is an attractive 
ideal.  Political egalitarians claim that it is.  Political egalitarianism is the view that political 
power ought to be distributed equally among the members of society.  I divide arguments for 
political egalitarianism into two groups.  Arguments in the first group aim to prove that an equal 
distribution of political power is a necessary part of treating all persons as moral equals.54   Such 
arguments are the focus of this chapter.  Arguments in the second group, which are the focus of 
the next chapter, claim that political equality is a necessary condition of political legitimacy.   
 In the first section of this chapter, I will look at several statements of political 
egalitarianism, with the aim of showing that many people do in fact endorse political 
egalitarianism.  In the next section, I explain why two common objections to egalitarianism in 
general are not serious threats to political egalitarianism.  I then consider two moral-equality-
based arguments for political egalitarianism.  The first is from Harry Brighouse, the second from 
Thomas Christiano.55   I claim that these arguments do not succeed in establishing political 
equality as a moral ideal.  Eventually, in Chapter 4, I will argue that the key premises of these 
arguments –  (1) the fact that all persons are of equal moral worth and (2) the claim that this fact 
has distributive consequences in the political sphere – actually support a non-egalitarian 
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54 As subsequent chapters will show, all the arguments for political egalitarianism or sufficientarianism that we will 
consider are arguments from moral equality in one form or another.  The arguments in this chapter are simply the 
most direct; they try to infer political egalitarianism directly from the demand that we treat all persons as persons of 
equal moral worth.  The arguments in Chapter 3 each have at least one intermediary step; they appeal to various 
values at stake in the political arena, the advancement of which affect people’s moral interests.
55 For related arguments for political egalitarianism, see Michael Walzer (1986) and John Rawls (2005, pp. 325-31).  
I focus on the arguments of Brighouse and Christiano because they are the most fully developed ones I have found.   
distributive ideal for political power.  So I agree with Brighouse and Christiano that we ought to 
treat each citizen as a person of equal moral worth, but I disagree with them on the question of 
whether maintaining an equal distribution of political power is the only way to fulfill this 
obligation.  
I.
Before I begin criticizing political egalitarianism, I want to show that I am not attacking a straw 
man.  I have formulated political egalitarianism as the thesis that political power – understood as 
the ability to make political outcomes conform to one’s will, even in the face of resistance – 
ought to be distributed equally.  In this section, I will show that, although none of them describe 
the distributive ideal for political power in precisely these terms, all of the theorists that figure 
prominently in what follows – Harry Brighouse, Joshua Cohen, Thomas Christiano, Jürgen 
Habermas, and Robert Dahl – do in fact accept this thesis.  I will show that each conceives of 
political power as I do, and that each argues for the equal distribution of political power so 
conceived.  
 Brighouse (1996) argues for what he calls equal availability of political influence.  This 
ideal is realized, “when equal means to affect the collective conditions of their shared social life 
are available to each citizen”  (p. 119).  I believe that it is fair to read this as a statement of 
political egalitarianism for several reasons.  First, power is an ability.  If an agent is able to do 
something, then it is necessarily available to him, in the sense that he has the option to do it. 
Thus, the sense of ‘ability’ that plays a role in my conception of political power encompasses the 
sense of ‘availability’ that plays a role in Brighouse’s statement.  Second, Brighouse’s ‘collective 
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conditions of…shared social life’ is just another way of describing what I call political outcomes. 
Third, Brighouse later unpacks his ideal as calling for everyone to have an equal opportunity “to 
get things to go their way,”  (p. 124) which conveys the same idea as my talk of the ability to 
make outcomes conform to one’s will.  Therefore, Brighouse’s equal availability of political 
influence is equivalent to what I call an equal distribution of political power.  And he is a 
political egalitarian because he holds that we ought to bring about such a distribution: “The 
obligation of equal respect towards others yields an obligation to ensure that social institutions 
embody a presumption of equal respect for all citizens.  The claim is that making available equal 
political influence is the proper institutionalisation of that presumption” (p. 124).  
 Joshua Cohen’s (2009) distributive ideal is almost identical to Brighouse’s.  The only 
difference between Cohen’s ideal – equal opportunity for political influence – and Brighouse’s is 
the term ‘opportunity’ in place of ‘availability’.  As far as I can tell, this is merely a 
terminological difference, not a substantive one.56  Thus, if Brighouse is a political egalitarian, 
then so is Cohen.  But even if I am wrong about Brighouse, it is clear that Cohen endorses 
political egalitarianism.  He claims that an equal distribution of power is one of the necessary 
conditions of political legitimacy: 
Democratic collective choice––institutionalizing the tie between deliberative 
justification and the exercise of public power––must ensure equal rights of 
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56 Brighouse and Cohen are both working with Rawls’s conception of equality of opportunity, according to which X 
and Y have equal opportunity for Z if and only if, assuming they are equally skilled and equally hard-working, they 
have the same chances of getting Z. As Rawls puts it: “those who are at the same level of talent and ability, and have 
the same willingness to use them, should have the same prospects of success” (Rawls 1971, p. 73).  You can see this 
in Brighouse when he unpacks ‘equal availability of political influence’ in terms of assigning probabilities for 
success (1996, p. 119).  And Cohen explicitly acknowledges his debt to Rawls on this score: “For the sake of 
discussion here, I rely on Rawls’s conception of equal opportunity” (2009, p. 272).  Thus, I see no reason why 
Brighouse would not accept the following statement about the distributive ideal for political power from Cohen: 
“[It] condemns inequalities in the opportunities for holding office and influencing political decisions (by influencing 
the outcomes of elections, the positions of candidates, and the conduct of inter-election legislative and 
administrative decision making)” (ibid., p.271).  
participation, including rights of voting, association, and political expression, with 
a strong presumption against restrictions on the content or viewpoint of 
expressions; rights to hold office; a strong presumption in favor of equally 
weighted votes; and a more general requirement of equal opportunities for 
effective influence.  This last requirement condemns inequalities in opportunities 
for office holding and political influence that result from the design of 
arrangements of collective decision making. (2009, p. 170)
In other words, our institutions for making collective decisions ought to be structured in a way 
that gives everyone equal ability to influence the outcomes of the collective decision-making 
process. 
 It is not so easy to prove that Habermas is a political egalitarian.  Nevertheless, I am 
confident that he is.  For starters, Habermas’s conception of power – and, by extension, political 
equality – is very similar to my own.  He defines ‘social power’ as “a measure for the 
possibilities an actor has in social relationships to assert his own will and interests, even against 
the opposition of others”  (1996, p. 175).  Given my broad conception of political outcomes (see 
pp. 23-6 above), this definition of social power is equivalent to my definition of political power. 
Of course, this is merely a definition of power, not a statement about how it ought to be 
distributed.  My confidence that Habermas endorses an equal distribution of political power 
comes from his views on legitimacy.  He says that legitimacy requires a rational deliberative 
process: “the only law that counts as legitimate is one that could be rationally accepted by all 
citizens in a discursive process of opinion- and will-formation”  (1996, p. 135).  He then says that 
such a process is possible only when all participants are equally able to participate: 
[A]ll political power derives from the communicative power of citizens. The 
exercise of public authority is oriented and legitimated by the laws citizens give 
themselves in a discursively structured opinion- and will-formation.…[T]his 
practice…owes its legitimating force to a democratic procedure intended to 
guarantee a rational treatment of political questions. The rational acceptability of 
results achieved in conformity with procedure follows from the 
institutionalization of interlinked forms of communication that, ideally speaking, 
ensure that all relevant questions, issues, and contributions are brought up and 
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processed in discourses and negotiations on the basis of the best available 
information and arguments. (ibid., p. 170, emphasis in the original)
  
So legitimacy requires an equal distribution of political power.  Thus, like Brighouse and Cohen, 
Habermas is a political egalitarian.
 We now turn to Christiano.  He does not use the term ‘political power,’ but several  things 
he does say suggest that he conceives of the ability to make political outcomes conform to one’s 
will as a distributive good; for instance, “We can…distribute resources for participating in the 
collective decision-making that shapes [our] common world.  We can distribute votes, resources 
for bargaining, coalition building, and deliberation”  (2008, p. 85).  I do not see any significant 
difference between ‘resources for participating in collective decision-making’ and what I call 
political power.  So it looks like we can attribute my conception of political power to Christiano. 
From there it is a short step to showing that Christiano endorses political egalitarianism, since he 
clearly holds that the resources for participating in collective decision-making ought to be 
distributed equally: 
[E]ach person’s judgment about how society ought to be organized must be taken 
seriously.  If someone’s judgment is not permitted a say in society, then [his 
interests] will be set back.  Anyone who is excluded from participation in 
discussion and decision-making can see that his or her interests are not being 
taken seriously and may legitimately infer that his or her moral standing is being 
treated as less than that of others.  So justice…demands an equal say for each. 
(ibid., p. 88)
  
Thus, I think it is fair to apply the label ‘political egalitarian’ to Christiano.
 Finally, let us consider Dahl.  The best indication of his understanding of political 
equality comes in his discussion of obstacles to it.  The largest obstacle to political equality, he 
says, is the fact that “[p]olitical resources…are always and everywhere distributed 
unequally”  (2006, p. 51).  Political resources are “any means that a person can use to influence 
the behavior of other persons”  (ibid.).  At first glance, this may not sound like a definition of 
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political power, but it will if one recalls our discussion of the proper object of exercises of 
political power (see pp. 20-3 above).  Dahl claims that exercises of political power, strictly 
speaking, must affect the behavior of some agent(s).  I disagree with him on this point, claiming 
that some paradigmatic exercises of political power do not affect anyone’s behavior.  But I agree 
with Dahl that, in most cases, political power does affect behavior.  So, Dahl’s definition of a 
political resource – “any means…to influence the behavior of other persons”  – captures (almost) 
all of my definition of political power – “the ability to make political outcomes conform to one’s 
will.”   At the very least, the two definitions are (almost) extensionally equivalent.57  Therefore, 
we can say that Dahl shares my conception of political power.  With that settled, it is easy to 
show that Dahl is a political egalitarian.  There is clear textual evidence that he supports an equal 
distribution of political power: “[O]pportunities to exercise power over the state, or more 
concretely over the decisions of the government of the state…ought to be distributed equally 
among all citizens” (1989, p. 325).  In short, Dahl is a political egalitarian.
 To sum up: The theorists whose arguments we will be looking at in this chapter and the 
next do actually defend political egalitarianism.  I am not attacking a straw man.
II.
Do we really need to bother with arguments for political egalitarianism?  After all, there are some 
well-known objections to egalitarianism in general; namely, the conflict between equality and 
responsibility, and the leveling down objection.  Many anti-egalitarians take these as conclusive 
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57 The only place where Dahl’s definition of a political resource and my definition of political power come apart are 
cases in which no behavior is affected.  Since my arguments against Dahl’s political egalitarianism do not rely on 
any cases of this sort, we can safely ignore this difference from here on.
proof that egalitarianism of any sort is false.  This is a mistake, however.  Making room for 
responsibility and avoiding the leveling down objection are serious challenges for some forms of 
egalitarianism, but not for political egalitarianism.  
 Let us begin with the conflict between equality and responsibility.  In a free society, some 
people will quickly become worse off than others because of choices they freely and 
intentionally make, choices for which they should be held responsible.  If we want to maintain an 
equal distribution of a particular good, we will often have to prevent people from bearing the full 
burden of their choices.  Take wealth, for instance. Suppose that today we achieve perfect 
equality of wealth: every adult citizen has a net worth of exactly $1 million.  Now suppose that 
tomorrow Jones makes some risky investments that play out well for him; he’s then worth $2 
million.  Smith, on the other hand, chooses to drive drunk tomorrow night.  He wraps his car 
around a tree; his hospital bills nearly wipe him out financially – his net worth is down to $300. 
Should we step in and restore economic equality between Jones and Smith?  Or should we allow 
both of them to live with the consequences of their actions?  The values of equality and 
responsibility pull in opposite directions here.
 I will not spend much time on this conflict.  To begin with, it has been discussed 
extensively elsewhere.58  And, more importantly, the conflict between equality and responsibility 
is mitigated in the case of political egalitarianism by the fact that power is an ability.  Political 
egalitarianism calls for an equal distribution of political power, which is (on my account) the 
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58  See the debates surrounding “luck egalitarianism,” which limits the scope of egalitarian concern to those 
equalities which are the result of luck.  The primary motivation behind luck egalitarianism is to reconcile the conflict 
between equality and personal responsibility.  The central idea of luck egalitarianism is that it is bad for some 
people, through no fault of their own, to be worse off than others.  In other words, inequalities may be morally 
acceptable if those who are worse off did something to deserve their lesser lot.  For some classic statements of this 
view, see Dworkin (1981b), Arneson (1989), and G.A. Cohen (1989).  For an extended criticism of luck 
egalitarianism, see Anderson (1999).
ability to influence political outcomes.  And preserving an equal distribution of an ability usually 
requires less intervention than does preserving an equal distribution of some other good.59 
Suppose I never vote and you always vote.  Assuming we are equal in every other way, you will 
have had – and, if our habits do not change, will continue to have – more influence than me. 
Since my relative lack of influence is a result of a decision I freely and intentionally made, I am 
responsible for it.  If our society takes responsibility seriously, it will allow this difference in 
actual influence to stand.  And our society could do this and still be committed to political 
equality.  The central claim of political egalitarianism – that everyone ought to have equal ability 
to influence the political process – does not say anything about inequalities of actual influence. 
In the imagined scenario, you and I remain political equals.  I have just as much ability as you to 
influence the political process.  If I were to decide to exercise my ability to cast a ballot, we 
would then have the same amount of actual influence as well.  Thus, a commitment to 
maintaining an equal distribution of political power need not prevent us from holding people 
responsible for the decisions they make.  
 Now for the leveling down objection.  One way to achieve greater equality is to make 
those who are best off somewhat less well off.  This brings them closer to those at the bottom end 
of the distribution, thus making the overall distribution more equal.  This is “leveling down” 
because we make some (much) worse off and no one better off.60  It looks like an egalitarian has 
to admit that there is something good about the more equal distribution and that, at least in some 
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59 It is not always true that it is easier to preserve an equal distribution of ability than of some other good.  If 
someone becomes cognitively disabled, for example, it could require a tremendous amount of intervention to bring 
him back up to the same level of ability that his healthy neighbors have.  We will return to the issue of disability in 
this context later in this chapter.
60 For more precise formulations of this objection, see Parfit (2002) and Temkin (1993, Ch. 9).
cases, we ought to level down.  But this strikes most of us as absurd: How can there be anything 
good about making some worse off while making none better off?61  
 This objection does not have much force against political egalitarianism, however.62  This 
is due to the competitive nature of political power.  Because political power is a competitive 
good, decreasing the share of some entails increasing the share of others.  Hence, strictly 
speaking, leveling down with respect to political power is impossible: one cannot make some 
worse off without thereby making others better off.63  
 Note well: the political egalitarian’s ability to avoid the leveling down objection is 
contingent on a couple of assumptions.  First, we must assume that power is being distributed 
among a fixed number of agents.  If this were not the case, then we could level down in the 
following sense: we could reduce the power of every existing agent by giving it to some “new” 
agent.  Second, we must assume that political power is roughly, if not exactly, constant sum.64 
Without this assumption, it would be possible to level down with respect to political power 
simply by reducing the total amount of power.  If power is constant sum, however, the power we 
take away from someone must go to someone else; it does not disappear. 
   
 46

61 The sense of absurdity here is not universal.  Temkin (1993) bites the bullet on leveling down; he says that there is 
something good about the leveled-down distribution – namely, it’s more equal.  And Brighouse (1996) endorses 
leveling down in the sphere of resources if that is the only way to achieve equality in the sphere of political power.   
62 Many egalitarians insist that they can avoid the leveling down objection.  They argue that once we understand the 
underlying commitments of egalitarianism we will see that there is nothing good about increasing equality by 
leveling down. Paula Casal (2007) explores several interesting responses along these lines (pp. 299, 308-9, 323-4). 
For Christiano’s response to the leveling down objection, see Christiano (2008, pp. 32-42).  
63  Brighouse and Swift (2006) make the same point about all competitive goods.  They argue that egalitarians, 
prioritarians, and sufficientarians should all support leveling down (at least to some extent) with respect to such 
goods.
64 Recall that a good is constant sum insofar as the total amount of it cannot be increased or decreased.  For a fuller 
discussion of constant-sum goods, see pp. 34-9 above.
III.
With the worries about responsibility and leveling down behind us, we can now turn to 
arguments for political egalitarianism. 
 The first argument for political egalitarianism that we will consider comes from Harry 
Brighouse (1996).  The structure of his argument is simple: we ought to express equal respect to 
all persons; expressing equal respect requires an equal distribution of political power; therefore, 
we ought to distribute political power equally among all persons.  Here is a more detailed 
reconstruction:
1.  Each person is of equal moral worth.
2.  We ought to treat persons of equal moral worth with equal concern and respect.
3.  A necessary part of being treated with equal concern and respect is having an equal 
opportunity to shape the world in which one lives.  (In other words, one cannot be 
treated with equal concern and respect unless one has an equal share of political power.)
4.  How much political power anyone has depends on how political institutions are 
structured. 
 
5.  Therefore, we ought to structure our political institutions in a way that guarantees each 
person an equal share of political power.65 
There’s the argument.  I think it is unsound.  But before I explain why I think this, let us look 
briefly at each step.   
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65 In Brighouse’s own words: “Making available to others equal influence over design of the institutions and the 
decisions made through them gives them as full an opportunity as everyone else has…to get things to go their way…
The obligation of equal respect towards others yields an obligation to ensure that social institutions embody a 
presumption of equal respect for all citizens…[M]aking available equal political influence is the proper 
institutionalisation of that presumption” (1996, p. 124).  
 I have no objection to the first premise – the presumption of equal moral worth.  There is 
no good reason to think that (most of) the people we live alongside are any more or less valuable 
than anyone else.  
 Nor do I question Brighouse’s second premise – the claim that we ought to treat moral 
equals with equal concern and respect.  This principle is abstract enough to be agreed upon by 
people who disagree on nearly everything else.
 The controversy begins with the third premise – the claim that having an equal share of 
political power is a necessary condition of being treated with equal concern and respect.  In 
defense of this claim, Brighouse says:    
The argument for [political egalitarianism] is that guaranteeing that equal 
influence will be available to them over our collective circumstances is a requisite 
of expressing respect for our fellow citizens.  Consider the ways in which equal 
respect is expressed within some affective associations; for example, in a group of 
friends.  We express equal respect in such contexts by consulting all who wish to 
assert their preferences in making decisions about where to go for dinner or which 
movie to see.  If we fail to consult one member of the group, or, having consulted 
her, fail to take her preferences into account when making the decision, that is 
usually a sign of relative disrespect.  Systematically giving one friend’s input 
more or less weight than the others, or giving them more or less opportunity to get 
themselves heard, would similarly count as expressing unequal respect. (p. 123)  
The underlying idea seems to be that each of us should have equal influence over collective 
decisions because we are all equally important and equally affected by the collective decisions 
our society makes.  What is controversial about this?  Brighouse assumes that all of the reasons 
why a society might allow someone to have less than equal political power are nefarious.  But, as 
I will soon argue, there are innocuous reasons for designing our political institutions in a way 
that gives some people more power than others.  
 Moving on to the fourth premise – the claim that the political institutions of one’s society 
affect how much political power one has.  Like the first two, it’s hard to dispute.  Political 
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institutions are the primary means by which we interact with our fellow citizens as citizens; so, 
clearly, how much political power anyone has depends on how political institutions are 
structured.    
 Since the argument is valid, its soundness turns on the truth or falsity of its premises.  I 
maintain that the third premise is false.  Brighouse claims that, in a large, complex political 
community, an equal share of political power is a necessary condition of being treated with equal 
concern and respect.  I will now make the case that someone can be treated with equal concern 
and respect even if he does not have an equal share of political power.   
 There are many reasons why a society might allow someone to have a less-than-equal 
share of political power.  Some of these obviously express a lack of concern and respect; for 
example, not allowing a person to vote simply because of her gender.  This is not true of all such 
reasons, however.  Suppose we deprived all immigrants (even those who became naturalized 
citizens) of an equal share of political power.  Immigrants can do everything native citizens can, 
except hold certain public offices, say.  We justify this on the grounds that immigrants may have 
residual loyalties to their home countries.66  We acknowledge that everyone (immigrants and 
native citizens alike) are owed equal concern and respect, but we say that, with an eye toward a 
potential threat to stability, we are not going to allow immigrants to have the same amount of 
power as native citizens.
 49

66 This is not as far-fetched a concern as it may initially appear.  Consider the “oath of allegiance” that all naturalized 
citizens of the United States must take: “I hereby declare, on oath, that I absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure 
all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty of whom or which I have heretofore 
been a subject or citizen; that I will support and defend the Constitution and laws of the United States of America 
against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I will bear arms 
on behalf of the United States when required by the law; that I will perform noncombatant service in the Armed 
Forces of the United States when required by the law; that I will perform work of national importance under civilian 
direction when required by the law; and that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose 
of evasion; so help me God.” 
 Is such a scheme consistent with treating everyone with equal concern and respect?  I 
believe it is.  According to Brighouse, we ought to ensure that everyone has an equal share of 
political power because it “gives them as full an opportunity as everyone else has…to get things 
to go their way” (p. 124).  And we can give everyone as full an opportunity as everyone else to 
get things to go their way even if some have more power than others.  Suppose we tell everyone 
that, even if others have more influence over the process than they do, we will make sure that 
outcomes “go their way”  an equal amount of the time.  That is, we will make sure that their 
interests are advanced to the same degree as everyone else’s.  Would we be treating these people 
with a lack of concern and respect?  I don’t think so.  I suspect that most people are less sensitive 
to inequalities in the political decision-making process than Brighouse assumes.  Even among 
those who are very concerned with political outcomes (the effects of political decisions on 
themselves and those they care about), most are not worried about the process that leads up to 
those outcomes.  This opens up the possibility of tradeoffs or compensation for a lack of political 
power.  Imagine that Jones was not born in the U.S. but became a naturalized citizen many years 
ago.  Assume that he has less political power than everyone else simply because he is not eligible 
to become president of the country (due to the constitutional requirement that the president be a 
native citizen).  Now imagine that rather than try to equalize Jones’s political power by changing 
the constitution, we compensate him by giving him special tax breaks and exempting him from 
some public-service duties that native citizens must fulfill.  Are we treating Jones with less-than-
equal concern and respect?  No.  We recognize that he lacks some of the opportunities available 
to many of his fellow citizens, and we try to offset this disadvantage with some other benefits. 
Thus, the case of Jones appears to be a counter-example to Brighouse’s claim that ensuring 
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someone has equal political power is a necessary condition for treating him as a person of equal 
moral worth.  
  How would Brighouse respond to this case?  He would likely deny that it is a counter-
example to his argument for political egalitarianism by insisting that we are not treating Jones 
with equal concern and respect.  There are a couple of reasons why he might say this.  First, 
Brighouse could say that political decision-making is a context of pure procedural justice – i.e., 
one in which there is no procedure-independent standard for what a just outcome looks like.67  If 
there is no procedure-independent standard for what equal concern and respect amounts to, then 
trying to treat someone with equal concern and respect without giving him an equal say in the 
process would be a non-starter.  I doubt that this is Brighouse’s reason for insisting that Jones is 
not treated with equal concern and respect, however.  If it were, the scope of his thesis would be 
limited to only those political decisions that are cases of pure procedural justice.  And I assume 
that Brighouse wants his political egalitarianism to apply to (at least some) cases that are not of 
this sort – i.e., cases in which we do know what a just outcome would look like.  Take a law that 
permits slavery, for example.  Surely Brighouse wants to be able to say that it would be unjust if 
this law were enacted (no matter the procedure that led up to its enactment), and that everyone 
ought to have an equal share of power in the decision-making process surrounding the law.  If he 
does want to say both of these things, then he cannot say that political egalitarianism applies only 
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67 Rawls explains the concept of pure procedural justice as follows: “[Pure procedural justice] contrasts with perfect 
procedural justice, where there is an independent and already given criterion of what is just (or fair), and the 
procedure can be designed to insure an outcome satisfying that criterion.  This is illustrated by the familiar example 
of dividing a cake: if equal division is accepted as fair, then we simply require the person who cuts the cake to have 
the last piece.…The essential feature of pure procedural justice, as opposed to perfect procedural justice, is that what 
is just is specified by the outcome of the procedure, whatever it may be.  There is no prior and already given 
criterion against which the outcome is to be checked” (2005, pp. 72-3).
to cases of pure procedural justice.  Thus, he cannot appeal to the latter claim as a way of 
avoiding the apparent counter-example involving Jones.      
 The second reason why Brighouse might deny that Jones is treated with equal concern 
and respect in the above case is that he holds that there is something inherently disrespectful 
about allowing Jones to have less than equal political power, even if someone else advances 
Jones’ interests as well as (if not better) than he himself could.  The most plausible explanation 
of why this is so would involve an appeal to the value of autonomy.  Allowing Jones to have less 
political power than his native born neighbors shows a lack of respect for Jones’s status as an 
autonomous agent. 
 We cannot evaluate this proposal until we get clear on what ‘autonomy’ means here.  A 
person is autonomous insofar as he lives by his own lights.  More precisely, a person is 
autonomous insofar as he is (to a significant degree) author of his own life and is responsive to 
the reasons provided by his situation.68  To be autonomous, one must be able to choose rationally 
between a range of valuable options.  
 Why this relatively demanding notion of autonomy rather than the more common one of 
“acting in accordance with one’s own will”?  Because the former, unlike the latter, offers a 
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68 This conception of autonomy is adapted from Raz (1986 and 1994) and Sher (1997).  Raz: “An autonomous agent 
or person is one who has the capacity to be or to become significantly autonomous at least to a minimal degree. 
Significant autonomy is a matter of degree.  A person may be more or less autonomous.  (Significantly) autonomous 
persons are those who can shape their life and determine its course.  They are not merely rational agents who can 
choose between options after evaluating relevant information, but agents who can in addition adopt personal 
projects, develop relationships, and accept commitments to causes, through which their personal integrity and sense 
of dignity and self-respect are made concrete.  In a word, significantly autonomous agents are part creators of their 
own moral world.  Persons who are part creators of their own moral world have a commitment to projects, 
relationships, and causes which affects the kind of life that is for them worth living.  It is not that they may not 
sacrifice projects or causes they are committed to for good reasons, but rather that there are certain kinds of actions 
vis-à-vis their commitments which amount to betrayal, compromise their integrity, sacrifice their self-respect, and in 
extreme cases render their life, i.e. the life they made for themselves, worthless or even impossible (in a moral 
sense)” (154-5).  Sher: “[O]n the reading I favor, autonomous agents are self-directing in the…sense of exercising 
their will on the basis of good reasons.…[I]n this context ‘self-directed activity’ means ‘activity that is motivated by 
an agent’s appreciation of reasons provided by his situation” (48).
straightforward explanation of why autonomy is valuable.  If autonomy were simply acting in 
accordance with one’s own will, it is not obvious why being autonomous would be good thing. 
People’s wills can (and often do) lead them to do bad things.  On the view of autonomy I am 
adopting, autonomy is valuable if practical rationality itself is valuable.  If it is good for people 
to act for good reasons (as opposed to bad ones or none at all), then it is good for people to be 
autonomous.69   
 (Let me head off an obvious worry about taking reason-responsiveness to be a necessary 
element of autonomy.  The worry is that this makes autonomy a rare commodity.  Since it 
requires us to respond rationally to some very complex situations, autonomy seems to require 
knowledge of all sorts of moral and nonmoral factors that we are often ignorant of.  Suppose I 
have $20 to spend as I choose.  Now suppose that even though I ought, all things considered, to 
donate it to charity, I spend it all at the movies instead.  Intuitively, I still act autonomously 
despite the fact that I did not respond to the reasons in the best way possible.  The worry is that 
my view of autonomy must deny the intuitively plausible claim that an agent can be autonomous 
even if he falls (far) short of perfect rationality.  But this worry is misplaced.  First of all, 
autonomy does not require perfect rationality.  It requires one to respond to sufficiently strong 
reasons, not necessarily the strongest ones.70  Suppose I ought, all things considered, to prepare 
for my lecture, but I really want to go for a walk instead.  Assuming my desire to go for a walk is 
strong enough and the consequences of being poorly prepared for my lecture are not too serious, 
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69 Sher puts the point this way:”[I]f autonomy is reasoned self-direction – if it consists precisely in recognizing and 
allowing oneself to be guided by rational considerations – then its…value is essentially that of (practical) rationality 
itself” (1997, p. 50).  Raz puts the point in terms of what makes an autonomous life valuable: “[A]utonomy is 
valuable only if one steers a course for one’s life through significant choices among diverse and valuable options. 
The underlying idea is that autonomous people had a variety of incompatible opportunities available to them which 
would have enabled them to develop their lives in different directions.  Their lives are what they are because of the 
choices made in situations where they were free to go various different ways” (1994, p. 119).  
70 See Sher (1997, pp. 53-5).
I could autonomously choose to go for the walk.  Even though the reasons to prepare for the 
lecture are stronger, the reasons provided by my desire to walk are real reasons nonetheless. 
Moreover, many of the reasons an autonomous agent must respond to are based in the agent’s 
own desires, talents, goals, etc.  Hence, unless the agent is unaware of even these factors, he will 
likely be able to meet the standard of rationality that autonomous action requires.)
 Now that we have a better sense of what an appeal to the value of autonomy involves, 
let’s return to the proposal that there is something inherently disrespectful about allowing 
someone to have less than equal political power, even if someone else advances that person’s 
interests as well as or better than he himself could.  Since we are interested in the connection 
between one’s share of political power and one’s ability to live autonomously, we can ignore for 
now the complications that arise from someone else advancing your interests for you and focus 
solely on the proposal that one’s having a less than equal share of political power is necessarily 
morally objectionable because it would violate one’s autonomy.  I do not find this proposal 
plausible.  I do not see why the fact that Abe has less political power than Bill entails that Abe’s 
autonomy is not being respected.  Depending on how we fill out the example, Abe’s ability to 
live by his own lights – understood as being the author of his own life and being responsive to 
the reasons provided by his situation – might not be limited in any objectionable way by Bill 
having a larger share of power.  Let’s fill out the example this way: Abe is the owner of a 
relatively successful small business (he is safely in the upper middle-class); Bill is the owner of 
a multi-national corporation and has a net worth of over a billion dollars.  The laws of their 
society do not engage in redistributive taxation for the purpose of equalizing political power, so 
Bill has more power than Abe because he has more money than Abe.  I see no reason to think 
that Abe’s society is not respecting his autonomy.  Abe is still able to pursue his projects and 
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respond to reasons.  True, there is no guarantee that he will be successful in all, or any, of his 
projects.71  But autonomy does not require that one achieve one’s goals; it merely requires that 
one is able to pursue them.  Thus, the fact that Bill has much more political power than Abe does 
not entail that Abe is being treated as something less than an autonomous agent.  If this is right, 
then an appeal to the value of autonomy cannot explain why respecting someone’s equal moral 
worth requires ensuring that she has an equal share of political power. 
   Brighouse would likely concede that things could happen that way, but he would also 
note that they could just as easily go a different way.  And it is the latter possibility – the 
possibility that Abe’s autonomy is restricted to a significant degree by Bill’s greater share of 
power – that we must protect against.  Insofar as we can control the distribution of political 
power, we should do whatever we can to make sure that it does not increase the risk of violations 
of autonomy.  We know that an unequal distribution of power is at least a potential threat to 
autonomy, so we commit to political equality as a prophylactic measure.  
 The problem with this line of argument, however, is that there is no reason to assume that 
an equal distribution of political power is the most effective available defense against violations 
of autonomy.  I will argue below that there are cases in which equalizing the distribution of 
political power would actually lead to violations of autonomy.  Since some people have good 
reasons to not be involved in politics, allowing inequalities in political power could actually lead 
to greater autonomy for everyone involved.  If this is right, then it would be a mistake to insist on 
an equal distribution of political power as a means of protecting autonomy.
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71 The same is true of Bill as well.  The fact that Bill has a lot more power than almost everyone else does not 
guarantee that he will always get what he wants, or even that he will get what he wants more often than Abe will. 
That depends on how well or poorly his preferences align with the preferences of the other political agents around 
him.
 But there is another way in which autonomy could factor into the explanation of why 
moral equality entails a demand for political equality.  One could say that Abe’s autonomy is 
restricted – and thus that he is not being treated as a moral equal – because he is (likely to be) 
oppressed by his lack of power.  His relative lack of political power makes him subject to the 
wills of others to an unacceptable degree.  Consider Elizabeth Anderson’s (1999) theory of 
“democratic equality.”   The starting point of the theory is that all citizens are persons of equal 
moral worth.  Anderson claims that since we are all moral equals, we ought to abolish oppressive 
social relationships.  We ought to seek a society in which all citizens stand in relations of 
equality to each other.  What is it to stand in relations of equality to others?  It means that one is 
autonomous – i.e., able to live by one’s own lights.72  So the proposal is that Abe’s lack of 
political power (relative to Bill) restricts Abe’s autonomy because it causes him to relate to some 
of his fellow citizens (namely, Bill) in ways that involve oppression.  
 I do not find this proposal convincing.  There is no (obvious) oppression in Abe’s relation 
to Bill.  There need not be any more oppression  (domination, exploitation, etc.) between Bill and 
Abe than there is between two people with the same amount of political power.  Could be, but 
need not be.  Remember: even though Abe does not have as much power as Bill, he still has quite 
a bit – enough, in fact, to make a non-trivial difference in the political process.  If Abe wants to 
put all his available resources into getting a particular candidate elected or a specific ballot 
initiative approved, he could play a large role in getting those things done.  True, Bill could 
spend even more money on the other side of the issue and thereby make Abe’s task very difficult. 
But, unless there is a direct connection between money and outcomes (i.e., unless the system is 
so corrupt that you can literally buy any outcome you want), Abe need not submit to Bill’s will. 
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72 “Equals are not dominated by others; they do not live at the mercy of others’ wills.  This means that they govern 
their lives by their own will, which is freedom” (Anderson 1999, p. 315). 
Sometimes Abe will lose, of course, but this does not prevent him from standing in a relation of 
equality to his fellow citizens (including Bill).  Abe certainly seems to meet Anderson’s criterion 
for autonomy.  He does not live at the mercy of others’ wills any more than a moderately wealthy 
person in the United States does today, and I doubt that many such people are oppressed by their 
lack of political power.  Thus, even though he does not have an equal share of political power, 
Abe’s autonomy is not limited to an objectionable degree.
 The upshot is that, absent an account of why a lack of political power necessarily violates 
one’s autonomy, Brighouse’s argument for political egalitarianism is incomplete at best.  We still 
have not found an explanation of why moral equality entails a demand for political equality.
 Now, I do not want to place too much emphasis on counter-examples such as the case of 
Jones and that of Abe and Bill.  Talk of equal concern respect is vague, as is talk of being treated 
as an autonomous agent.  Absent some further specification of what we mean by “equal concern 
and respect”  or “living by one’s own lights (to a significant degree),”  there is no principled way 
to adjudicate between conflicting intuitions.  Thus, in the remainder of the chapter I will focus on 
an argument for political egalitarianism that spells out these concepts with more precision.  This 
increased precision does not help the political egalitarian’s cause, however.  I hope to show that, 
far from being entailed by the demand that we treat people with equal concern and respect, 
political egalitarianism will often be inconsistent with this demand. 
IV.
In our search for a successful argument for political egalitarianism, the work of Thomas 
Christiano is an obvious place to look.  To begin with, Christiano is clearly a political egalitarian: 
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“No political society can rightly claim to advance the interests of its members without giving 
them a say in how it is organized.  And no political society can justly claim to advance the 
interests of its citizens equally without giving each citizen an equal say in the shaping of its 
institutions”  (2008, p. 12).  Moreover, he agrees with Brighouse that an equal share of political 
power is owed to everyone simply by virtue of their status as persons of equal moral worth.  But 
Christiano’s argument for this claim is slightly different than Brighouse’s.  Christiano begins by 
presenting the principle of equal advancement of interests as a basic principle of justice, and he 
then argues that the only way to advance everyone’s interests equally is to give each an equal 
share of political power. 
 There are two ways of understanding the relationship between Christiano’s argument and 
Brighouse’s.  The first is to see Christiano’s equal-advancement-of-interests view as an 
alternative to Brighouse’s equal-concern-and-respect view.  The second is to read Christiano as 
giving a fuller explanation of what equal concern and respect amounts to.  I prefer the second 
interpretation – i.e., reading Christiano’s view as a more complete version of an equal-concern-
and-respect view.  I prefer this reading because I think it allows us to build the strongest possible 
case for political egalitarianism.  Brighouse’s argument is incomplete because it does not include 
an account of what it means to treat someone with equal concern and respect.  By using 
Christiano’s account to fill in that gap, we make the overall argument for political egalitarianism 
more compelling.  I still do not find it compelling enough, of course.  But before I explain why 
not, we need to look at the argument itself.
 Here is my reconstruction of Christiano’s argument for political egalitarianism:
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1. Justice requires that the interests of all persons be advanced equally.73
2. Justice must not only be done, it must be seen to be done. (Call this the publicity 
requirement.)
3. Therefore, justice requires not only that everyone’s interests be advanced equally, but that 
this be done in a way that everyone can see.
4. But there is pervasive disagreement about what people’s interests are, and about how to 
advance them through our political institutions.  (In other words, all views about the 
substantive requirements of justice are controversial.)
5. Given such disagreement, the only principle that everyone could see to be advancing their 
interests equally – and thus the only one that satisfies the publicity requirement – is the 
principle that everyone ought to have an equal share of political power. 
6. Therefore, justice requires an equal distribution of political power.74
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73 Christiano assumes that all persons (or at least all adult citizens)  have equal stakes in the political decision-making 
process, that everyone’s interests are affected to the same degree by the outcomes of the political process. 
Christiano puts this in terms of the fact that we “share a common world.”  He describes a common world as “a set of 
circumstances among a group of persons in which the fundamental interests of each person are implicated in how 
that world is structured in a multitude of ways.  It is a world in which the fulfillment of all or nearly all of the 
fundamental interests of each person are connected with the fulfillment of all or nearly all the fundamental interests 
of every other person.” (2008, p. 80).  Interestingly, Brighouse and Fleurbaey (2010) seem to miss this point.  They 
present their “proportionality principle” – according to which an agent’s share of political power should be 
proportional to his stakes in the political process –  as a competitor to Christiano’s equality-based approach.  But 
they are mistaken to do so, since nothing Christiano says is inconsistent with accepting the proportionality principle. 
Brighouse and Fleurbaey’s argument merely reminds us that political egalitarianism is (almost) always limited in its 
scope.  Arguments for an equal distribution of political power are intended to apply only within a given political unit 
(nation, state, county, city, utility district, etc.), not among all persons.
74 In Christiano’s own words: “The basic institutions of society are charged with the task of advancing the interests 
of all members of society equally. A just society advances the interests of all persons in it and it advances the 
interests of persons equally. This basic principle of justice is the moral foundation of democracy and liberal rights.…
No political society can rightly claim to advance the interests of its members without giving them a say in how it is 
organized.  And no political society can justly claim to advance the interests of its citizens equally without giving 
each citizen an equal say in the shaping of its institutions” (2008, p. 12).  And: “[W]e share a common world in 
which we wish to establish justice and advance the common good.  Since we have roughly equal stakes in this 
common world justice demands that our interests be advanced equally within it, and social justice demands that we 
realize equality in accordance with a publicly clear measure so that justice may be seen to be done.  But we must do 
this in the context of pervasive disagreement among persons over how to establish justice and the common good and 
the facts of diversity, cognitive bias, and fallibility of persons.  And each has fundamental interests in advancing his 
or her judgment in this context.  When these facts and interests are acknowledged we see that the only way to 
advance the interests of persons equally in a way that each can plausibly see to be treating him or her as an equal is 
to give each an equal say (within a limited scope) over how the common world is to be shaped” (ibid., p. 95).
This argument needs some unpacking, but the basic structure is simple: when faced with a 
collective decision, the most just decision-procedure is one in which the ability to influence it is 
distributed equally among all affected parties; thus, political equality is a requirement of justice.  
 At first glance, Christiano’s argument is more promising than Brighouse’s because it 
offers a more precise explanation of why anything less than equal political power is 
unacceptable.  Whereas Brighouse merely appeals to the intuition that if our social institutions 
allow someone to have less power than others this shows a lack of respect for that person, 
Christiano argues that an unequal share of political power is unjust because it leads to some 
people’s interests being better advanced than others’.  Nevertheless, I think Christiano’s 
argument fails for the same reason Brighouse’s does; namely, the crucial inference is invalid. 
The demand that we treat everyone as moral equals does not entail that we must ensure that each 
has an equal share of political power.  Not only is political egalitarianism not entailed by a 
commitment to respecting the moral equality of everyone involved, the former is often 
inconsistent with the latter. 
 Let us now go through Christiano’s argument step by step, beginning with the first 
premise – Justice requires that the interests of all persons be advanced equally.  I will not 
challenge this premise; indeed, assuming we are talking about all and only those people who 
have not done anything to deserve be treated as less than a moral equal, I accept it.75 
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75 For the sake of simplicity, I will treat this premise as a claim about interests in general.  But it should be noted that 
Christiano is talking about a specific subset of interests, which he calls fundamental political interests.  He identifies 
four such interests: 1) the interest in correcting for cognitive bias; 2) the interest in being at home in the world; 3) 
the interest in learning the truth about matters of moral importance; 4) the interest in having one’s own equal 
standing among one’s fellow citizens recognized and affirmed.  (See Christiano 2008, pp. 64-6.)  As far as I can tell, 
it does not distort Christiano’s argument to read it in terms of interests in general rather than fundamental political 
interests specifically. 
 Moving on to the second premise, the publicity requirement – Justice must not only be 
done, it must be seen to be done.  I have several worries about the publicity requirement.  Rather 
than jump right into those, however, I want to make sure that we are clear on what a violation of 
the publicity requirement would look like.  In order for a principle of justice to violate the 
publicity requirement, it must be impossible (given reasonable effort and normal intelligence) for 
at least one person to see that his interests are being advanced equally by that principle.  The 
mere fact that someone is not paying attention to how well or poorly his interests are being 
advanced is no indication that the publicity requirement is being violated.  The requirement is 
violated only if that person could not, if he wanted to, find out that his interests are indeed being 
advanced equally. 
 My first worry about the publicity requirement is that it is out of place here.  Publicity 
seems a plausible requirement for laws and judicial rulings, but not for principles of distributive 
justice.  The notion of publicity has a long history in the context of the law, and with good 
reason.  If society is going to take away citizens’ liberty and property as punishment for violating 
certain rules, those rules had better be widely known and reasonably clear; and the process by 
which we determine whether someone has in fact violated the rules had better be open and 
honest.  
 The need for publicity in the context of principles of distributive justice is less obvious. 
Christiano attempts to justify it as follows:
Social justice requires that individuals be treated as equals.  In order for the 
system of rules, norms, and laws by which justice is established among persons to 
treat people as equals it must be that they evince an equal respect for the judgment 
of all of those on whom the rules have a major impact.  The system of rules and 
laws realize that equal respect when they are made in a way they can be seen by 
all to be treating them as equals. (p. 56)
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In other words, non-public principles of justice do not evince equal respect for the judgment of 
all persons.  
 But I remain unconvinced of the need for a publicity requirement in this context, since I 
can imagine situations in which non-public principles of justice do not evince a lack of respect 
for anyone’s judgment.  Consider a case of secretive repayment.  Suppose that one person 
(Debtor) borrows money from another (Creditor).  Debtor promises to pay back the money to 
Creditor by a specified date.  When that date arrives, Creditor asks where her money is.  Debtor 
then informs Creditor that he has already repaid her.  And, in fact, he has: Debtor secretly 
deposited the money in Creditor’s bank account the day before.76  Assuming that Debtor was 
aware that Creditor would not be able to verify that she had received the money from him, 
Christiano must say that Debtor’s action is defective with respect to justice; because Debtor 
knew that Creditor would not be able to see that justice was done (that she got what she was 
owed), Debtor’s action evinces a lack of respect for Creditor.  I do not see why we should agree 
with Christiano on this point, however.  The fact that Debtor knows that Creditor is not able, 
even in principle, to see that he has paid her back does not necessarily tell us anything about 
Debtor’s attitude towards Creditor or Creditor’s judgment.  It could, but it need not.  Whether it 
does depends on Debtor’s reason for acting as he did.  If his reason for paying the money back 
secretly were to deceive Creditor in some way, then perhaps his action would be defective with 
regards to justice.77  If, on the other hand, Debtor’s reason for paying back the money in the way 
he did was to make sure that he didn’t forget to pay it back, his action would not be defective 
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76 I take this example from Christiano (2008, pp. 49-50).
77 To make it clearly defective with regards to justice, we probably need to fill in the example a bit more.  Suppose 
Debtor mistakenly believed that he owed $20.  He really owed $15.  He pays back $15 in secret, knowing Creditor 
will be unable to find this out.  Debtor’s action would then be deficient in justice, even though he paid back the 
amount of money he owed, because his intention was to benefit himself unfairly.
with regards to justice.78  The upshot is that a lack of publicity does not entail a lack of respect 
for anyone.  So Christiano’s argument for the publicity requirement is blocked.     
 Absent some other justification of the publicity requirement, I think that we should reject 
it and, by extension, Christiano’s argument for political egalitarianism as well.  Not everyone 
will share my skepticism about the publicity requirement, of course.  But that does not trouble 
me, because we will shortly see that Christiano’s argument faces more serious problems.
 Before we get to those problems, one more point about the publicity requirement: even if 
we should have some such requirement, I do not think that Christiano’s “weak”  version is viable. 
There is a tension between Christiano’s justification of the publicity requirement (which appeals 
to the major impact that a system of rules, norms, and laws has on everyone who lives under it) 
on the one hand and his reliance on a weak publicity requirement (which requires only in 
principle acceptance) on the other.  Recall Christiano’s “weak”  publicity requirement: everyone 
must be able – in principle, given a reasonable effort – to see that they are being treated justly.79 
A “strong” publicity requirement would require that people actually see that justice is being done 
– i.e., that they actually see that they are being treated justly.  Why require only in principle 
acceptance rather than actual acceptance?  Presumably because actual acceptance will be 
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78 Suppose that Debtor is forgetful and he knows this about himself.  He also knows that he has the ability to directly 
deposit money into Creditor’s bank account.  So the first time Debtor has $15 available and remembers that he owes 
that amount to Creditor, he deposits it into the creditor’s bank account.  There’s no intention to deceive Creditor or 
to get more than his fair share.
79 “The weak notion of publicity demands that the principles of social justice be ones that people can in principle see 
to be in effect or not.  The notion of ‘in principle possibility’ here is to be specified relative to facts about the 
limitations on human cognitive abilities.  To be sure, publicity does not require that each person actually see that he 
or she is being treated justly.  It requires only that each person can see that he or she is being treated justly once the 
basic facts about our cognitive limitations are taken into account and given a reasonable informed effort on his part. 
So a principle that requires that we go beyond our ordinary cognitive limitations to determine whether it has been 
realized or not is not a public principle of justice.  But a principle that a person can, given normal cognitive faculties, 
see to be realized if he makes a reasonable effort is a public principle even if the person does not in fact see it to be 
realized on account of not having made a reasonable effort or on account of ignoring the basic facts of cognitive 
limitation” (Christiano 2008, pp. 47-8).
unattainable in practice: there will always be some (perhaps unreasonable) objections to any 
principle of justice.  And as long as there are actual objections to any putative principle, then, on 
a strong publicity requirement, there would be no valid principles of social justice.  That would 
be, no doubt, a counter-intuitive implication of adopting a strong publicity requirement.  But, if 
we follow Christiano’s justification for the publicity requirement, this may not be sufficient 
reason to adopt a weak publicity requirement instead.  If we justify the publicity requirement by 
appealing to the demand that we show equal respect to everyone on whom our system of rules 
has a major impact, then how can it not apply to everyone in our society (whether they are 
reasonable or not)?  Christiano argues that acting on non-public principles of social justice is 
incompatible with treating all those who live under them with equal respect; he says that it 
evinces a lack of respect to tell someone that, even though she cannot see it, she is actually being 
treated in a just way.  Does the same go for people who are unreasonable, uninformed, or both? 
Suppose someone objects to a principle for some crazy reason.  Should we simply ignore this 
person, or must we allow her to exercise veto power over the principles of justice?  Presumably, 
Christiano would opt for the former.  But, if we believe that every person (whether reasonable or 
not) is of equal moral worth, it is unclear how we could be justified in excluding the 
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unreasonable from the set of people whose acceptance a principle of justice must secure.80  After 
all, our system of rules, norms, and laws has as much impact on their lives as it does on everyone 
else’s.  In short, Christiano faces the following dilemma: 1) give up the publicity requirement 
(thereby undermining his entire argument for political egalitarianism) or 2) accept a strong 
publicity requirement (thereby facing the prospect that no principles will meet this requirement, 
which would entail that there are no valid principles of justice, which would also undermine his 
case for political egalitarianism). 
 Back to Christiano’s argument for political egalitarianism.  Steps 3 and 4 are 
unproblematic.  Step 3 – the conclusion that justice requires not only that everyone’s interests be 
advanced equally, but that this be done in a way that everyone can see – follows from the first 
two premises.  And step 4 – the observation that there is pervasive disagreement about what 
people’s interests are, and about how to advance them through our political institutions – is 
certainly true.
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80 There is a further problem with excluding the unreasonable.  How do we know who to exclude?  As Joseph Raz 
points out, the fact that a person holds a particular belief or rejects a particular principle, is not, in the absence of 
other evidence, proof that he is unreasonable: “Beliefs are usually judged unreasonable if they are, in relation to the 
evidence available to the experts, patently false.  That means that experts do not usually disagree about these beliefs. 
For the experts, the holding of such beliefs falls beyond the margin of common error.  At times not the experts but 
some other group will be the implied reference group for such judgements.  But all judgements of the reasonableness 
of a certain view abstract it from any particular believer.  It follows that perfectly reasonable people can have 
unreasonable beliefs.  Creationist science is committed to many unreasonable beliefs, but if you were taught 
creationist science at school and at home and came across no other science, then your reasonableness may be more 
in doubt if you reject creationist science than if you believe it” (1998, pp. 34-5).  The difficulty of identifying the 
unreasonable leads Raz to wonder whether  the reasonableness condition has any real-world implications: “[O]ne 
cannot take the rejection of any proposition as in itself strong evidence that the agent is unreasonable (in the sense in 
which this is a cognitive vice).  The implication of this is that the exclusion [of unreasonable people] has no political 
teeth.…Rejecting a belief would testify to the unreasonableness of the rejectors only if it is one which no rational 
agents, whatever their beliefs, could rationally reject, or if given the rejectors’ other beliefs and their situation, they 
could not rationally reject.  I will disregard the first half of this test, on the ground (or in the hope) that there are no 
propositions with direct political implications which are current in contemporary societies which meet this test.…
There is no proposition which has currency in Western societies and which some people in them could not 
reasonably accept” (ibid., pp. 36-7).  
 Where Christiano runs into serious trouble is step 5, which says that the only principle 
everyone could see to be advancing their interests equally is the principle that everyone ought to 
have an equal share of political power.  There are two distinct claims here, and I think we should 
reject both of them.  The first is that everyone could see that an equal distribution of political 
power would lead to their interests being advanced equally.  The second claim is that a principle 
calling for the equal distribution of power is unique in this regard; i.e., that it is the only one that 
everyone could see as advancing their interests equally.  
 What is wrong with the first of these claims?  There is no reason to think that everyone 
could see the justice of a principle that calls for an equal distribution of political power.  Even if 
many people could accept such a principle, it is highly doubtful that everyone could.  Christiano 
says that anyone who recognizes that they share certain fundamental interests81 and that certain 
“facts of judgment” 82 are unavoidable would accept the principle.83  But why think that everyone 
could recognize these interests and facts?  Surely people will disagree on what belongs on the list 
of fundamental political interests.  (Some will think that Christiano’s list is too long, others that it 
is too short, and others that it simply contains the wrong items.)  And there is a further source of 
disagreement that Christiano does not consider: some people reject the idea that everyone’s 
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81 Namely, the interest in correcting for cognitive bias, the interest in being at home in the world, the interest in 
learning the truth about matters of moral importance, and the interest in having one’s own equal standing among 
one’s fellow citizens recognized and affirmed. (Christiano 2008, pp. 88-96) 
82 There are four such facts: people differ in their capacities for well-being, each person’s moral judgment is fallible, 
there is pervasive disagreement on just about everything, and we are all cognitively biased in favor of our own 
interests and the interests of those we care about. (Christiano 2008, pp. 56-60)
83 “[W]e must [establish justice]  in the context of pervasive disagreement among persons over how to establish 
justice and the common good and the facts of diversity, cognitive bias, and fallibility of persons.  And each has 
fundamental interests in advancing his or her judgment in this context.  When these facts and interests are 
acknowledged we see that the only way to advance the interests of persons equally in a way that each can plausibly 
see to be treating him or her as an equal is to give each an equal say (within a limited scope) over how the common 
world is to be shaped” (Christiano 2008, p. 95).
interests ought to be advanced equally.  Perhaps all contemporary political philosophers accept 
this, but that is hardly a representative sample of the population.  Suppose someone holds that 
people’s interests should be advanced in proportion to how closely they adhere to God’s law. 
Could this person see the justice of a principle that gives equal weight to everyone’s interests? 
Not unless he gave up some of his most basic beliefs.  And we cannot simply dismiss him as 
unreasonable; depending on the evidence he has been exposed to, his beliefs may be perfectly 
reasonable.  The upshot is that some people, even some reasonable people, may not be able to 
see the justice of a principle that calls for an equal distribution of political power.  Thus, the fifth 
premise of Christiano’s argument is false, making the argument unsound.
 But maybe I’m wrong about this.  Maybe everyone could (eventually) come to see that 
distributing the ability to influence political outcomes equally is a just way of responding to the 
fact that people disagree about what those outcomes should be.  That is still not enough to save 
Christiano’s argument for political egalitarianism.  Recall the second claim contained in 
Christiano’s fifth premise – the claim that a principle calling for the equal distribution of political 
power is the only one that everyone could see as advancing their interests equally.  Christiano’s 
argument for this claim runs as follows.  He begins by noting that substantive principles of 
justice are always controversial.  Hence, appealing to any substantive principle of justice – i.e., a 
principle about outcomes rather than procedures – would violate the requirement that everyone’s 
interests be advanced equally and in a way that everyone can accept.84   Regarding any 
substantive principle of justice, someone will be able to object that it would not advance his 
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84 “The standard by which we evaluate this situation from a public standpoint cannot go beyond the idea of an equal 
say, because any particular outcome standard is controversial.  So the democratic process, by virtue of the fact that it 
gives each equal abilities to shape the common world in which they live and thereby equal abilities to advance their 
interests, is the only publicly clear and acceptable realization of equal advancement of interests in the light of the 
facts and interests in judgment” (Christiano 2008, p. 96).  
interests equally.  If we ignore this person’s objections and act on the principle anyway, then we 
will necessarily violate the fundamental principle of justice – the principle that everyone’s 
interests ought to be advanced equally.  Why?  Because acting on a principle that someone does 
not see as a just principle (a principle that he does not think advances his interests equally) 
displays a lack of respect for the judgment of that person.  And this lack of respect for a person’s 
judgment frustrates one of the fundamental interests we all have – namely, the interest in 
correcting for cognitive bias.85   Therefore, concludes Christiano, the only way to advance 
everyone’s interests equally is to give everyone equal ability to advance his or her own interests 
in the political arena – i.e., to give everyone an equal share of political power.   
 This sounds plausible enough, until we look more closely at the move from someone 
lacking an equal share of political power to that person’s interests not being advanced equally. 
Unlike Christiano, I do not think that the former entails the latter.  I believe there are cases in 
which the fact that someone has a less-than-equal share of power does not set back her interests 
in any way.  If there are such cases, then Christiano’s argument for an equal distribution of power 
uniquely satisfying the equal-advancement-of-interests requirement does not go through.  I will 
now try to show that there are such cases.  
 Consider Art, a virtuoso violinist.  Art has never cared much about politics; he has put all 
his time and energy into playing music.  Art’s political skills never developed, and he is largely 
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85 “Given that each person’s judgment has cognitive biases toward her own interests built into the judgments and 
given the diversity of persons, each person can see that any attempt to impose a particular view of justice 
unilaterally in law and policy by a group of persons is likely to fail to take into account and properly reflect the 
interests of those who are imposed upon.  Her interests are likely to be neglected because they are ill understood and 
because they are likely not to be given due weight by others who do not share those interests.  And the principles by 
which her interests are accommodated to the others’ interests are likely to fail fully to find the proper place for those 
interests.  As a consequence, a decision procedure that accorded no weight to a person’s judgment or significantly 
less weight to that judgment than to those of others, and more worryingly to the judgments of all the members of 
whole groups of persons, can be expected, given the normal functioning of human cognitive systems, to give short 
shrift to the interests of those persons” (ibid., p. 89).  
ignorant of basic political issues and historical facts: he cannot follow the on-going public 
debates, he does not know how to direct his money and energy effectively during campaigns, and 
so on.  As a result, Art has less political power than most of his neighbors: he has very little 
ability to influence his society’s collective decisions.  Suppose we allow him to keep living his 
life as he always has.  By allowing him to remain (relatively) powerless, are we thereby ensuring 
that his interests will not be advanced to the same degree as the interests of his more politically 
active neighbors?  Christiano would say that we are.  But this overlooks the possibility that 
allowing Art to have a less-than-equal share of political power could actually lead to his interests 
being advanced just as well as, if not better than, they would be if he had an equal share of 
power.  How is this possible?  Art is neither willing nor able to advance his own interests by 
means of the political process.  Equalizing Art’s political power would make it more difficult for 
him to achieve the valuable goal that he has chosen – becoming the best violinist he can be. 
Assuming that we either cannot or should not “level down”  everyone else in Art’s community, 
the only way to equalize Art’s political power would be to get him to care more about politics 
and to develop some political skills.  The only way for him to do those things, however, would 
be to pay less attention to music and neglect (at least for a while) his musical skills.  And this 
would frustrate (to some degree) one of Art’s fundamental interests – namely, the interest in 
living autonomously.86   Thus, not only does Art’s lack of political power not lead to the 
frustration of his interests, it leads to the greater advancement of his interests.  
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86 The interest in living autonomously is my gloss on what Christiano calls the “interest in being at home in the 
world”: “Being at home in the world one lives in implies that one can appreciate that world and enjoy its many 
valuable qualities.  Being at home in the world one lives in is one of the socially necessary conditions for one to 
have well-being.  For it is the condition in which one has a sense of fit, connection, and meaning in the world one 
lives in and its is therefore the condition in which one can experience the value of the things around one.  It gives 
one an orientation among the things in one’s world that enables one to appreciate them”  (Christiano 2008, pp. 61-2).
 Now, Christiano would likely deny that this presents a problem for his view.  After all, he 
calls for everyone to have equal ability to influence political decisions, not for straight equality of 
influence.  If someone is simply not interested in politics, this will affect how much actual 
influence that person has on the political process, but not how much ability he has to influence it. 
So, the reply goes, a case like Art’s does not threaten political egalitarianism: Art’s lack of 
influence is traceable to his lack of interest in politics, and that is consistent with the ideal of 
equal ability to influence.87  
 It is true that Art could, if he put more time and effort into politics, become more 
politically influential.  But does this mean that he is, at present, equally able to influence political 
outcomes?  That depends on how we understand ability; specifically, the relationship between 
skills and ability.  How do we have to understand this relationship in order to say that Art is 
indeed equally able to influence political outcomes, despite his lack of skills?  We would have to 
say that having the ability to develop an ability is the same thing as having the ability already. 
Suppose that the only thing required for having ability T is having skills X, Y, and Z.  We would 
have to say that someone has ability T so long as he has the ability to develop skills X, Y, and Z, 
even if he does not have those skills at present.  To bring this back to Art, in order to say that he 
is equally able to influence political outcomes, despite his lack of skills, we would have to say 
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87 Recall that political egalitarians want choice to play a role in the distribution of political power: 
[P]olitical equality demands equal opportunity for effective political influence rather than equality of 
effective influence itself.  Inequalities of effective influence are sometimes acceptable, on any 
reasonable view of political equality.  Some citizens may be more influential because, for example, 
they care more about politics.  Differences of influence that trace to such differences in values and 
choices seem unobjectionable.  Similarly, if a person is more influential because her views are widely 
shared, or her judgment widely trusted, and other are therefore likely to be swayed by her position on 
the issue at hand: the differences of influence trace to the distribution of political values and 
commitments in the population, not to the organization of the structure of collective choice.  The 
requirement of equal opportunity for effective influence condemns certain kinds of effective exclusion 
or dilution, but it does not support charges of objectionable exclusion or dilution merely because I am 
unwilling to make reasonable efforts to persuade others, or because others regard my views as 
ridiculous, or because they lack confidence in my judgment. (J. Cohen 2009, p. 273)  
that Art has the same ability to influence political outcomes as people who are more skilled than 
he is because he has the ability to increase his skills if he chose to.  And this seems right.  There 
is a sense in which Art is equally able to influence political outcomes, despite his current lack of 
skills: assuming that Art does not have any cognitive or physical disabilities, he could pretty 
quickly bring his political skills up to the level of most everyone else’s.  All other things being 
equal, he would then be equally able to influence political outcomes – i.e., have an equal share of 
political power.  
 If this is the correct account of the relationship between skills and ability –  i.e., equal 
ability does not require equal skills but merely the ability to develop equal skills – then Art’s case 
is not a counter-example to Christiano’s argument.88  Art does not have a less-than-equal share of 
political power.  Hence, we do not need to intervene in order to increase his share of political 
power.  Hence, there is no threat to Art’s interest in living autonomously.                
 There are more problematic cases for Christiano, however.  The most problematic cases 
involve inequalities in power that derive from aspects of people’s personalities that they either 
cannot or would not change; for example, their physical appearance89  and abilities, their 
cognitive abilities, and their relationships with friends and family.  In such cases, the type and 
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88 What account of the relationship between skills and ability would we have to adopt if we wanted to avoid this 
conclusion?  An account according to which having an ability at present requires the agent to have certain skills at 
present.  On such an account, Art’s present lack of skills would entail that he does not have the same abilities as his 
more skilled neighbors.  Even if he were to become equally willing to participate now or in the future, Art would not 
have an equal share of political power.  But this account has some counter-intuitive implications.  Consider my 
ability to speak Chinese, for example.  I do not, at present, know a single word of Chinese.  With adequate 
instruction, I could eventually come to speak the language fluently.  Nevertheless, I think it would be misleading to 
say that I currently have the ability to speak Chinese.  If this is right, then cases such as Art’s – i.e., cases in which 
an agent’s lack of power is traceable to a lack of skills that the agent could develop if he wanted to – are not a threat 
to Christiano’s argument for political egalitarianism.
89 Empirical studies consistently show that physical appearance plays a role in our evaluation of politicians.   
Rosenberg et al. 1986; Ballew and Todorov 2007. 
amount of intervention necessary to equalize the political power of everyone involved would 
frustrate some people’s interests in living autonomously.  
 To begin to see just how intrusive some of the measures needed to equalize political 
power would be, consider a case in which the only way to increase an agent’s political power 
would be to change his personality drastically.  Consider Roger, a social recluse.  Just the thought 
of being politically active terrifies him.  Like Art, Roger does not participate in the political 
decision-making process.  Unlike Art, however, Roger is not merely indifferent to politics or 
disinclined to participate in politics; he lacks the ability to be as involved in politics as most 
people are.  Roger is not able to talk to his neighbors about political issues, for example, or even 
to go to the polls on election day.  In short, Roger does not have an equal share of power because 
he is less able than others to participate in, much less influence, the political decision-making 
process of his community.  The only way to equalize Roger’s share of political power would be 
to change Roger – not only his preferences but his abilities as well – in a way that makes 
political participation a real option for him.  And it is hard to see how society could do this 
without significantly restricting Roger’s autonomy.  There are many ways to increase political 
participation: give tax breaks to people who vote regularly, start an ad campaign encouraging 
people to do their civic duty, organize voter-registration events, etc.  But, given Roger’s lack of 
social abilities, such things would likely have no effect on him.  What then?  To me, the obvious 
answer is to say that Roger ought not to have an equal share of political power.  We should allow 
him to have less power than his neighbors.  Christiano cannot say this, however; he must say that 
there is something unjust about Roger’s relative lack of political power.  But in order increase 
Roger’s share of political power, we would have to get him more involved in politics; in order to 
get him more involved in politics, we would first have to get him able to be participate in 
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politics; and in order to get him more able to participate in politics, we would have to change his 
personality in a fundamental way.  This raises several questions. 
 First of all, to what extent can someone’s personality be altered?  Surely both the person 
himself and his society have some control over his personality.  So, it is possible to make Roger 
more involved in politics, up to a point.  (Where that point is located is an empirical question 
which we cannot go into here.)  The next question is to what extent does the attempt to change 
someone’s personality restrict his autonomy?  How far can we go toward changing someone’s 
personality without restricting his ability to be author of his own life?  Some of the ways we 
could change someone’s personality are perfectly compatible with respecting that person’s 
autonomy – rationally persuading him, say, or giving him incentives.  When do such efforts 
begin to restrict an individual’s autonomy to a troubling degree?  I suggest it is the point at which 
we begin to restrict the individual’s ability to engage in valuable projects.  Suppose Roger is an 
inventor who spends day after day in his garage developing prototypes of all sorts, or a writer 
who works tirelessly on his novels.  Equalizing Roger’s share of political power would come at 
the cost of making it more difficult for him to do these things.  How so?  He would have to take 
time away from his work in order to undergo a personal transformation and a political education: 
to develop new habits of thought and action; to learn how government and social institutions 
interact; and so on.  Roger could not do all these things – at least not to the degree necessary to 
equalize, rather than merely increase somewhat, his share of political power – without neglecting 
his other projects.  And, on the view of autonomy I sketched above, this is a clear restriction of 
Roger’s autonomy. On that view, a person is autonomous insofar as he is able to choose 
rationally between valuable options.  Some of the valuable options Roger would have been able 
to choose from – e.g., spending the weekend testing his latest prototype – would be closed off to 
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him by the measures he must take to equalize his political power – e.g., undergoing therapy for 
his social anxiety disorder.  Roger’s interest in living autonomously would be frustrated.  In this 
case, therefore, the demand that everyone have an equal share of political power pulls in the 
opposite direction of the demand that everyone’s interests be advanced equally.
 Now consider Tom.  Tom has too much power (read: significantly more than his 
neighbors) due to his tremendous ability to persuade people to see things his way.  How should 
we go about reducing Tom’s share of power so that he has no more (and no less) than his 
neighbors?  It might appear that we could give all of his neighbors money to compensate them 
for their lack of rhetorical skills.  But that would get very expensive very quickly, and it still 
might not be enough.  (Tom could easily persuade his neighbors to give him all of this money.) 
We could limit the number of words anyone is allowed to speak in public.  We could limit the 
topics that people could speak about publicly.  (Anything political is off limits, perhaps.)  The 
point is this: any of these measures would have the effect of restricting Tom’s autonomy, as well 
as that of other people.  We would be limiting the number and type of valuable options available. 
There is at least one thing that someone like Tom cannot do under a regime of political equality 
that he would have been able to do otherwise; namely, do everything he can to influence the 
collective decision-making process of his community.  Moreover, by limiting Tom’s ability to 
make his views known, we are limiting the ability of his neighbors to be informed by his 
arguments, which restricts their autonomy by leaving them unaware of some options they may 
have chosen if they had been aware of them.  Thus, once again, an equal distribution of power 
would lead to the unequal advancement of interests. 
 Here’s the upshot: Because it cannot allow someone like Roger to have less power than 
most and someone like Tom to have more power than most, political egalitarianism cannot avoid 
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calling for some restrictions on autonomy.  This is a potentially fatal flaw in the political 
egalitarian’s position.  Beyond a certain point, limiting people’s autonomy is inconsistent with 
treating them as persons of equal moral worth.  And since we are considering arguments for 
political egalitarianism that ground the demand for political equality in the demand that we treat 
everyone as persons of equal moral worth, the possibility of internal inconsistency is real.  If 
political egalitarianism required us to treat people in ways that are inconsistent with treating 
them as persons of equal moral worth, the arguments for political egalitarianism we are 
concerned with in this chapter would collapse in on themselves.  You cannot violate someone’s 
moral equality as a means of respecting his moral equality.     
 Now, I do not want to overstate the worry about autonomy.  To begin with, as we have 
already seen, it is possible to equalize someone’s share of political power without threatening his 
autonomy.  For instance, the state could offer rhetoric classes to increase the skills, and thereby 
the power, of those who are not eloquent public speakers.  No one is forced to go, and the classes 
are free and offered several times a week; this could only increase people’s autonomy (by giving 
them more options than they previously had).  Another way to increase someone’s political 
participation, and thereby her power, without limiting her autonomy is a compulsory voting 
system.  If you don’t vote, you pay a tax penalty.90  Incentivizing political participation in this 
way would likely bring us closer to the ideal of political equality, and no one’s interest in living 
autonomously would be frustrated.  There is also the possibility of compensating people whose 
autonomy is restricted.  One form this could take is to give those with less ability to influence the 
political process at one stage (e.g., the agenda-setting stage) more ability to influence it at 
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90 The most well-known such system is probably that of Australia.  Note well: I assume that not all taxation limits 
autonomy.  Some anarchists and libertarians deny this.  And, although making voting compulsory would increase 
turnout, I’m not sure how far it would go toward equalizing political power, since the ability of a single vote to 
influence an election is vanishingly small.
another stage (e.g., the decision-making stage).  Come election time, for example, we could 
weigh a person’s vote in inverse proportion to that person’s wealth.  The less wealthy you are, 
the more your vote counts toward determining the outcome.91  
 More fundamentally, the fact that it endorses some restrictions on autonomy is not a 
reductio of political egalitarianism.  Achieving any distributive ideal is going to require us to 
restrict someone’s autonomy to some degree.92  As soon as we get into the business of increasing 
and/or decreasing people’s shares of political power, we are going to start interfering with their 
ability to live by their own lights.  So the question is not “Does this ideal call for restrictions on 
autonomy?”  but rather “How many, and how significant, are the restrictions on autonomy that 
this ideal calls for?”   In subsequent chapters, I will attempt to show that the restrictions on 
autonomy endorsed by a non-egalitarian approach will be fewer in number and lesser in degree 
than those endorsed by egalitarianism.  This is a key part of my argument for political 
sufficientarianism.  (According to political sufficientarianism, what matters is that each person 
have enough political power, regardless whether some have more than others.) 
Sufficientarianism will endorse some restrictions on autonomy.  But, because it does not aim at 
maintaing a specific distribution of power – namely, an equal distribution – sufficientarianism 
must endorse fewer of these than egalitarianism.  The egalitarian seeks to eliminate all deviations 
from equality.  The sufficientarian seeks to eliminate only those deviations from equality that 
involve someone falling below the threshold of sufficiency.  
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91 It is not clear how far a compensation scheme can take us toward lessening the potential conflict between political 
egalitarianism and individual autonomy.  One limitation of this particular proposal is that agenda-setting and 
lobbying between elections are, in many ways, more important than voting.  If all the options on the ballot are 
odious to me, the fact that my vote is given extra weight does not make me feel much (if any) better.
92 Recall that autonomy is a matter of degree.  A person can have his autonomy restricted and still be autonomous. 
No one is perfectly autonomous. (Raz 1986, pp. 154-7)
 Where does this leave us in regards to Christiano’s argument for political egalitarianism? 
Christiano argues that treating everyone as moral equals demands that we advance everyone’s 
interests equally, and that the only way to advance everyone’s interests equally is to ensure that 
everyone has an equal share of political power.  I have tried to show that this argument fails 
because it is possible to advance everyone’s interests equally without an equal distribution of 
political power.  Indeed, achieving (or maintaining) an equal distribution of political power can 
actually prevent us from advancing everyone’s interests equally.  This is because pursuing the 
ideal of political equality would require us to restrict some people’s autonomy in various ways. 
Assuming (with Christiano) that everyone has an interest in being autonomous, therefore, the 
demand that we treat all citizens as moral equals does not entail political egalitarianism.   

V.
All I have done in this chapter is show that the moral-equality-based argument for political 
egalitarianism is incomplete at best.  This does not prove that all such arguments fail, much less 
that political egalitarianism is false.  My ultimate aim is to show that we ought to adopt a non-
egalitarian distributive ideal for political power, but I do not deny that sometimes political power 
should be distributed equally.  This is where the arguments of Brighouse and Christiano are 
instructive.  Even if the arguments fail to establish political equality as a moral ideal in general, 
they help us to see what ourselves and our society would have to be like for the arguments to 
succeed.  I will conclude this chapter by briefly sketching the circumstances in which political 
equality would indeed be a requirement of treating people as moral equals.
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 For the demand that we treat everyone as moral equals to entail a demand that we ensure 
that each has an equal share of political power, all of the following conditions would have to be 
in place.  First, each person has an equal stake in the political process – i.e., each is affected to 
the same degree by the outcomes of the process.  Second, everyone’s willingness to participate in 
the political arena is equal.  Third, everyone is equally skilled at influencing political outcomes 
by non-rational93 means – e.g., rhetoric and deal-making.  Fourth, everyone agrees that political 
power is a morally significant good, that it matters morally how political power is distributed.  If 
all these conditions were in place, then none of my objections to Brighouse and Christiano could 
get any traction.  In a society where the above four conditions held, the best way to express equal 
concern and respect (or advance everyone’s interests equally) would be to ensure that everyone 
has an equal share of political power.  
 No doubt, there are many cases in which someone’s lack of political power is the result of 
her society not expressing adequate respect toward her.  But there are also cases in which this is 
not so.  On this point, I agree with David Estlund: 
[U]nequal political institutions often do express disdain, or condescension.  But this 
is a contingent matter.  Inequality does not express disrespect unless it is owed to 
disrespect.  When it is, that is a moral failing of the particular societies involved, 
not a defect of unequal political influence itself.  Unequal influence can, in 
principle, exist entirely for other reasons. (2000, p. 138).94 
 
Indeed, my suspicion is that most people aren’t as concerned with the political decision-making 
process as political egalitarians take us all to be.  Far from feeling disrespected by a lack of 
political power, a lot of people would gladly give up some power if it meant that they would 
have a little more time and energy to devote to things they truly care about.  There are limits, of 
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93 This qualifier is important.  Political egalitarians do not object to inequalities of power that result from people’s 
unequal abilities to offer and understand rational arguments.
94 Daniel Ortiz (1998, pp. 901-5) makes the same point. 
course.  The point at which their lack of power began to interfere with their ability to pursue their 
non-political activities is the point at which most people would begin to clamor for more power.
 But arguments from moral equality are not the only possible arguments for political 
egalitarianism.  Many political egalitarians attempt to ground their view in the requirements of 
political legitimacy.  In the next chapter, I will consider a family of arguments to the effect that 
one of the necessary conditions of legitimacy is an equal distribution of political power.
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Chapter 3: Arguments from Legitimacy

Perhaps the case for political egalitarianism is more complicated than the arguments in the 
previous chapter suggest.  Those arguments tried to ground the case for political egalitarianism in 
the demands of moral equality alone.  But even if those arguments fail, we may still have good 
reason to pursue political equality.  After all, we care about many things besides treating people 
as moral equals, things like building a sense of solidarity within the community, finding the right 
answers to political questions, and so on.  The distribution of political power affects how well we 
are able to accomplish each of these goals.  If we consider all of these things, then, perhaps we 
will find that an equal distribution of power is indeed a moral ideal.  
 According to the below arguments for political egalitarianism, an equal distribution of 
political power is a necessary condition of legitimacy: a political institution is legitimate if it 
promotes the relevant value(s) to a sufficient degree, and the only way to promote the value(s) to 
a sufficient degree is to distribute political power equally.  I question both steps of these 
arguments.  While I accept the importance of autonomy, accuracy, fairness, etc., I have problems 
with some of the theories of legitimacy that appeal to these values.  And I think that an equal 
distribution of political power is rarely (if ever) the only means of promoting one or more of 
these values.
 A note about the concept of legitimacy.  We usually restrict talk of legitimacy to political 
institutions such as governments and constitutions.  It is odd to say that an individual law or the 
distribution of some resource is (il)legitimate.  (Although in the case of a distribution that strikes 
us as seriously repugnant, we might start to question the legitimacy of any government that 
would allow it to persist.)  The arguments for political egalitarianism in this chapter should be 
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read as making the case that an institution cannot be legitimate unless everyone had equal power 
over its composition, formation, and/or continuation.  What does it mean to say that an institution 
is legitimate?  In general terms, an institution has political legitimacy if it is morally justified in 
enforcing its commands.95  Different theories of legitimacy have different standards of moral 
justification.  They disagree about which (combinations of) values are relevant to determining 
whether a political institution is morally justified in enforcing its commands.  One could say, for 
example, that an institution has legitimacy if and only if it fosters a sense of fraternity and shared 
responsibility among the people living under it.  On another view, legitimacy could be 
conditional on maximizing the liberty of individual citizens.  On yet other views, the source of 
legitimacy could be the ability to get the right answers to political questions.  And, of course, 
legitimacy could depend on some combination of these and other values.  In order to find out 
whether a good case for political egalitarianism can be based in the demands of legitimacy, 
therefore, we will look at several justifications of political equality, each employing a different 
theory of legitimacy.   
 Here is the plan for the rest of the chapter.  I begin by looking at arguments for political 
egalitarianism that take contractualist theories of legitimacy as their starting point.  I argue (1) 
that contractualist theories of legitimacy are not plausible and (2) that even if they were, they 
would not provide a solid foundation for political egalitarianism, since some unequal 
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95  When we talk about justification in this context, we must keep in mind that justification and persuasion are 
distinct.  As Nagel says, “‘Justification’ does not mean ‘persuasion’.  It is a normative concept: arguments that 
justify may fail to persuade, if addressed to an unreasonable audience; and arguments that persuade may fail to 
justify” (1987, p. 218).  We should also not confuse stability with legitimacy.  The fact that a government is 
legitimate does not entail that it is stable.  Even if the government is morally justified in enforcing its commands, 
there may very well be some irreconcilables who seek to overthrow it.  (Think of the pockets of resistance in the 
South that refused to accept the legitimacy of the United States government after the Civil War.)  Similarly, an 
illegitimate government may be quite stable; because the population falsely believes that the government is 
legitimate, opposition forces are just too weak to overthrow it, etc.
distributions of power could meet the contractualist standard of legitimacy.  I then consider 
arguments based on best-results theories of legitimacy.  I find such theories of legitimacy 
plausible, but I doubt that an equal distribution of political power is the way to achieve the best 
results.  I then consider David Estlund’s (2008) argument for political egalitarianism, which is 
based on a contractualist/best-results hybrid view of legitimacy.  I argue that Estlund puts too 
much weight on the contractualist elements of his account and not enough on the best-results 
elements.  Finally, I consider arguments for political egalitarianism that are based on theories of 
deliberative democracy.  I do not find deliberative democratic views of legitimacy compelling, 
nor do I think that an equal distribution of political power is necessary in order to secure the 
goods that deliberative democrats claim legitimacy requires.
 
I.
Let us begin with a contractualist account of legitimacy, according to which an institution is 
legitimate if and only if everyone living under it agrees (or could agree) that it should be in 
place.96   Contractualists recognize that actual agreement is elusive, so most of them opt for 
hypothetical agreement instead: an institution is legitimate if and only if it could be the object of 
unanimous agreement.97   How can we determine whether everyone could agree to a particular 
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96 For statements of the contractualist view, see Rawls (1971) and Scanlon (1998). Nagel summarizes the view this 
way: “The pure ideal of political legitimacy is that the use of state power should be capable of being authorized by 
each citizen––not in direct detail but through acceptance of the principles, institutions, and procedures which 
determine how that power will be used.  This requires the possibility of unanimous agreement at some sufficiently 
high level, for if there are citizens who can legitimately object to the way state power is used against them or in their 
name, the state is not legitimate” (1991, p. 8).
97 I do not here add the qualifier ‘reasonable’ to the term ‘agreement’. Why do I not follow most contractualists and 
restrict my focus to reasonable agreement? Because, as will become clear below, I think the reasonableness 
restriction is problematic and thus deserving of a separate discussion.
institution?  By looking at whether the institution gives everyone’s interests sufficient weight and 
whether the demands it places on anyone are excessive.98   So the contractualist criterion of 
legitimacy comes to this: an institution is legitimate if and only if each person living under it 
could see that his interests are being accorded equal weight and that the demands made on him 
are in line with those it places on everyone else.
 Before moving on to the arguments for political egalitarianism, I would like to point out 
an implicit assumption in the contractualist’s view of legitimacy.  The contractualist assumes that 
everyone could agree to all and only those institutions that give (roughly) equal weight to 
everyone’s interests.  This is not obviously true.  All contemporary political philosophers might 
accept this assumption, but why think that everyone else would?  The sorts of institution that 
everyone could agree to depends on, among other things, the interests and beliefs of the people 
involved.  And these are not uniform.  Suppose someone believed, with Plato, that some human 
beings are more valuable than others.  Could this person agree to institutions that give equal 
weight to everyone’s interests?  Probably not.  He would likely insist that institutions should 
weigh a person’s interests in proportion to that person’s value.  What this shows is that any 
argument which presupposes, as the contractualist arguments for political egalitarianism do, that 
all people are of equal value would not impress our imagined non-egalitarian.  The contractualist 
arguments could not get off the ground for him, since implicit in this view of legitimacy is a 
claim that he rejects – namely, that everyone’s interests are equally important.  
 Although this is a potentially serious worry, at least for the version of contractualism I 
have sketched above, I will not make too much of it.  Even if the below argument for political 
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98 This is Nagel’s interpretation at least (1991, pp. 33-40).
egalitarianism does not hold always and everywhere (it only holds in modern, liberal societies, 
say), that would still be a significant result.        
 Turning now to an argument for political egalitarianism that relies on the contractualist 
view of legitimacy, it goes like this: 
1. An institution is legitimate if and only if everyone living under it could agree that it should 
be in place.
2. The only institution that everyone could agree should be in place is one under which 
everyone is equally able to influence political outcomes – i.e., one in which everyone has an 
equal share of political power.  
 
3. Therefore, a political institution is legitimate if and only if everyone living under it has an 
equal share of political power.99
I am doubly unimpressed by this argument.  Not only do I doubt that an equal distribution is the 
only distribution of power that everyone could agree to, I also doubt that the contractualist 
approach to legitimacy is tenable.  Let us look at these doubts in turn.
 There may be some circumstances in which an equal distribution of power is the only 
possible object of unanimous agreement.  (These would probably be similar to those sketched at 
the end of the previous chapter – everyone is equally involved in politics, equally skilled, etc.) 
But I think these circumstances are quite rare.  In most cases, it is possible to achieve unanimous 
agreement even though some have more power than others.    
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99  David Estlund offers one such argument, cast in terms of the legitimacy of decisions rather than institutions: 
“Disputes over such things as distributive justice are deep and pervasive.  Whatever the correct resolution of those 
disputes may be, we hope that a political decision about distributive justice can be legitimate, even if not just, on the 
basis of certain features of the political procedure, and not simply on the basis of whether the decision is morally 
correct, since the latter issue will be too deeply contested.  But now imagine a process in which those who have 
more money than others have more influence over the process.  Such a process can easily seem unfair, depleting it of 
the moral capacity to render the outcomes of the process legitimate.  At least if the process were fair, the outputs 
could be said to be fair in that procedural sense.  A fair procedure, some argue, requires equal availability of 
[influence], or at least insulation of influence from things like differential wealth.  It is natural to conclude that 
whether or not justice requires economic equality, legitimacy requires substantive political equality – equal 
availability of political influence – so as to keep the political process fair” (2000, p. 129).
 How could everyone agree to an unequal distribution of political power?  In particular, 
how could those with a less-than-equal share agree to such a distribution?  They could agree to it 
if they cared enough about things other than the procedural fairness of their society’s political 
decision-making.  If, for example, they cared more about getting the right answers than they did 
about everyone having an equal say in the decision-making procedure leading up to those 
answers. If everyone felt this way, then they could agree that political power ought to be 
distributed in proportion to competence, which is not evenly distributed throughout society.  
 Of course, it is unlikely that this (or anything else) would be the object of unanimous 
agreement in any actual society.  But that is not the relevant standard; on the version of 
contractualism we are considering, the relevant standard is hypothetical agreement, not actual 
agreement.  An institution is legitimate if and only if each person living under it could agree to it. 
The relevant question is whether each person living in the society I have just described could 
agree to a set-up in which some have more power than others.  Each person could agree to it, I 
suggest, if he believed the following three things: (1) it is very important to get the right answer 
to political questions; (2) distributing political power in proportion to competence is the best way 
to get the right answer to political questions; and (3) his own share of political power is (roughly) 
proportional to his level of political competence.100  People could disagree about everything else, 
but as long as they agreed on these three points, an unequal distribution of political power would 
be legitimate.  While unanimity on these points is unlikely, it is possible; and that is reason 
enough to deny the claim that an equal distribution is the only distribution of power that could be 
the object of unanimous agreement.
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100 Some political egalitarians (e.g., Christiano and Estlund) claim that it is impossible for each person to accept (3). 
I will argue that it is possible later in the chapter; for now, I simply assume that it is.
 The second, more fundamental worry I have about the contractualist’s argument for 
political egalitarianism has to do with the contractualist approach to legitimacy itself.  Following 
Joseph Raz (1998), I will now argue that there is no good theoretical reason to view legitimacy 
as conditional on agreement.  (There are probably good pragmatic reasons to do so, but that’s 
another issue.101)  To begin, consider the fact that contractualists can avoid the conclusion that no 
institutions are legitimate only by excluding the unreasonable from the group of people whose 
agreement is a necessary condition of legitimacy.  We have already noted that most 
contractualists adopt hypothetical, rather than actual, agreement as their standard of legitimacy 
because it opens up the possibility that some institutions might actually be legitimate.  (In every 
society – at least in every complex, modern society – there will be at least one person who would 
never come to see the institution in question as morally justified.)  But, even on the hypothetical 
agreement standard of legitimacy, the contractualist still faces a threat from people who are 
unreasonable; such people may not be able to accept the demands placed on them by the 
institution in question, thereby rendering it illegitimate.  In response to this threat, contractualists 
place restrictions on the group of people whose hypothetical agreement is necessary for 
legitimacy; they exclude unreasonable people from the group, for example.  The basic idea is 
that we do not need to justify our institutions to unreasonable people (or people with 
unreasonable views on the relevant issues), because they are beyond the reach of rational 
justifications.    
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101  Beyond the pragmatic reasons to exercise restraint in the face of disagreement (e.g., concerns about stability), 
there may also be epistemic reasons.  Raz suggests that history can teach us a lot about how to navigate these 
competing reasons.  The settlements and strategies that have arisen in the history of a society are likely the best 
places to start when looking for a morally acceptable solution to the problem of disagreement in politics (1998, pp. 
47-52).
 But excluding the unreasonable in this way is problematic for two reasons.  First, we face 
the difficult task of determining who or what is (un)reasonable.  On our ordinary understanding 
of reasonableness, a reasonable person is one who responds appropriately to reasons, to 
evidence.  An unreasonable person, by contrast, is unwilling or unable to change his beliefs or 
intentions in the face of evidence that they are misguided.  Taken in isolation, the fact that you do 
or do not hold a particular belief tells us nothing about your reasonableness or lack thereof. 
Whether it is reasonable for you to hold the belief in question depends on how you were raised, 
what evidence you have been exposed to, and much else besides.  If you were born into a culture 
in which hereditary slavery was common and in which you were taught that there is nothing 
wrong with the practice, say, then you could reasonably believe that it is morally permissible.102
 Some people will resist this claim.  They will deny that it could ever be reasonable to 
believe that slavery is anything other than evil.  That reaction is understandable, given the fact 
that anyone raised in a modern Western society who believed that hereditary slavery is morally 
permissible would be unreasonable.  If you were raised in such a society, you have been exposed 
to sufficient evidence that slavery is in fact morally evil.  But the pro-slavery person we are 
imagining was raised in a society very different from our own; given the evidence he has (not) 
been exposed to, his belief could be reasonable.  The upshot is that determining who or what is 
reasonable or unreasonable is not as easy as one might think.  
 A further reason why excluding the unreasonable is problematic is that every person, 
whether reasonable or not, counts morally.  As Raz notes: “The life and well-being of those with 
unreasonable views are just as likely to be affected by the actions of political authorities as the 
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102  Raz uses the example of creationist science to make the same point: “[P]erfectly reasonable people can have 
unreasonable beliefs. Creationist science is committed to many unreasonable beliefs, but if you were taught 
creationist science at school and at home and came across no other science, then your reasonableness may be more 
in doubt if you reject creationist science than if you believe it” (1998, p. 35). 
life and well-being of other people.  Moreover, their life and well-being are of moral 
consequence.  They cannot be ignored”  (33).  Holding unreasonable views may be an intellectual 
defect, but it is not a moral one.  If your unreasonable views cause you to act wrongly, then you 
would be rightly criticized for those actions; but the holding of the views themselves is morally 
neutral.  Therefore, whatever moral reasons there are for requiring the agreement of reasonable 
people apply equally to unreasonable people.  If legitimacy requires agreement, then it requires 
the agreement of everyone, not just the reasonable. 
 The contractualist’s fundamental mistake is making justification dependent on agreement. 
Once she does that, the only way she can salvage the conclusion that some institutions are 
legitimate is to make hypothetical (rather than actual) agreement the standard of legitimacy. 
What this move ignores, however, is that there is no practical difference between actual 
justification and hypothetical justification: in the world in which we live, ‘can be justified to 
those living under it’ and ‘is justified’ amount to the same thing.  Why think that some institution 
can be justified to those living under it?  Because we are confident that it is justified by a sound 
argument.103  
 On Raz’s view, which I endorse, agreement (whether actual or hypothetical) tells us 
nothing about legitimacy.  Political institutions are justified (and thus legitimate) if and only if 
the principles upon which they are based are true.  The reason people could agree to those 
principles is that they are true; they are not true because people agree to them.
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103 “Justifications are in principle publicly available.  There can be contingent reasons why this person that will find 
it very difficult to come to realize that the principles are justified.  But there is nothing inherently private about 
justification.  Some people are not in a position fully to understand some justification or another, their senses may be 
impaired, or their powers of understanding limited.  For the most part, even they are capable, however, of realizing 
that the principles or beliefs in question are justified” (Raz 1998, pp. 37-8).  And: “Regarding any justified principle, 
people of normal capacities are in principle able to understand that it is justified.  The requirement that the principles 
on which the constitution is based be justified already includes the requirement that every potential subject of the 
constitution be in principle capable of understanding that they are justified” (ibid., p. 38).  
 The contractualist would likely reply that Raz’s view cannot accommodate the core 
insight of contemporary liberalism; namely, that justifications must be publicly available.  To be 
legitimate, the coercive force of the state must be seen as justified by those on whom that force is 
exercised.  It is not enough to have a true justification, the people being coerced must (be able to) 
see that the justification is true.104   
 But this reply rests on an overly demanding view of what each of us is owed as a rational 
agent.  It assumes that no rational agent should be forced to act on reasons she thinks are false, 
that there is always something problematic about someone being compelled to act on reasons that 
are not her own.  It ignores one of the essential characteristics of rational agents: we can change 
our minds.  If a person disagrees with our reasons, then we owe it to her to try to persuade her; 
and, since we could be the ones who are wrong, we should listen to her arguments as well. 
Especially when the stakes are so high – when we are trying to justify the use of coercive force – 
we should proceed with caution in the face of disagreement.  Treating everyone as a rational 
agent requires us to do so, but it does not require us to avoid acting on what we believe are the 
best reasons.105       
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104 Consider Rawls’s liberal principle of legitimacy: “our exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is 
exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be 
expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common human reason” (Rawls 2005, p. 
137).  As Nagel puts it, “our ultimate aim in political theory should be to approach as nearly as possible to 
unanimity, at some level, in support of the basic framework of those political institutions which are maintained by 
force and into which we are born” (1991, p. 8).
105  In Raz’s words: “Respecting people as rational self-directing agents does not require desisting from following 
true beliefs which those people dispute. The suggestion that it does have this implication confuses respect for 
people, because they have rational powers, with respecting their currently held views. That people have rational 
powers means that they are not stuck with the views they have at any given time, that they can examine and revise 
them.  We are considering the response to the fact that they have false beliefs. Given that they are rational we expect 
them to examine and revise such beliefs, and if we have any duties in this matter it is to encourage such 
reexamination.  In politics these duties include respecting freedom of expression, explaining policies to the 
population, and being open to arguments and to contrary suggestions.  It does not include a duty to desist from 
following the truth, when it is disputed” (1998, p. 43).
 Let’s recap where we’ve been so far.  According to contractualist arguments for political 
egalitarianism, legitimacy requires unanimous agreement; unanimous agreement is impossible 
unless everyone has an equal share of political power; therefore, legitimacy requires an equal 
distribution of political power.  I have two worries about such arguments.  First, I suspect that an 
unequal distribution of political power could be the object of unanimous agreement, and thus 
meet the contractualist standard of legitimacy.  But even if I am wrong about this, there is still 
reason to resist these arguments, because the contractualist account of legitimacy is not plausible. 
At least in the context of political legitimacy, agreement has no justificatory force.
      
II.
We now turn to a best-results conception of legitimacy.  On a best-results conception, political 
institutions are legitimate if and only if they produce better results than any other available 
institutions.  Results can be evaluated along many different dimensions – happiness, fairness, 
moral virtue, etc.  If happiness were the relevant dimension, for example, an institution would be 
legitimate if and only if it produced more happiness than any other available institution.  
 In this section we will focus on Robert Dahl’s (1989) argument for political 
egalitarianism, which evaluates results in terms of the equal advancement of interests.  The 
argument runs as follows: 
1. Whatever political institutions do the best job of advancing equally the interests of 
everyone living under them are legitimate.
2. The institutions that fit this description are those that give each citizen an equal share of 
political power.
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3. Therefore, political power ought to be distributed equally.106
In short, legitimacy requires equal advancement of each person’s interests, and the equal-
advancement-of-interests requirement entails that each person must have an equal share of 
political power.
 But while Dahl’s best-results view of legitimacy is more plausible than the 
contractualist‘s view for the simple reason that agreement plays no role in Dahl’s view, his 
argument for political egalitarianism is no more successful than the contractualist’s.  Dahl’s 
argument is unsound because the claim that giving each person an equal share of political power 
is the best way to ensure that everyone’s interests are advanced equally is false.  It is false 
because there are significant inequalities in the distribution of political competence.
 By ‘political competence’ I mean the combination of moral and technical competence 
needed to advance people’s interests in the political sphere.107  Moral competence involves not 
only a certain kind of knowledge – knowledge of what is in one’s own interest, what is in the 
interests of others, and how to reconcile one’s own interests with those of others – but also the 
disposition to act in the way that that knowledge calls for.  Technical competence is knowledge 
of how things work, how to get things done, how to achieve one’s ends.  (Moral and technical 
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106 “At the decisive stage of collective decisions, each citizen must be ensured an equal opportunity to express a 
choice that will be counted as equal in weight to the choice expressed by any other citizen.  In determining outcomes 
at the decisive stage, these choices, and only these choices, must be taken into account.  [The justification for this 
requirement] rests on the practical judgment that voting equality at the decisive stage is necessary in order to provide 
adequate protection for the intrinsic equality of citizens…. Without it, citizens would face the prospect of an infinite 
regress of potential inequalities in their influence over decisions, with no final court of appeal in which, as political 
equals, they could decide whether their interests, as they interpreted them, were given equal consideration.  Just as 
inequalities in other resources could give advantages to some persons in securing special consideration for their 
interests, and handicap others, so too, without a requirement of equal voting at the decisive stage, inequalities in 
votes could work cumulatively to violate the Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests” (pp. 109-10, emphasis in 
the original).
107 I take this conception of political competence from Dahl 1989, pp. 57-8.
competence need not track one another.  An agent could have very high moral competence but 
almost no technical competence, or vice versa.) 
 Why think that some people are more politically competent than others?  Beyond 
anecdotal evidence, consider the fact that many voters consistently vote in ways that frustrate 
their own interests.108  The simplest explanation of this is that at least some of these voters are 
lacking in political competence: they either do not know what is in their interests, do not know 
how to advance their interests through the voting booth, or both. 
 Dahl need not deny that some people are more politically competent than others.  What 
he must deny is that differences in competence could be large enough to justify giving some 
people more political power than others.  And he does in fact deny this, by arguing that each 
person is better placed than anyone else to advance her own interests:
In judging whether some course of action or policy is in A’s interests, either we 
must know something about A’s preferences, wants, or needs, or we must possess 
knowledge of what is good for A independently of A’s own preferences, wants, or 
needs….The more that knowledge of A’s interests requires direct access to A’s 
awareness, the more advantageous is the position of A herself.  If we were to 
assume that A’s own interests are most accurately reflected by her immediate 
preferences, her claim to adequate, even superior knowledge of her interests is 
enormously strengthened.  Likewise, though A’s expressed preferences might 
reflect a mistaken view of her deeper or more enduring wants, with respect to her 
wants, too, her unique access to her own awareness again provides a definite 
advantage.  Even if we were to hold that human interests consist ultimately not of 
preferences or wants but needs, as a general matter the self is probably in a better 
position than any other to know the relative order of urgency among its various 
needs. (1989, p. 102)
That all sounds plausible enough.  So why do I say that giving everyone an equal share of 
political power is not the best way to advance each person’s interests equally?  Because knowing 
one’s interests and advancing one’s interests are not the same thing.  Even if A knows better than 
anyone else which outcomes are in her interest, she may not be in a position to bring about those 
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108 See Jason Brennan (2011a, Ch. 7), Larry Bartels (2008, Chs. 3 and 4), and Bryan Caplan (2007).
outcomes.  Getting the outcomes one wants often requires knowledge and skills that many 
people lack – knowledge of how the political system works and the ability to gets things done 
within that system.
 To sum up: Since people differ in their ability to advance their own interests within the 
political sphere, Dahl’s argument for political egalitarianism has a false premise; namely, the 
assumption that giving everyone an equal share of political power is the best way to ensure that 
everyone’s interests are advanced equally.
 In response to this criticism, Dahl may be willing to concede that political equality is not 
sufficient for equal advancement of interests; he could say that an equal distribution of political 
power alone is not enough to meet his standard of legitimacy.  But he would likely insist that an 
equal distribution of power is nevertheless a necessary condition of legitimacy: ensuring that 
everyone’s interests are advanced equally will require something in addition to equalizing 
everyone’s share of power – offering political training classes, perhaps, or financial subsidies to 
those who are politically disadvantaged.  Whatever else legitimacy requires, however, surely it 
requires an equal distribution of political power.
 To which I reply: If an equal distribution of power is not sufficient for the equal 
advancement of everyone’s interests, then why insist on it?  Suppose no amount of training, 
subsidies, etc. will lead to everyone’s being equally able to advance their own interests.  What 
then?  If equal consideration of interests is our ultimate goal, then we should accept deviations 
from equality in the sphere of political power when these would better achieve that goal. 
 At this point, Dahl would presumably suggest that each of us has an interest in our 
judgments being taken as seriously as everyone else’s.  Dahl could then argue that any attempt to 
achieve the equal advancement of interests without an equal distribution of power is doomed to 
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failure.  The interests of those with greater-than-equal power would inevitably be advanced to a 
greater degree than the interests of those with less-than-equal power.  Every person has an 
interest in his judgments being given equal weight, and, in the case of those with less-than-equal 
power, this interest is necessarily frustrated.109 
 But this argument works only if we accept (1) that there can be no public test for political 
competence and (2) that each person has an interest in having his judgment be given equal 
weight.  Although I think that both of these claims are false, I will not say much about (1) now. 
This is not only because I have a hard time saying what form public tests of political competence 
should take – which I do – but also because I will say more about them in the next section.  For 
now, let’s focus on the claim that each person has an interest in having his judgment be given 
equal weight.  I think we should reject this claim because there is no compelling reason to give 
everyone’s judgments equal weight; and, absent such a reason, to assume that everyone’s 
judgments must be given equal weight is to beg the question in favor of political egalitarianism. 
I accept that all sane human beings have an interest in their judgment being given some weight – 
i.e., in not having their judgment ignored.  To have one’s judgment ignored would be to have 
one’s rationality ignored.  But what reason is there to think that each of us has an interest in 
having his judgment taken equally seriously?
 We treat different people’s judgments differently all the time, and it is hard to believe that 
this frustrates anyone’s interests.  We generally take the judgments of experts more seriously than 
we take the judgments of non-experts, for example.  Whether the subject is knitting or nuclear 
physics, we give extra weight to the judgments of people who know a lot about it.  Suppose the 
subject is your health.  Far from being frustrated, your interests are better advanced by giving 
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109 This should call to mind the argument of Christiano (2008, pp. 88-96) that we looked at in Chapter 2.
your doctor’s judgment more weight than your own: you will be better off in the long run if you 
trust his judgment more than your own.  Your judgment matters – it should not be ignored – but, 
when the subject is your health, it should not be given the same weight as your doctor’s.
 Dahl would likely say that this sort of case is irrelevant to the argument for political 
egalitarianism.  We are not talking about judgments in general or interests in general; we are 
talking about political judgments and political interests.110  Politics differs from other subjects 
(e.g., medicine) in that A’s judgment about her own political interests are always more reliable 
than anyone else’s judgment about A’s political interests. 
 But I think this is simply false.  We all hold some mistaken beliefs about what is in our 
best interest politically, and many people’s beliefs in this area are deeply confused.  Indeed, I 
suspect that in many cases the people who know a person well (her friends and family, say) have 
a better sense of what is best for her than she herself does.  In such cases, that person would be 
better off if her judgments were not given equal weight.  Suppose A gets all of her news from a 
very distorting source – e.g., the public-relations division of a political party.  This leads her to 
have consistently false beliefs about all sorts of things, including the connection between various 
governmental policies and her own well-being.  My claim is that A’s judgments should not be 
given equal weight.  Everyone, including A, would be better off if we gave more weight to the 
judgments of people who were better informed than A.  If I am right about this, then it is strange 
to say that we all have an interest in having our political judgments taken equally seriously.  And, 
absent such an interest, there is no reason to think that an equal distribution of political power is 
the best way to advance everyone’s interests equally.
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110 Christiano (2008, pp. 64-6) makes a lot of this distinction.
 But, we can imagine Dahl interjecting at this point, what about A’s interest in autonomy? 
Deferring to others’ judgments about your own interests is a serious loss of autonomy.  Hence, it 
is impossible for A’s interests to be advanced equally while A is deferring to others’ judgments 
about those interests. 
 My response is three-fold. First of all, I am not saying that we should completely ignore 
A’s judgments about her own interests or anything else.  We should give them some weight, just 
not as much weight as we give to the judgments of some other people.  Secondly, deferring to 
others’ judgment need not involve a loss of autonomy.  As Julia Driver has noted:
When an agent decides to accept the testimony [of the moral expert] the agent is acting 
autonomously.  There is an autonomous decision not to make one’s own decision.  So, 
one does display independence of thought at this level.  If the worry is that one is failing 
to make up one’s own mind, then the worry involves a confusion over levels of decision-
making.  If I decide to trust the expert, I have made an autonomous decision. (Driver 
2006, p. 635, quoted in Brennan 2011a, p. 97).111  
In other words, if A were to recognize that she would be better off by deferring to others’ 
judgments, she could choose to do so without thereby surrendering any autonomy.  Finally, no 
one is completely autonomous.  So, even if A’s lack of political power involves some loss of 
autonomy, it need not set back her interests to a significant degree.112
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111 Jason Brennan offers this example:
Deference can be autonomous when done the right way.  When I was a graduate student, I received 
plenty of practical advice (about writing, presenting, networking, etc.)  from my dissertation supervisor 
and other faculty.  I was in a position to grasp the truth of some of this advice but not all of it. Some of 
the advice could be shown true only through experience.  Still, when I accepted this latter kind of 
advice, I was not thereby acting non-autonomously.  I did not just take their word for it.  Rather, I 
accepted their advice because I came to an independent, autonomous judgment that they were 
trustworthy and reliable advisers.  Even as I followed their advice, I remained prepared to stop 
following it if I came upon strong enough evidence that they were wrong. (2011a, p. 97)
112 As Brennan puts it: “A self-controlled, authentic, autonomous individual might defer to others on politics because 
she recognizes that others will produce good enough outcomes, and within that range of likely outcomes, the 
outcomes just are not that important to her. Or she might defer because she accepts not having control over 
everything and finds more important places to make her stand” (Brennan 2011a, p. 101).  
 Now for a brief recap of this section.  Dahl argues that the best way to advance 
everyone’s interests equally is to give each person an equal share of political power.  I tried to 
show that this argument fails because political competence is not distributed equally.  Since some 
people are more competent than others, it is possible for everyone’s interests to be advanced 
equally even if some have more power than others.  Assuming that equal advancement of 
interests is the criterion of legitimacy, therefore, a political institution that allows some people to 
have more power than others could be legitimate. 
         
III.
David Estlund’s (2008) argument for political egalitarianism rests on his epistemic 
proceduralism, which is a hybrid contractualist/best-results theory of legitimacy.  Estlund argues 
that if we want to make the most accurate decisions we can while still respecting the need for 
unanimous agreement, then we ought to adopt a decision-making procedure in which power is 
distributed equally.113  
 As with the previous two arguments for political egalitarianism, I do not find this one 
convincing.  Estlund dismisses the possibility of everyone agreeing to an unequal distribution of 
political power, even one that is epistemically superior to an equal distribution.  He claims that 
someone could always object to a decision-making procedure in which some participants had 
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113 Throughout this section, I talk as if Estlund were a political egalitarian.  This could be misleading, since Estlund 
is attempting to justify democracy, not an equal distribution of political power.  These concepts are not equivalent 
because some democratic procedures and institutions may involve unequal distributions of power.  So why call 
Estlund a political egalitarian?  Because it is much less clunky to say “Estlund” than it is to say “someone who 
offers a parallel argument for political egalitarianism.”  Thus, in the interest of simplicity, I will continue to treat 
Estlund as a political egalitarian. 
more power than others.  In this section, I will argue that everyone could agree to an unequal 
distribution of power, if the epistemic benefits were large enough.
 To understand Estlund’s argument, we need to understand epistemic proceduralism. 
According to epistemic proceduralism, decisions “are legitimate and authoritative because they 
are produced by a procedure with a tendency to make correct decisions”  (2008, p. 8).114  As the 
term ‘epistemic proceduralism’ suggests, there is both a substantive and a procedural aspect to 
this standard of legitimacy.  In order to produce legitimate decisions, a procedure must be (a) 
procedurally fair and (b) more likely than not to get the right answers on the most important 
questions.115  The only decision-making procedures that can satisfy both of these criteria, 
according to Estlund, are ones in which political power is distributed equally.  Therefore, he 
concludes, an equal distribution of political power is necessary for legitimacy because it is the 
epistemically best procedure among those that are morally acceptable.116 
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114 Whereas I talk about the legitimacy of institutions, Estlund talks about the legitimacy of decisions.  There is not a 
problem, however, because legitimate decisions are simply decisions produced within legitimate institutions.  Thus, 
there is no tension between my discussion of legitimacy and Estlund’s.
115 This may sound quite demanding, but the epistemic bar is actually pretty low: “Epistemic proceduralism does not 
need procedures to be highly accurate.  This is an easy point to miss, because a natural alternative epistemic 
approach might say that laws are legitimate and authoritative when they are actually just or correct – that is, only if 
the procedure is highly accurate in that sense.  Epistemic proceduralism is importantly different.  It says that a 
modestly epistemic procedure gives legitimacy and authority to the general run of laws, even the mistaken ones. 
The analogy to keep in mind here is the jury trial, since its epistemic value is a crucial reason we think that even 
erroneous verdicts have authority.  That, too, is an epistemic proceduralist structure.  The point here is that we are 
not looking for a source of extremely high accuracy for democratic procedures (though that would be nice). 
Something quite modest will serve the needs of the theory” (Estlund 2008, p.18).
116  “I hope to support the conjecture that a proper democracy will tend to perform better than random across the 
wide range of issues it would face by arguing that with respect to the primary bads it would perform far better than 
random.  If we show that the primary bads [e.g., war, famine, economic collapse, political collapse]  would be 
reliably avoided, and why, then we can argue from there that this supports the supposition that the general run of 
decisions would be made with better-than-random accuracy: after giving due weight to the more important 
decisions, and factoring this into the evaluation of performance (a correct answer on a more important issue counts 
for more), the result would be better than a random procedure.  It is the overall weighted score that epistemic 
proceduralism needs to be better than it would be in a random procedure” (ibid., p. 160).
 Estlund says that although some distributions of power could very well be epistemically 
superior to an equal distribution, they could not be legitimate because they would require us to 
make invidious comparisons among the members of society.  The comparisons in question are 
claims of differential expertise, “claims that some [citizens] are wiser than others”  (2008, p. 36). 
Such comparisons are invidious because those who are labeled less wise – or, more simply, 
incompetent – would resent the label and deny the legitimacy of the system that placed it on 
them.  The only way to avoid the problem of invidious comparisons, according to Estlund, is to 
make legitimacy conditional on (hypothetical) agreement.  We thus get his qualified acceptability 
requirement, which states that a “necessary condition on the legitimate exercise of political 
power [is] that it be justifiable in terms acceptable to all qualified points of view” (ibid., p. 41).117
 So Estlund’s argument for political egalitarianism comes to this: an equal distribution of 
political power will lead to decisions that are better than random; any unequal, epistemically 
superior distribution of political power will run into the problem of invidious comparisons; 
therefore, if we want to make the most accurate decisions we can while also respecting each 
person’s moral status, we ought to distribute political power equally.     
 I think we should reject this argument for a couple of reasons.  For one, there is good 
reason to reject the claim that consent or agreement is a necessary condition of legitimacy.  Since 
we spent a good deal of time on this already, I will not belabor the point here.  I find Raz’s 
argument against the agreement-for-legitimacy view (see pp. 89-93 above) decisive.  Raz shows 
that respecting people as rational agents does not require us to avoid acting on reasons with 
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117 For our purposes, we can treat “qualified acceptability” as equivalent to “reasonable agreement.”  If we substitute 
‘reasonable’ for ‘qualified’, we get something very similar to Rawls’s liberal principle of legitimacy: “[O]ur exercise 
of political power is fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which 
all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in light of principles and ideals acceptable to 
their common human reason” (Rawls 2005, p. 137). For Estlund’s explanation of why he prefers ‘qualified 
acceptability’ to ‘reasonable agreement,’ see 2008, pp. 43-4. 
which they disagree.  And once we do away with the agreement condition, we have to take 
seriously the possibility that an unequal distribution of political power could be morally 
acceptable.  That is, even if an equal distribution of power is the only distribution that everyone 
could agree to (which I doubt), this does not show that an equal distribution is the only legitimate 
one.
 My second worry about Estlund’s argument is that, despite appearances, it does not take 
the accuracy of political decisions seriously enough.  Estlund admits that some unequal 
distributions of political power could produce more accurate decisions than could an equal 
distribution.118   The only reason he does not endorse any unequal distribution of power is that it 
would require us to make invidious comparisons between citizens.  It would require some sort of 
competence testing, he says, and there will always be reasonable doubts about whether these 
tests are reliable measures of how competent people actually are.  I do not think we should give 
up the potential increased accuracy of our decisions so quickly, however.  Instead, we should 
look more closely at whether it is possible to increase the accuracy of our decisions without 
making invidious comparisons.  I believe it is.119  
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118 “[E]ven if the knowers aren’t generally acceptable, they do exist. And they might simply be a more accurate 
source of knowledge about what should be done than any democratic procedure could ever be. I don’t want to deny 
this” (Estlund 2008, p. 7).
119 On this point, I agree with John Stuart Mill: “There is not, in [the practice of distributing power in proportion to 
competence], anything necessarily invidious to those to whom it assigns the lower degrees of influence.  Entire 
exclusion from a voice in the common concerns is one thing: the concession to others of a more potential voice, on 
the ground of greater capacity for the management of the joint interests, is another.  The two things are not merely 
different, they are incommensurable.  Every one has a right to feel insulted by being made a nobody, and stamped as 
of no account at all.  No one but a fool, and only a fool of a peculiar description, feels offended by the 
acknowledgement that there are others whose opinion, and even whose wish, is entitled to a greater amount of 
consideration than his.  To have no voice in what are partly his own concerns is a thing which nobody willingly 
submits to; but when what is partly his concern is also partly another’s, and he feels the other to understand the 
subject better than himself, that the other’s opinion should be counted for more than his own accords with his 
expectations, and with the course of things which in all other affairs of life he is accustomed to acquiesce in.  It is 
only necessary that this superior influence should be assigned on grounds which he can comprehend, and of which 
he is able to perceive the justice” (1861, Ch. 8). 
 A lot depends on the details, of course.  Some judgments about a person’s competence are 
demeaning; it is clearly demeaning, for instance, to be labeled as less competent than your fellow 
citizens simply because you have less formal education than they do.  But this does not show that 
all judgments about competence are demeaning.  It may not be demeaning to be labeled as less 
competent than your neighbors if you freely choose to be so labeled.  Suppose the government 
(national, state, or local) sets up a series of civics classes.  The only requirement is that each class 
cover certain basic information about history and about how the political process works (how 
votes are cast, how districts are drawn, how a bill becomes a law, etc.).  The classes themselves 
are run by various organizations (political parties, chambers of commerce, activist groups, etc.). 
Now suppose that the government enacts a law saying that you cannot give money to any 
political campaign unless you have attended at least one of these classes.  The law is justified as 
follows: by restricting campaign donations in this way, our political decisions will be more 
accurate, because people will be more informed about who they are giving their money to and 
how it will be spent.  Assume for the sake of argument that the law would indeed lead to more 
accurate decisions.  The question is, Does this increase in accuracy come at the cost of invidious 
comparisons?  Not obviously.  If you choose not to attend a meeting, then you will have a less-
than-equal share of political power because you will not be able to donate money to political 
campaigns.  But our explanation of why you have a less-than-equal share of power is not that 
you are less competent or less important than anyone else; rather, it is that we have no evidence 
that you possess the basic information covered in the classes.  Our law is based on the 
presumption that attending a class is a reliable indicator of at least a minimal level of political 
competence.  Thus – assuming the law was well publicized, the meetings were offered at 
convenient times, etc. – you have no one to blame but yourself for your relative lack of political 
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power.  We are not discounting your intellectual or moral worth.  We are saying that, since you 
did not jump through certain hurdles, you cannot do certain other things.
 To be clear, I am not saying that we should offer such classes and use them in the way 
imagined.  In any real-world scenario, some people will not have access to such classes or the 
classes themselves will be used for non-educational purposes (political parties will seek 
advantage by preventing members of other parties from attending, say).  All I am trying to show 
here is that there is nothing necessarily invidious about judgments that some people should have 
more political power than others.  At least for those who did have a genuine opportunity to attend 
but chose not to, their relative lack of power is not morally objectionable.  This (admittedly 
unrealistic) scenario shows that we could get the epistemic benefits of making the distribution of 
political power sensitive to competence without making demeaning judgments about anyone. 
Thus, Estlund’s claim that an unequal distribution of political power necessarily involves 
invidious comparisons is false.           
 It is worth noting that we do not need to make precise judgments about competence in 
order for more competent people to have more political power than less competent people. 
Many of the institutional filters we have in place do not even try to identify the most competent; 
they are designed merely to weed out the incompetent.  Why do we require most government 
employees to have college degrees?  Not because the possession of a degree ensures that you are 
fully competent but because the lack of a degree is a reliable indicator that you are not fully 
competent.  Why do we require senior-level administrators to be confirmed by Congress?  Again, 
the idea is not that the most competent candidate will emerge from the confirmation process but 
rather that the process will prevent a truly incompetent candidate from getting the job. 
Qualification requirements and confirmation hearings are designed to ensure that the people 
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whom we entrust with a certain amount of power have a certain amount of competence.  They 
are analogous to jury selection in this regard.  Lawyers are not looking for the most competent 
jurors; they are trying to get rid of those who are incompetent in ways relevant to the case.120 
While it is hard to know how much such filters improve the accuracy of our collective decisions, 
they surely help somewhat.  And here’s the important point: they do not require us to make 
invidious comparisons.  
 Now, one could insist that qualification requirements do involve invidious comparisons – 
“You don’t have a degree, so you must be incompetent.”   But if that is right, then it is hard to see 
why such comparisons are morally objectionable.  If you do not meet the minimum requirements 
for admission to the university of your choice, you should not feel insulted when your 
application is denied.  You know where the bar is set, and you are free to do whatever you can to 
clear that bar and apply again next year.   
 Of course we will make mistakes in our judgments about people’s competence levels. 
After all, we are drawing rough-and-ready conclusions from minimal evidence.  The risk of 
making a mistake is present in any political action, however.  It is often a reason to proceed with 
caution, not a reason for inaction. 
 To sum up this section: Estlund argues that if we want to make accurate decisions, within 
the constraints of unanimous agreement, we should distribute political power equally.  Any 
unequal distribution would lead to invidious comparisons, he argues.  I have tried to show that 
this is not necessarily true, that we can have the epistemic benefits of an unequal distribution of 
political power without demeaning or insulting anyone.  Thus, Estlund’s hybrid best-results/
contractualist theory of legitimacy does not entail political egalitarianism.  Even if we accept that 
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120 See Brennan (2011b, pp. 703-10) for a discussion of the parallels between the role of juror and the role of voter.
legitimacy requires both accurate decisions and unanimous agreement, legitimacy does not 
require an equal distribution of political power. 
IV.
We will conclude this chapter with arguments based on deliberative democratic theories of 
legitimacy.  Deliberative democrats see legitimacy as a product of free and rational public 
deliberation.121   We will look at the arguments for political egalitarianism of two prominent 
deliberative democrats: Joshua Cohen and Jürgen Habermas.  By now it should come as no 
surprise that I do not find these arguments compelling.  Not only is the deliberative democrats’ 
view of legitimacy problematic, I doubt that an equal distribution of political power is the only 
way to secure the goods that deliberative democrats claim legitimacy requires.  
 We begin with Cohen’s argument.  Its starting point is the following criterion of 
legitimacy: “outcomes are democratically legitimate if and only if they could be the object of a 
free and reasoned agreement among equals”  (2009, p. 23).  How could outcomes be the object of 
a free and reasoned agreement among equals?  By emerging from a decision-making process in 
which reason alone determines the outcome.  Cohen then describes what such a process – which 
he calls the ideal deliberative procedure – would look like.122   For our purposes, the only 
relevant feature of the ideal deliberative procedure is the need for everyone involved to be equal 
in certain respects:  
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121 Classic statements of deliberative democracy can be found in J. Cohen 1989 and 1996; Habermas 1996; and 
Gutmann and Thompson 1996.  Some read Rawls as a deliberative democrat, but this is controversial (see Brighouse 
1997, and J. Cohen 2003).
122 There are four features in total: it is free, it is reasoned, it is among equals, and it aims at consensus (Cohen 2009, 
pp. 23-5).
In the ideal deliberation, parties are both formally and substantively equal.  They 
are formally equal in that the rules regulating the procedure do not single out 
individuals.  Everyone with the deliberative capacities has equal standing at each 
stage of the deliberative process.  Each can put issues on the agenda, propose 
solutions, and offer reasons in support of or in criticism of proposals.  And each 
has an equal voice in the decision.  The participants are substantively equal in that 
the existing distribution of power and resources does not shape their chances to 
contribute to deliberation, nor does that distribution play an authoritative role in 
the deliberation. (2009, p. 24, emphasis in the original) 

That is the ideal at least.  What does it have to do with real-world deliberations?  Cohen says that 
we should try to approximate the ideal as closely as possible.123  The closer we can bring our 
actual procedures to mirroring this ideal, the better our decisions will be.  (Call this the mirroring 
doctrine.124)  And in order to approximate the ideal deliberative procedure, we need an equal 
distribution of political power: “people who are equally motivated and equally able to play [the 
role of active citizen], by influencing binding collective decisions, ought to have equal chances to 
exercise such influence” (Cohen 2009, p. 272).  Inequalities of power introduce non-rational 
forces into the process.  The powerful could coerce (through bribery, threats, etc.) the weak into 
accepting a decision that they know is not supported by the best reasons.125  The relatively 
powerless could be forced to accept a decision that they do not actually agree with – either 
because they literally cannot do anything to stop it or because agreeing to it is the only way to 
avoid some worse alternative.
 So, to summarize Cohen’s argument for political egalitarianism: 
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123 “The aim in sketching this procedure is to give an explicit statement of the conditions for deliberative decision-
making that are suited to the formal conception, and thereby to highlight the properties that democratic institutions 
should embody, so far as possible.  I should emphasize that the ideal deliberative procedure is meant to provide a 
model for institutions to mirror” (Cohen 2009, p. 23).
124 The label comes from Estlund 2008.
125 The idea must be that equalizing power would minimize such non-rational forces, not eliminate them, since 
coercion is certainly possible among equals.
1. In the ideal deliberative procedure, everyone must have equal opportunity for influence 
(equal power) over the collective decision-making process. 
2. Legitimacy requires that our political institutions mirror the ideal deliberative procedure 
as closely as possible. (The mirroring doctrine.)
3. Therefore, legitimacy requires an equal distribution of political power.          
I think we should reject both premises of this argument.  We will consider each in turn.  
 The problem with the first premise – the claim that, in the ideal deliberative procedure, 
everyone must have equal opportunity for influence over the decision-making process – lies in its 
justification.  The justification appeals to two values: responsibility and accuracy.  Cohen takes 
pains to explain why both of these values call for equality of opportunity for influence, rather 
than straight equality of influence, in the ideal deliberative procedure.126  Responsibility calls on 
us to allow deviations from straight equality of influence in the ideal deliberative procedure 
because allowing some people to have more influence than others is a necessary part of treating 
everyone as responsible agents.  If someone chooses to sit out of some deliberation, for instance, 
holding him responsible for this choice entails allowing him to have no influence on the outcome 
of that deliberation.  Similarly, we should allow deviations from equality of influence in our ideal 
deliberative procedure because this would improve the accuracy of our decisions.  Everyone 
having equal opportunity to influence our collective decisions leads to better decisions than 
everyone having the same amount of actual influence because the former, unlike the latter, allows 
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126 “[I]t is unreasonable to demand influence irrespective of one’s own actions or of the considered convictions of 
other citizens.  That demand is unreasonable, because a compelling interpretation of the idea of political equality 
must ensure a place for individual responsibility.  Members of a democratic society are represented as free…. As 
free, they are to be treated as responsible for their political judgments and conduct.  So if I demand influence 
irrespective of the judgments of other citizens, then I deny the importance of such responsibility.  Once we accept it, 
then we accept, too, that a regime with equal opportunity for effective influence is almost certain to be associated 
with inequalities of actual influence” (Cohen 2009, p. 274).
us to discriminate on the basis of the quality of argument.  We can let people who make good 
arguments be more influential than those who make bad arguments. 
 My claim is that Cohen’s justification of his first premise better supports an ideal that 
permits some people to have greater opportunity than others to influence the decision-making 
process.  In other words, Cohen should not stop at equality of opportunity; the same reasons he 
gives for allowing deviations from straight equality of influence also justify allowing deviations 
from equality of opportunity for influence.  If we take responsibility and accuracy as seriously as 
Cohen says we should, then we should allow some people to have not just more actual influence 
than others but more opportunity than others.
 Holding people fully responsible for the choices they make could entail allowing them to 
have less than equal opportunity for influence.  Suppose John lost all of his money through 
gambling.  Without money, John lacks one of the key means of influencing our public 
deliberations; thus, he has less opportunity for influencing our deliberations than many of his 
neighbors.  (They can use money to publish their views and the arguments in support of those 
views, whereas John cannot.)  But, assuming John knew the risk he was taking when he made his 
bets and freely chose to go through with them anyway, he is rightly held responsible for the 
choice that resulted in him having less-than-equal opportunity for influence.  Hence, there are 
cases in which people make responsible choices that lead to them having not just less-than-equal 
actual influence but less than equal opportunity for influence.  
 The same is true of equality of opportunity for influence and the value of accuracy.  If 
Cohen is right about the epistemic benefits of adopting equality of opportunity for influence, 
rather than straight equality of influence, then why not let those who make good arguments have 
greater-than-equal opportunity to influence our decisions?  The ideal of equality of opportunity is 
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more attractive than straight equality of influence because it allows us to discriminate on the 
basis of quality of argument.  Those who make good argument should have more actual influence 
than those who makes bad arguments.  But if that’s right, then why not go one step further and 
say that those who make good arguments should have more opportunity to influence our 
decisions than those who make bad arguments?  Our decisions would be more accurate if we 
gave the most skilled deliberators more opportunity to influence the process – more time to 
speak, perhaps.  (The suggestion is not that taking accuracy seriously should lead us to prevent 
all but the most skilled people from speaking; rather, it is that we allow the most skilled to speak 
more than the least skilled.)  In short, it looks like Cohen’s justification of his first premise does 
more than he realizes: it justifies not only inequality of actual influence but also inequality of 
opportunities for influence over the process of public deliberation.     
 Now, Cohen would likely reject my claims in regards to both responsibility and accuracy. 
In regards to responsibility, Cohen would likely say that taking responsibility seriously does not 
require us to allow people like John to have less than equal opportunity for influence.  He would 
probably deny that John has less than equal opportunity despite his lack of money; the idea being 
either that having equal opportunity at one time is sufficient for realizing the ideal of equal 
opportunity or that John still has equal opportunity because he is still able to regain his lost 
money (and thereby his influence).  In regards to accuracy, Cohen would no doubt challenge my 
claim that allowing some people to have more opportunity for influence than others would 
improve the accuracy our decisions.  Inequalities of opportunity for influence lead to worse 
decisions, not better; such inequalities distort the deliberative process by giving non-rational 
 108

forces – bribery, threats, etc. – a larger role. After all, the reason that the ideal deliberative 
procedure has so much epistemic value is that, in it, none but rational forces are at work.127
 There are problems with each of these responses, however.  Let us take responsibility 
first.  The only way that Cohen can avoid the tension between responsibility and equality of 
opportunity is by invoking an implausible view of equality of opportunity.  The view is that if 
you had equal opportunity at any point in the past, you cannot justifiably complain that you lack 
equal opportunity now.  Even if you do not now, and never will again, have equal opportunity, 
that does not change the fact that you had it at some point in the past.  And that is all that the 
ideal of equality of opportunity requires.128  Why do I think this view is implausible?  Because it 
seems to be at odds with the egalitarian intuitions that would lead someone to adopt equality 
(rather than, say, sufficiency) as the distributive ideal for opportunity in the first place.  Consider 
two different intuitions that could underlie the belief that John has no grounds for complaint 
about his opportunity set after his losing bets.  The first is that he still has equal opportunity.  The 
second intuition that he still has enough of an opportunity.  I suspect that someone who adopts 
the view of equality of opportunity I have sketched is more likely motivated by the second than 
the first.
 There are at least two problems with Cohen’s response in regards to the value of 
accuracy.  For starters, there is plenty of room for non-rational factors to play a role even in 
deliberations among equally powerful parties.  An equal distribution of power does little if 
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127 “[Parties in an ideal deliberation] give reasons with the expectation that those reasons (and not, for example, their 
power) will settle the fate of their proposal.  In ideal deliberation, as Habermas puts it, ‘no force except that of the 
better argument is exercised’ [Habermas 1975, p. 108]” (Cohen 2009, p. 24).
128 Following Dworkin, we might call such a view a “starting gate” conception of equal opportunity.  For a 
discussion of starting-gate theories of justice, see Dworkin (2000, pp. 87-90).  For some graphic examples of how 
harsh such theories can be, see Anderson (1999, pp. 295-301).
anything to correct for the cognitive biases each of us brings to any deliberation.129  Moreover, 
the threat of non-rational forces such as coercion and bribery playing a role in a deliberation is 
not necessarily increased by asymmetries of power.  There is no reason to think that parties with 
slightly unequal shares of power cannot deliberate just as rationally as parties with precisely 
equal shares of power.  Perhaps the threat of coercion, bribery, etc. is increased by large 
asymmetries in power.  But, even then, a concern for accuracy should lead us to limit how large 
the asymmetries of power can get, not to eliminate them altogether.
 Moving on now to the second worry I have about Cohen’s main argument for political 
egalitarianism.  It concerns the argument’s second premise, the mirroring doctrine – the claim 
that we should attempt to approximate, as far as possible, ideal deliberative conditions in the real 
world.  The problem with this claim is that in the real world, where deliberation falls far short of 
the ideal, trying to mirror ideal deliberations may actually make things worse.  Our real-world 
deliberations do not, indeed cannot, perfectly resemble the ideal deliberative procedure; because 
actual deliberations have time constraints, participants are not equal in all relevant respects, 
participants do not always act in good faith, and for many other reasons.  Why not try to get our 
real-world institutions to mirror the ideal deliberative procedure?  Because, as Estlund points out, 
“promoting that kind of resemblance to the ideal would often require acquiescence in the face of 
serious distortions of the process of deliberation, skewing not only the process but also the 
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129 For a discussion of such biases and the distorting effects they can have on deliberation, see Sunstein (2009). 
decisions that are likely to result”  (2008, p. 204).  The best response to deviations from the ideal 
can be to further deviate from it.  Sometimes we ought to fight fire with fire.130
 Imagine that you are running for Congress.  Your opponent in the campaign is an 
incompetent jerk.  (He does not know or care about the public good; he’s in politics only to better 
himself and his cronies.)  His only chance to beat you is to “go negative”  – i.e., to attack you 
personally.  And that’s exactly what he does; he runs a relentlessly negative campaign.  How 
should you respond?  Should you stay above the fray, trying to adhere to the ideal of deliberative 
democracy by arguing rationally about policy issues?  Or should you respond in kind by lobbing 
a few ad hominems of your own?  If you refuse to go negative, you will lose and your district 
will be represented by an incompetent jerk.  If you attack your opponent personally, you will 
win.  (Attack ads may appeal to non-rational forces, but they work.)  So what should you do? 
You should go negative.  This is a case where the appropriate response to an initial deviation 
from the norms of rational deliberation is a further deviation, not an attempt to adhere to those 
norms as closely as possible.  Therefore, the claim that real-world political deliberations should 
mirror, so far as possible, ideal deliberative conditions – the mirroring doctrine – is false.  And, 
thus, Cohen’s argument for political egalitarianism is unsound.
 Now, Cohen would likely disagree with my analysis of this case.  He would likely say 
that a further deviation from the ideal of rational deliberation can only be justified in terms of its 
good consequences, and that consequences are irrelevant here.  Cohen is concerned with 
procedures, not consequences.  On purely procedural grounds, two wrongs cannot make a right. 
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130  “Even if it would be desirable for the deliberative norms to be respected by [everyone in the political sphere], 
nothing even approximating this is likely.  This presents a profound version of the problem of the second best.  The 
problem of the second best, in general terms, is the fact (when it is one) that when one of a number of desiderata is 
not satisfied, the other desiderata are no longer appropriate.  That is, a situation that departs even further from the 
original list of desiderata may be better than one that more closely conforms to them” (Estlund 2008, p. 190).
Trying to justify your deviation from the norms of ideal deliberation by appealing to an outcome 
shows that you do not understand the nature of your obligation to conform to those norms.  On 
Cohen’s view, we are obligated to conform to the norms of the ideal deliberative procedure 
because we are trying to reach unanimous agreement through a process that is free of coercion 
and deception.  By going negative in response to your opponent’s initial negative tactics, you are 
getting even further away from the ideal.  You are introducing even more coercion and deception 
into the process, thereby undermining the ultimate goal – unanimous agreement among free and 
equal rational agents.  
 What is my reply?  The further deviation from the ideal deliberative procedure can be 
justified on purely procedural grounds.  Your deviation is not simply a way of bringing about a 
single good result (your worthless opponent is blocked from becoming an elected 
representative), it also increases the rationality of our deliberations. By canceling out one 
irrational force with another, you are making the overall deliberation more rational.  The second 
deviation brings us closer to the ideal rather than further away.131  Having our deliberations be as 
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131 On the notion of using a countervailing non-ideal force to get closer to the ideal: 
[A]n influence that does not at first lead someone to choose something for the right reasons may in the 
longer run do precisely that.  Like choices based on nonrationally conditioned preferences, choices that 
are directed at incentives, and hence are unconnected to the (potential) value of what is chosen, may 
themselves put agents in a position to appreciate that (potential) value ‘from the inside.’… Moreover, 
while incentives admittedly can divert attention from value-based reasons, they can also cancel the 
effects of counterincentives that otherwise would themselves divert attention from such reasons.  For 
example, by subsidizing artistic projects, a government can reduce the need for artists to undertake 
commercial ventures, and thus can free them to respond to more purely aesthetic considerations. (Sher 
1997, p. 64)
rational as possible remains the ultimate goal, but we acknowledge that sometimes this goal is 
best served by introducing non-rational factors into actual deliberations.132
 So, in the end, I have two worries about Cohen’s argument.  The first is that the values of 
responsibility and accuracy, which Cohen appeals to in his justification of the ideal of equality of 
opportunity for influence, actually justify an ideal that allows for inequalities of opportunity for 
influence.  If we take responsibility and accuracy seriously, then there is no good reason not to 
allow some people to have greater opportunities than others for influencing the decision-making 
process.  My second worry has to do with the claim that our political institutions should mirror 
the ideal deliberative procedure as closely as possible.  Cohen justifies this claim in terms of 
accuracy: the closer our actual institutions mirror those of ideal deliberation, the more accurate 
our collective decisions will be.  But it certainly looks as though there are cases in which 
accuracy is better promoted by deviating from, rather than mirroring, the ideal.
 Let us now turn to Jürgen Habermas’s (1996) argument for political egalitarianism, which 
does not involve the mirroring doctrine.  Here is my reconstruction of Habermas’s argument 
from deliberative democracy:
1. In pluralistic societies, all appeals to truth are controversial: there is no comprehensive 
worldview or conception of the good that everyone shares. 
2. Thus, we cannot show that our collective decisions are legitimate by appealing to truth – 
i.e., by insisting that our decisions are true or right.  The only way we can justify our 
collective decisions is to show that they are reasonable.133
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132  Christine Korsgaard offers a parallel argument about how a Kantian can justify violating the duties of ideal 
theory in response to non-ideal circumstances: “The Formula of Humanity and its corollary, the vision of a Kingdom 
of Ends, provide an ideal to live up to in daily life as well as a long-term political and moral goal for humanity.  But 
it is not feasible always to live up to this ideal, and where the attempt to live up to it would make you a tool of evil, 
you should not do so.  In evil circumstances, but only then, the Kingdom of Ends can become a goal to seek rather 
than an ideal to live up to, and this will provide us with some guidance” (1986, p. 349).
133  Notice that reasonableness here applies to decisions (or views, or claims, or beliefs), not people.  This is a 
contrast with the contractualists such as Rawls, Nagel, and Scanlon.
3. There is no process-independent standard for reasonableness.  Reasonable decisions are 
ones “to which all who are possibly affected could assent as participants in rational 
discourses” (458).  
4. The standard for reasonableness – and thus legitimacy – is hypothetical agreement:  “At 
the posttraditional level of justification,…the only law that counts as legitimate is one that 
could be rationally accepted by all citizens in a discursive process of opinion- and will-
formation”  (135).  So, a decision is legitimate if it could be unanimously agreed to after a 
rational deliberative process.
5. The best way to reach decisions that can meet this standard is to follow a decision-
making process in which non-rational forces (coercion, manipulation, exploitation, fear, 
etc.) play no role.
6. The best way to limit coercion, manipulation, exploitation, fear, etc. in our decision-
making process is to give everyone equal opportunity to influence the process – i.e., to 
give everyone an equal share of power.
7. Thus, the best way to make reasonable collective decisions – i.e., decisions “to which all 
who are possibly affected could assent”  – is to give everyone an equal share of power in 
the collective decision-making process.
8. Therefore, legitimacy requires an equal distribution of political power.
Habermas avoids the mirroring doctrine by not saying that real-world political deliberations 
should resemble ideal deliberations, but he does say that our political deliberations should 
produce decisions that resemble, as far as possible, the decisions produced by ideal deliberations. 
So, for Habermas, political equality is valuable insofar as it leads to outcomes that could have 
been produced by an ideal deliberative procedure.134 
 My problems with the above argument begin with the third premise.  Immediately after 
asserting that there is no process-independent standard of reasonableness to which we can 
appeal, Habermas appeals to just such a standard.  He does so by invoking a hypothetical 
agreement view of legitimacy.  On a hypothetical agreement view, we cannot judge the 
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134 Estlund (2008, pp. 88-90) argues – persuasively, I believe – that this is the most charitable reading of Habermas’s 
justification of political equality.
legitimacy of a particular decision by looking at the actual process that produced it.  The question 
of legitimacy is settled only by looking at the decision and asking whether it could have been the 
object of consensus in an ideal deliberation.  And that can be determined only by making a 
considered judgment about whether the decision is reasonable.  We can, of course, look at the 
features of the ideal deliberative process and see if any of these rule out the decision in question. 
But we cannot know whether it could be the object of consensus in an ideal deliberation; 
because, among other reasons, we cannot even imagine all the different perspectives that would 
be represented in such a deliberation.  Since we cannot engage in ideal deliberations, we must 
rely on our considered judgments here and now to determine whether a particular decision could 
have emerged from an ideal deliberative process.  So, unless Habermas is willing to concede that 
we can never know whether a particular decision is legitimate (which would be an unwelcome 
implication of a theory of legitimacy), he must appeal to a process-independent standard of 
reasonableness.  
 Now, all this shows is that Habermas’s argument is internally inconsistent: it appeals to 
process-independent standards while denying that there are any such standards.  We can modify 
the argument to avoid this problem.  We simply can remove the claim that there are no process-
independent standards for the reasonableness of decisions and thus for legitimacy.  But if we do 
this (as I believe we should), it becomes clear that agreement (whether hypothetical or actual) is 
not doing any justificatory work in the account.  All the work is being done by some process-
independent standard for reasonableness.    
 But, given his skepticism about process-independent standards for reasonableness, 
Habermas would likely resist this move.  The only way to remove the inconsistency in his 
argument, therefore, is to give up his hypothetical agreement view of legitimacy and adopt an 
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actual agreement view instead.  If Habermas were to insist that there are no process-independent 
standards for reasonableness – and thus no process-independent facts about the legitimacy of 
political decisions – he would have to modify the rest of his argument (steps 4 through 8) so that 
hypothetical agreement no longer provides the standard for the legitimacy of our decisions.  He 
would have to modify his argument in this way because, as I noted above, a hypothetical-
agreement view of legitimacy cannot judge the legitimacy of a particular decision by looking at 
the actual process that produced it.  On such a view, we must look at the decision itself and 
determine whether it could have been the object of consensus in an ideal deliberation.  And how 
do we determine that?  Not by looking at the procedure that actually produced it – no actual 
deliberation is ideal, if for no other reason than that there are no time limits in ideal deliberations. 
No, we must determine whether a decision is reasonable by seeing if the reasons that support it 
are good reasons.  What, according to this view, makes reasons good reasons?  Presumably the 
fact that everyone would, after adequate deliberation, come to accept them.  Thus if Habermas 
wants to avoid a process-independent standard of legitimacy, the most natural way to modify his 
argument would be to replace hypothetical agreement with actual agreement.  Modified in this 
way, Habermas’s criterion of reasonableness – and, by extension, legitimacy – for a decision 
would be whether everyone would in fact agree to it.  
 As we have already seen, however, an actual agreement view of legitimacy has the 
counter-intuitive implication that few (if any) decisions will ever be legitimate.  There will 
(almost) always be somebody who disagrees with the decision in question.  
 Habermas faces a dilemma.  First horn: keep agreement as the standard of legitimacy, but 
make it actual rather than hypothetical agreement.  Second horn: employ a substantive (i.e., 
process-independent) standard of legitimacy, and admit that agreement is not doing any 
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justificatory work in the account.  If Habermas adopts an actual-agreement view of legitimacy, 
then virtually no decision will be legitimate.  If he adopts a view of legitimacy in which 
agreement plays no justificatory role, then he has abandoned one of his fundamental 
commitments; namely, the claim that unanimous agreement among rational agents is the only 
source of legitimacy in a pluralistic society.          
 Beyond the questions I have raised so far about Cohen’s and Habermas’s arguments, I 
have a worry about deliberative democracy in general.  The worry is that the deliberative 
democratic account of legitimacy is irrelevant to the real world.  It is irrelevant because it makes 
several unrealistic assumptions about politics and political agents.  Cohen clearly states these 
assumptions when he spells out the features that a deliberative procedure must have if it is to 
produce legitimate decisions.  The procedure must be free: the participants’ “consideration of 
proposals is not constrained by the authority of prior norms or requirements”  (2009, pp. 23-4).  It 
must be reasoned: “[T]he parties of it are required to state their reasons for advancing proposals, 
supporting them, or criticizing them.  They give reasons with the expectation that those reasons 
(and not, for example, their power) will settle the fate of their proposal”  (p. 24).  It must be 
among equals: “[The parties to the deliberation] are substantively equal in that the existing 
distribution of power and resources does not shape their chances to contribute to deliberation, 
nor does that distribution play an authoritative role in the deliberation” (p. 24).  And it must aim 
at consensus: “[the goal of the procedure is] to find reasons that are persuasive to all who are 
committed to acting on the results of a free and reasoned assessment of alternatives by 
equals” (pp. 24-5).  
 While there is nothing incoherent about these assumptions, the possible world in which 
they are realized is very far from our own.  Hence, it is unclear how much the theory of 
 117

deliberative democracy can help us in answering practical political questions – such as how 
political power ought to be distributed.  My worry, in other words, is that actual political agents 
and institutions are so far removed from ideal deliberative procedures that deliberative 
democracy is irrelevant to real-world political issues.
 Deliberative democrats are aware of the irrelevance objection.  Cohen’s response is that 
the ideal of deliberative democracy gives us a model for institutional reform.  Even if we 
ourselves and our political institutions can never perfectly resemble the ideal, we should try to 
approximate the ideal as closely as possible: “the ideal deliberative procedure is meant to provide 
a model for institutions to mirror”  (2009, p. 22).  The problem with this response is that it is 
simply a restatement of the mirroring doctrine, which we have already rejected.  Remember: it 
does not follow from the fact that a certain deliberative procedure is ideally rational that we 
should try to make our real-world deliberations approximate it as closely as possible.  Even if we 
want our actual decisions to be as rational as possible, mirroring the ideal deliberative procedure 
is not always the best way to achieve this goal.  Sometimes the best response to deviations from 
the ideal is to deviate further from it, in an effort to counteract the initial deviations.   
 How problematic one finds the unrealistic assumptions of deliberative democracy 
depends on what one wants from a normative political theory.  I suspect that most people want an 
ideal for how we could live, either now or in the foreseeable future.  If I’m right about this, then 
the more unrealistic a theory’s assumptions are, the more irrelevant it becomes.  Every theory has 
to make some unrealistic assumptions.  (My sufficiency view is no exception: it assumes that the 
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ideal distributive principle for political power is – to use Raz’s term – satiable.135)  But not every 
theory has to make as many unrealistic assumptions as deliberative democracy does. 
 So, to sum up, I reject Cohen’s and Habermas’s arguments for political egalitarianism 
because of their internal tensions and because the deliberative democratic account of legitimacy 
is implausible.  I have two problems with Cohen’s argument in particular.  The first is that his 
argument is not an argument for political egalitarianism; it actually justifies an ideal that would 
allow some people to have more power than others.  The second problem with his argument is 
that it relies on the mirroring doctrine, which is false.  As for Habermas, I claim that he faces a 
dilemma.  He must either adopt actual agreement as the criterion of legitimacy (thereby ensuring 
that few if any decisions will ever be legitimate) or adopt a process-independent criterion of 
legitimacy (thereby abandoning his view claim that unanimous agreement among rational agents 
is the only source of legitimacy in a pluralistic society).  And the deliberative democratic account 
of legitimacy is implausible because it makes several unrealistic assumptions about political 
agents and political institutions. 
V.
In this chapter we have considered and rejected several more arguments for political 
egalitarianism.  We began with an argument that takes a contractualist approach to legitimacy.  I 
rejected this argument for two reasons: (1) contractualist theories of legitimacy are not plausible 
and (2) even if such theories were plausible, they would not provide a solid foundation for 
 119

135  Principles are satiable if their demands can be completely met, in which case “whatever may happen and 
whatever might have happened the principles cannot be, nor could they have been, satisfied to a higher degree” (Raz 
1986, pp. 235-6). This means that it is possible, in principle, for everyone to have enough political power.  And if 
everyone had enough power, no one’s claim to more power would be stronger than anyone else’s.
political egalitarianism, since some unequal distributions of power could meet the contractualist 
standard of legitimacy.  We then turned to an argument based on a best-results theory of 
legitimacy.  I rejected this argument because there is good reason to doubt that an equal 
distribution of political power is the best way to achieve the best results.  Next was David 
Estlund’s (2008) argument for political egalitarianism, which is based on a hybrid contractualist/
best-results view of legitimacy.  I rejected this argument because I think that Estlund puts too 
much weight on the contractualist elements of his account and not enough on the best-results 
elements.  Lastly, we looked at arguments based the deliberative democratic approach to 
legitimacy.  I rejected these both because there are internal tensions within each and because the 
deliberative democrat’s view of legitimacy is problematic.
 Where does this leave us in regards to political egalitarianism?  I agree with the political 
egalitarian’s claim that any two people with equal political ambition and equal political talents 
ought to have the same amount of political power.  Where I disagree with the political egalitarian 
is on the question of what, if anything, the above claim has to do with societies such as our own. 
In large, pluralistic societies, some people are more ambitious and talented than others.  Political 
egalitarians say that we should structure our political institutions as if people were equally 
talented and ambitious.  I think that would be a mistake.  There are significant costs to ignoring 
differences in talent and ambition for the purpose of structuring our political institutions.  The 
costs include violations of autonomy and less accurate collective decisions, among others.  So, I 
concede that political equality is an attractive ideal, in certain circumstances.  But it would be 
difficult, if not impossible, to bring about the relevant circumstances in any complex, modern 
society; and, even if that end were obtainable, the means may not be morally acceptable.
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 In the next chapter, I will try to show that, in most cases, a sufficient distribution of 
political power – i.e., a distribution in accordance with a principle of sufficiency – would better 
promote the values that motivate political egalitarianism.  Whether a society ought to have an 
equal or a sufficient distribution depends on several factors, including the interests of the people 
there and the social institutions already in place.  There is no simple formula that applies to all 
societies.  In some, an equal distribution of political power will be the only way to strike the 
proper balance between the various values at stake.  In most societies, however, a sufficient 
distribution would produce a better balance.  Finding the proper balance will be difficult, of 
course.  And which balance is proper can change over time: if accuracy becomes less important 
than solidarity, say, then competence should play less of a role in the distribution of political 
power than it did previously.  We might then do away with judicial review, for example; because, 
no matter the cost in the accuracy of our decisions, we do not want to give so much power to a 
few unelected officials. 
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  Chapter 4: A Sufficientarian Approach

 
Up to this point, my argumentative strategy has been almost entirely negative.  I have argued 
that, with a few exceptions, equality is not an attractive distributive ideal for political power.  It is 
not attractive because of the conflicts between political equality and other important values.  We 
cannot pursue or maintain an equal distribution of political power without restricting some 
citizens’ autonomy, decreasing the accuracy of our collective decisions, and so on.  I will now 
pull together the strands of these negative arguments into a positive argument for a non-
egalitarian distributive ideal for political power.  
 I defend a version of political sufficientarianism.  Political sufficientarianism is the view 
that each person ought to have enough political power.  Stated at this level of abstraction, few 
would object to the view; even political egalitarians could fully embrace it.  What makes political 
sufficientarianism interesting (and controversial) is its further claim that something less than an 
equal share can be enough.  I will attempt to justify sufficientarianism by appealing to the moral-
equality requirement we encountered several times above.  I agree with political egalitarians that 
we ought to set up our political institutions so that each member of society is treated as a moral 
equal.  Where I disagree with egalitarians is on the question of whether this goal is best achieved 
by an equal distribution of power.  I will argue that a sufficient distribution of power would better 
achieve this goal because it can better accommodate the fact that people differ in ways that affect 
how much political power they need in order to be treated as moral equals.  On any plausible 
theory of well-being, a person’s interests depend in part on her circumstances – her own 
preferences and skills, the preferences and skills of her neighbors, and the broader social context 
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she finds herself in.  Thus, a single unit of political power does not affect each person’s well-
being equally; it may benefit some, harm some others, and have no effect on yet others.  That is 
why an equal distribution of political power is not entailed by the moral-equality requirement. 
What is entailed by this requirement is that each person should have as much or as little power as 
she needs in order for her interests to be advanced to the same degree as everyone else’s.  Being 
treated as a moral equal requires that you have enough power, and enough could be a greater or 
lesser share than some of the people around you. 
 A term coined by Joseph Raz might be helpful here.  Raz (1986) applies the label of 
rhetorical egalitarianism to positions or arguments which appear egalitarian – because they 
invoke the value of equality – but whose egalitarian tendencies are actually a by-product of the 
pursuit of some non-egalitarian value or principle.136   I think many arguments for political 
egalitarianism are rhetorical in this sense.  The cases invoked by political egalitarians are often 
cases in which an agent or group has (almost) no power.  The most troubling aspect of these 
cases, from a moral point of view, is that the agent or group does not have nearly enough power. 
The fact that they also have an unequal share of power is, if anything, a secondary worry.  I 
suspect that what bothers most people about the current, very unequal distribution of political 
power in our society is not the lack of equality per se; it is the fact that so many people do not 
have enough power.  If that’s right, then sufficiency rather than equality is the operative value. 
 123

136 “Arguments and claims invoking equality but not relying on strictly egalitarian principles are rhetorical.  This is 
not meant in a derogatory sense.  It is simply that they are not claims designed to promote equality but rather to 
promote the cause of those who qualify under independently valid principles.…[P]rinciples of equal respect or 
concern, etc., often amount to little more than an assertion that all human beings are moral subjects, to an assertion 
of humanism.  Such principles can be expressed with equal ease without invoking equality.  They are not designed to 
increase equality but to encourage recognition that the well-being of all human beings counts.  If their resort to 
fashionable egalitarian formulations makes them more attractive, so much the better.  The price we pay is in 
intellectual confusion since their egalitarian formulation is less perspicacious, i.e. less revealing of their true 
grounds, than some non-egalitarian formulations of the same principles: ‘Being human is in itself sufficient ground 
for respect’ is a more perspicacious rendering of ‘All humans are entitled to equal respect’.” (Raz 1986, p. 228).
 This chapter has three sections.  In the first, I make the case for adopting sufficiency 
rather than equality as the distributive ideal for political power.  My argument, simply put, is that 
a sufficient distribution is better equipped than an equal one to treat all members of society as 
moral equals.  In the next section, I spell out my sufficiency view in more detail, paying special 
attention to some of its non-traditional elements.  In the final section, I consider some of the 
practical prescriptions that fall out of my view.
I.
Ronald Dworkin was one of the first to argue against political egalitarianism.  In the fourth and 
final paper in his series on the concept of equality137, he asks whether political equality is an 
attractive ideal.  Dworkin argues that in a truly egalitarian society – i.e., a society committed to 
treating all its members with equal concern and respect – political power should not be 
distributed equally.  The pursuit of political equality, he argues, leads to the neglect of other 
values.  Political egalitarianism gives insufficient weight to the accuracy of our decisions, for 
example, because it focuses entirely on the process through which political decisions are made, 
ignoring the results of the process.  Dworkin concludes that what really matters is not that each 
citizen have an equal share of political power but rather that each have enough to participate in 
the political arena as a moral agent: 
Moral agency is possible for all citizens in politics only if each has an opportunity to 
make some difference…[T]his says nothing about equality of influence…The 
emphasis is on the opportunity for some influence––enough to make political effort 
something other than pointless––rather than on the opportunity to have the same 
influence as anyone else has. (2000, p. 203)
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137 Dworkin 1981a, 1981b, 1987a, and 1987b.
This statement suggests that sufficiency, not equality, is the ideal here.138  Whereas the egalitarian 
says that everyone ought to have the same amount of power, the sufficientarian says that 
inequalities do not matter, so long as everyone has enough power.  
 Sufficiency is, by now, a familiar option in debates about how various goods should be 
distributed.139  The canonical statement of sufficientarianism comes from Harry Frankfurt: “what 
is important from the point of view of morality is not that everyone should have the same but that 
each should have enough”  (1987, p. 134).  This is sufficientarinaism in its most general form. 
Political sufficientarianism is simply this ideal applied to the distribution of political power: what 
is important from the point of view of morality is not that everyone should have the same amount 
of political power but that each should have enough political power.   
 I will now try to show that, as a distributive ideal for political power, sufficiency is more 
attractive than equality.  The starting point of my argument is what we may call the fact of moral 
equality – the fact that everyone’s well-being is of equal and tremendous importance.140   
 A few words on well-being, interests, and moral equality.  I conceive of well-being in 
terms of interests.  To say that your well-being is increased is to say that your interests are 
advanced.  To say that your well-being is decreased is to say that your interests are frustrated. 
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138 I say ‘suggests’ rather than ‘entails’ because Dworkin is not a political sufficientarian.  He rejects any attempt to 
impose a distributive ideal on political power, on the grounds that it ignores the personal, moral significance of 
political agency.  I address this worry in Chapter 5.
139 Although the positions continue to be refined, most contributors to this debate end up defending equality, priority, 
or sufficiency.  For defenses of equality, see Temkin (2003), Casal (2007), and Otsuka and Voorhoeve (2009).  For 
defenses of priority, see Parfit (2002), Arneson (2006), and Holtug (2007).  And for defenses of sufficiency, see 
Crisp (2003), Dorsey (2008), and Huseby (2010).
140 Samuel Scheffler on the ideal of equality: “it asserts that all people are of equal worth and that there are some 
claims that people are entitled to make on one another simply by virtue of their status as persons.  As a social ideal, 
it holds that a human society must be conceived of as a cooperative arrangement among equals, each of whom 
enjoys the same social standing.  As a political ideal, it highlights the claims that citizens are entitled to make on one 
another by virtue of their status as citizens, without any need for a moralized accounting of the details of their 
particular circumstances” (2003, p. 22). 
Two people are moral equals insofar as their interests ought to be advanced equally.  Two people 
are treated as moral equals insofar as their interests are in fact advanced equally.  And when I say 
that something is “in the agent’s interest,”  I mean that it promotes one or more of the particular 
interests of the agent – e.g., his interest in autonomy.141   As much as possible, I will remain 
neutral on the question of what is in people’s interests, of what makes people’s lives go best.  I 
do assume, however, that each person has an interest in at least one of the values at stake in the 
political arena (accuracy, autonomy, fairness, etc.).  Thus, my argument for sufficientarianism is 
compatible with any account of well-being that has some objective component.142  
 So the first premise of my argument comes to this: each person’s interests (whatever they 
may be) ought to be advanced to the same degree as everyone else’s.  All people count the same.  
 What implications does this have for the distribution of political power?  No one’s share 
of political power should prevent him or anyone else from being treated as a moral equal.  The 
point of disagreement between myself and political egalitarians is whether having an equal share 
of power is a necessary part of being treated as a moral equal.  I argue that it is not.  If giving 
everyone an equal share of power is the only way for a particular society to advance everyone’s 
interests equally, then that society should adopt equality as its distributive ideal for political 
power.  But, as we saw in the previous two chapters, an equal distribution of political power 
often would not lead to everyone’s interests being advanced equally.  Since people differ both in 
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141  This formulation of something being in an agent’s interest comes from Joel Feinberg: “One’s interests, then, 
taken as a miscellaneous collection, consist of all those things in which one has a stake, whereas one’s interest in the 
singular, one’s personal interest or self-interest, consists in the harmonious advancement of all one’s interests in the 
plural.  These interests, or perhaps more accurately, the things these interests are in, are distinguishable components 
of a person’s well-being: he flourishes or languishes as they flourish or languish. What promotes them is to his 
advantage or in his interest; what thwarts them is to his detriment or against his interest” (1984, p. 34).  For other 
possible interpretations, see Feinberg 1984, pp. 38-45.   
142 The view could be purely objective or a subjective/objective hybrid, such as Parfit’s “composite” view of well-
being (1984, pp. 500-2).
interests and in ability to advance their own interests via the political process, an equal 
distribution of power will favor some people more than it does others.      
 To begin to see why a sufficient distribution of political power is better equipped than an 
equal one to meet the demands of moral equality, we need to think about the effects that the 
distribution of power has on various values at stake in the political arena –  accuracy, autonomy, 
responsibility, fairness, solidarity, and economic productivity.  Why focus on these values and 
not others (e.g., honesty, aesthetic beauty)?  Partly because interests in these values are 
widespread.  We all have an interest in some of them, and most of us have some interest in all of 
them.  But the main reason I focus on these values is that our political institutions have a large 
effect on how well they are promoted.  If we structure our institutions to distribute power in 
proportion to competence, for example, we would promote accuracy.  If our institutions were 
designed to eliminate as many unearned (dis)advantages as possible, this would promote 
fairness.  And so on down the list.    
 What does the fact of moral equality tell us about how much we should promote these 
values?  It tells us that we should promote each value to whatever degree is necessary in order 
for everyone’s interests to be advanced equally.  Thus, the degree to which each value should be 
promoted in a given society depends on the interests of the people within that society.  Different 
people have different interests, so the promotion of any of these values does not affect every 
person in the same way.  One person’s well-being is significantly increased by living in a fair 
society, for example, while someone else’s well-being is unaffected by this.  I may have a greater 
interest in responsibility than you do – i.e., my well-being would be benefitted more than yours if 
our society began to promote responsibility more than it has in the past.  Or suppose that I have 
benefited from many unfair advantages in my life while you have suffered unfairly.  Now 
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suppose that our society begins to take fairness more seriously; it shifts its institutions in order to 
make things more fair.  This would increase your well-being while leaving me either worse off or 
the same as before.
 What is the connection between the promotion of these values and the distribution of 
political power?  The distribution of political power goes a long way toward determining how 
well or poorly these values are promoted.  If one group is so powerful that it can ignore all others 
(because it does not need their cooperation to achieve its desired outcomes), this will obviously 
undermine the sense of solidarity among the groups.  Or if some people are so politically 
powerful that they are insulated from the negative consequences of their actions, say, this 
frustrate the promotion of responsibility.
 To be clear, I am not saying that these values matter simply because someone happens to 
have an interest in them.  One reason they matter is that their promotion has an effect on people’s 
well-being, but they matter for other reasons as well.  So, for example, even if it turned out that 
no one in a particular society had any interest in fairness – no one’s well-being was increased or 
decreased to any degree by (un)fairness – there may still be reason to promote fairness in that 
society.  Thus, although I remain neutral on what is in fact in anyone’s interests, I do not have to 
remain neutral on whether these values matter.  I assume that they do matter.  On a more 
practical level, this means it will usually be a good thing for a society to promote all of the 
values, regardless what the interests of its members happen to be.
 The upshot is that different people need different amounts of political power in order to 
be treated as moral equals, in order for their interests to be advanced equally.  Some people need 
more (or less) political power than others.  Sufficientarianism can justify such inequalities: it 
says that everyone should have enough political power – i.e., whatever amount of political power 
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is necessary in order for the various values to be promoted the degree necessary in order for 
everyone’s interests to be advanced equally.  What counts as enough political power can vary, 
depending on the circumstances.  Egalitarianism does not have this sort of flexibility.  An equal 
distribution must be equal.  Therefore, if treating everyone as moral equals is our ultimate goal, 
sufficiency is a more attractive distributive ideal for political power than equality is.  
 Now, insofar as I am neutral on the question of which values are indeed in people’s 
interests, I am also neutral on the question of the degree to which any of these values should be 
promoted.  This is not a problem for my overall argument.  Because, as I will now argue, 
sufficientarianism is better equipped than egalitarianism to promote any of these values to the 
degree necessary in a particular society.  Rarely does one value take precedence over all the 
others.  Even those who take accuracy seriously, for instance, recognize that we must balance the 
need get the right answer with other demands.143   Sometimes accuracy wins out, sometimes 
fairness does, sometimes something else; but they all matter somewhat.  
 What I want to show now is that each of these values individually is promoted at least as 
well under sufficientarianism as it is under egalitarianism, and that, when we consider the need to 
promote more than one of these values at the same time, sufficientarianism does better still. 
 We will begin by looking at each value separately and asking whether it would be better 
served by an equal or a sufficient distribution of political power.
Accuracy.  We want our decisions to be accurate.  A decision is accurate insofar as it is right 
(best, correct).  The criterion for rightness varies from case to case.  Suppose we are deciding 
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arrangement that Estlund labels “epistocracy.”  This is essentially the view that Plato defends in Republic, Bk. IV. 
See also Laches 184e8-9 and Gorgias 463d1-465e1.  Aristotle’s view, though clearly epistocratic, is somewhat more 
moderate (see Politics, Bk. III).
which voting procedure to adopt in an upcoming election.  In this case, the most accurate 
procedure would be the one that does the best job of conveying the genuine preferences of 
voters.  But in the case of a Supreme Court decision, say, the criterion of accuracy may have 
nothing to with the preferences of voters; it may be fidelity to the Constitution, or something 
else.  
 Unlike some who talk about the value of accuracy, I do not equate it with moral rightness 
or goodness.144  On my account, a decision can be accurate and morally repugnant at the same 
time.  Suppose we want to maximize economic efficiency.  Suppose further that the best way to 
maximize economic efficiency is to violate some people’s moral rights.  If we chose to violate 
these rights and thereby maximized economic efficiency, our decision would be both immoral 
and accurate.  Which is not to say that we cannot assess the accuracy of a decision in moral 
terms.  If we are trying to distribute resources in a just way, for instance, the most accurate 
decision would be the one that comes closest to meeting the demands of justice – whatever those 
turn out to be.  In short, although accuracy is not opposed to moral considerations, it is distinct 
from them. 
 It is often difficult to know whether a decision is accurate – since it is difficult to know, 
for instance, what (all of) the demands of justice are in a particular case.  And many claims 
regarding accuracy will be controversial: there is much disagreement not only about moral issues 
but also about what policies promote economic efficiency and other non-moral values.  But 
difficulty and controversy should not lead us to abandon the notion that our collective decisions 
can be more or less accurate: even if we cannot know or agree on which decisions are the most 
accurate, it still makes sense to say that some are in fact better than others along this dimension.   
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 Why think that a sufficient distribution of power could produce more accurate decisions 
than an equal one?  Because, unlike egalitarianism, sufficientarianism can allow competence to 
play a role in the distribution of political power.  By giving a greater-than-equal share of power 
to those who are better at making political decisions, our decisions will be more accurate than 
they would be if we gave everyone an equal share.   
Autonomy.  Recall the conception of autonomy I sketched above, according to which a person is 
autonomous insofar as he lives by his own lights.  An autonomous agent is (to a significant 
degree) author of his own life and responsive to the reasons provided by his situation. 
 Concern for autonomy leads naturally to a sufficientarian distribution of political power. 
Ensuring that someone has enough power requires much less intrusion into her life than 
ensuring that she has the same amount of power as everyone else.  As I argued at length in 
Chapter 2, maintaining an equal distribution of political power could involve interfering with 
someone’s ability to live by her own lights.  The tension between equality and autonomy often 
arises in cases involving people with more or less political skills than their neighbors.  In the case 
of a highly skilled agent, we would have to place restrictions on her ability to speak publicly 
about political issues.  In the case of a lowly skilled agent, the pursuit of political equality could 
require her to forgo certain valuable, non-political projects.
Responsibility.  If we care about promoting the value of responsibility, then we must allow 
people to enjoy or suffer the consequences of their actions.  There is more room to do this within 
sufficientarianism than there is within egalitarianism.  Egalitarians can permit some inequalities 
in the distribution of power that arise from holding people responsible for their actions, but they 
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must mitigate such inequalities as much as possible.  (They can permit inequalities in other 
spheres, of course, but only so long as these do not lead to significant inequalities of political 
power.)  Sufficientarians need not worry about inequalities that result from decisions for which 
people are rightly held responsible, so long as these do not cause anyone to fall below the 
threshold of sufficiency.  Thus, responsibility can play some role in political egalitarianism, but 
not as large of a role as it can in sufficientarianism.       
 
Fairness.  On the surface it may appear that an equal distribution of political power is more fair 
than a sufficient one.  Assume that it is unfair for people to be advantaged in the sphere of 
political power because of factors that are arbitrary from a moral point of view.145  Putting aside 
for now the question of what makes certain factors arbitrary from a moral point of view, it is safe 
to say that many of the ones that affect a person’s location in the distribution of power fall into 
this category – physical attractiveness and inherited wealth, for instance.  If everyone had the 
same amount of power, no one would gain an advantage from such factors.  Therefore, it looks 
like fairness demands that political power be distributed equally.
 I agree with this argument, up to a point.  It is true that if we made no attempt to equalize 
the distribution of political power, it would be very unequal, and this would be (in some sense) 
unfair.  But I worry that the conception of fairness upon which the above argument relies – it is 
unfair for someone to benefit from something that is arbitrary from a moral point of view – is too 
demanding.  This conception of fairness is demanding because, on reflection, it is unclear which 
factors are not arbitrary in this sense.  Even something as seemingly non-arbitrary as how much 
effort one puts into one’s work is dependent on many factors that are just as arbitrary as the 
 132

145 Cf. Rawls 1971, §§ 12, 17.
wealth of one’s family – e.g., one’s pain tolerance.146  Two people doing the same activity may 
experience different amounts of pain, or, even if the pain-level is the same, it may bother one of 
them more than it does the other.  Either of these differences could eventually affect how much 
effort each puts out.  
 Put more positively, my point is that some values (e.g., autonomy, responsibility) are not 
morally arbitrary.  If one insists on eliminating or offsetting all arbitrary factors in the name of 
fairness, then one has to abandon most other values.  Regardless whether that is a worthwhile 
tradeoff, it is one that few (if any) political egalitarians are willing to make it.  If we accept the 
above demanding view of fairness, then almost every inequality in the distribution of political 
power is unfair.  Yet even political egalitarians want to allow for inequalities from sources such 
as willingness to participate in the political process and quality of arguments.  Suppose you could 
not care less about politics because you grew up in a family where politics was never discussed. 
Political egalitarians would probably concede that you should be allowed to have a less-than-
equal share of power.  But, according to the present conception of fairness, this would be unfair, 
since the fact that you were born into this family rather than a more politically active one is 
surely arbitrary from a moral point of view.  Similarly, suppose that you have more political 
power than most of your neighbors because of your ability to give sound arguments.  Surely this 
ability relies on many things that are arbitrary from a moral point of view, and, therefore, it 
would be unfair for you to be advantaged because of it.  But even egalitarians want to allow for 
inequalities that result from some people offering better arguments than others.  Hence, we need 
a more lenient conception of fairness.  
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 And once we adopt a more lenient conception of fairness, it is not so clear what fairness 
calls for in the distribution of political power.  More plausible conceptions of fairness – i.e., ones 
that permitted a person to gain some advantages from factors that are arbitrary from a moral 
point of view – would likely allow for some inequalities in the sphere of political power.  Thus, it 
would be a mistake to assume that an equal distribution of power is more fair than a sufficient 
one.
Solidarity.  Once again, it may seem obvious that an equal distribution of political power would 
best promote a sense of solidarity among the members of society.147  Things are not so clear, 
however.  An unequal distribution of political power certainly could undermine a community’s 
sense of solidarity – if, say, everyone’s sense of membership in the community were tied to 
having the same amount of political power as everyone else.  But this is clearly not the case for 
all societies.  The sense of solidarity within a community depends on many things besides how 
much power anyone has.  It depends, for example, on the cultural traditions of the various groups 
that form the community and how well (or poorly) the traditions of one group mesh with those of 
others.  The upshot is that the value of solidarity may be served by many different distributions 
of political power, including a sufficient distribution.  We should not assume that solidarity is 
undermined by inequality. 
Economic productivity.  Each of us benefits from living in a society that not only produces many 
goods but produces them efficiently.  One could argue that an economy would be more 
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productive if everyone in it were political equals.  Perhaps the idea is that everyone could 
produce more goods if they did not have to worry about their share of political power.  
 But, such arguments notwithstanding, I do not see any connection between political 
equality and economic productivity.  What I can see is how an economy could perform much 
better under a sufficient distribution of power than it could under an equal distribution.  Under a 
sufficient distribution, those who would be better off by spending their time and effort engaged 
in economic activity rather than political activity could do so.  We would not have to worry about 
ensuring that everyone remained political equals despite their divergent pursuits. 
    
What if I’m wrong about one or more of these values?  What if one of them would fare better, 
perhaps much better, under an equal distribution of power than under a sufficient distribution? 
Suppose it turns out that an equal distribution of power is the best, perhaps only, way to achieve 
fairness.  Does this conclusively tell in favor of political egalitarianism?  Not unless the value of 
fairness trumps all others.  And that is unlikely: there will almost always be several competing 
values that ought to be promoted simultaneously.  Thus, even if some value(s) were better served 
by egalitarianism than by sufficientarianism, the case for the latter could still be quite strong.  
 So far we have looked only at the various values individually.  I now want to consider 
what happens in cases where we need to promote multiple values alongside one another.  This is 
an important test, since rarely (if ever) will a single value take precedence over all the others. 
Although the relative weight of each value will vary in different contexts, each one will have 
some weight in almost every context.
 Suppose that, in order to promote autonomy, we must ensure that everyone has at least 10 
units of political power.  Suppose further that, in order to promote accuracy, we must ensure that 
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the most competent among us have as much as 40 units of power.  Finally, suppose that, in order 
to promote economic productivity, some people – namely, those who are not economically 
productive – should be allowed to have as little as 10 units of political power.  Depending on 
how much weight we assign to the remaining values (fairness, responsibility, etc.), the members 
of this society would best served by a distribution of power that went from 10 units at the bottom 
to 40 at the top.  An equal distribution of power – whether it was at 10, 20, 30, or some other 
level – would leave many of these people worse off than they would under a sufficient 
distribution.148 
 We could consider countless examples of this sort, but my point should be clear enough 
by now.  If concern for each value individually calls for some inequalities in the distribution of 
political power, a concern for all the values will often call for even greater inequalities in that 
sphere.  Sufficientarianism can accommodate this fact; egalitarianism cannot.  Thus, once again, 
if we take seriously the need to promote the values of autonomy, fairness, etc., the most attractive 
distributive ideal for political power is sufficiency. 
 One might worry that there is a problem lurking here.  The problem is that my view can 
yield inconsistent demands.  I say that we should distribute political power so that each value is 
promoted to the necessary degree.  But suppose that the promotion of autonomy requires that 
everyone have at least 30 units of power, while the promotion of accuracy requires that some 
have less than 20 units.  We cannot fulfill both of these requirements: it is impossible for 
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sufficiency threshold for every individual – it is the amount of political power that he should have.  This threshold 
depends on many factors: the strength of his interests in various values; his skills; the strength of his neighbors’ 
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which he is a member; and so on.  We rarely have access to all of the relevant information for any individual, and, to 
make things even messier, these factors are not static (people change, as do their circumstances).  So, in practice, we 
will usually be able to do no better than judgments such as, “A should have somewhat more power than B.”
everyone to have at least 30 units of power at the same time that some have less than 20.  And 
things may get even worse as we bring in additional values.  Suppose that the promotion of 
fairness requires that everyone have the exact same amount of power, and that the promotion of 
responsibility requires that some have much more power than others.  In short, we may be 
morally obligated to do the impossible.  This seems to be a serious problem for my view because 
it seems to violate the principle of ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. 
 My response to this worry has two parts.  First, the sort of cases just described are quite 
rare.  Second, in cases where it is indeed impossible to meet our moral obligations in the sphere 
of political power, my view does not say that we are, all things considered, morally obligated to 
do the impossible.  My view says that we should compensate the people whose interests are 
frustrated as a result of a lack of political power.  Let us look at each part of this response in 
more detail, beginning with the first.     
 The need to promote different values generates conflicting requirements only if all the 
values in question are of roughly the same importance.  There is no problem if one of the values 
is much more important than the others: we resolve the conflict by giving priority to the 
requirements of the more important value.  Things are really simple if some values have lexical 
priority over others.  In that case, the demands of the most important value must be fully met 
before we even begin worrying about the demands of the next most important value, and so on 
down the priority ranking.  But I think it is implausible to give lexical priority to any of these 
values.  Even if we think that fairness, say, is the most important value, surely there is some cost 
in terms of autonomy (or accuracy, or responsibility, or whatever) that is too high to pay for the 
sake of greater fairness.  So, let us put the lexical-priority option to the side. 
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 Fortunately, we do not have to give lexical priority to any value(s) in order to resolve 
many of the potential conflicts.  If fairness is significantly, though not lexically, more important 
than responsibility, the fact that the demands of fairness conflict with those of responsibility is 
not too troubling.  We need not ignore completely the demands of responsibility, but we balance 
them against the demands of fairness only in extreme cases.  This obviously leads to the question 
of the relative ranking of the values.  Which is the most important, the second most important, 
and so on?  I have no answer to that question at this point.  I believe there is an answer, but 
discovering it is beyond the scope of this dissertation.  
 The upshot is that I cannot give very specific prescriptions for how political power should 
be distributed in the real world.  What I can do, however, is give prescriptions of this form: if the 
values are ranked like this, then people’s shares of political power should fall within this range; 
and if the values are ranked like that, then people’s shares of political power should fall within 
that range.  Consider a couple of possible rankings.  Suppose that autonomy is by far the most 
important value; it has significant, though not lexical, priority over all the others.  In that case, 
every individual and group should have quite a bit of political power, except when this would 
undermine completely our efforts to promote some other value(s).  Now suppose that 
responsibility is by far the most important value.  In that case, some people should be allowed to 
have little power while others have a lot; but, out of concern for other values, we should set a 
floor and a ceiling.  Of course, as the relative weights of several values converge, these 
prescriptions get more complicated.  
 Which brings us to the second part of my response to the worry about conflicting 
requirements.  Suppose that autonomy and accuracy are equally important, and that autonomy 
points toward everyone having at least 30 units of power while accuracy points toward some 
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having less than 20 units.  The best we can do here is to come as close as we can to promoting 
the relevant values to the necessary degree.  This may mean splitting the difference – i.e., giving 
everyone roughly 25 units of power.  Or it could mean using some complicated function that 
takes into account not only the interaction of the conflicting values but also all the other values, 
as well as facts about the broader social context:  we give some people as much as 28 and other 
people as little as 22, depending on how all the factors (the other values and the broader context) 
interact.  Either way, we are not satisfying the demands of autonomy or fairness fully, but we are 
satisfying them to the greatest extent possible. 
 In such cases – i.e., when we cannot meet the standard of sufficiency for everyone in the 
sphere of political power – we should compensate those people whose interests are insufficiently 
advanced.  Remember: the ultimate demand is to advance everyone’s interests equally.  By 
focusing on the distribution of political power, we have been assuming, in effect, that the 
distribution of political power is the only thing that affects how well or poorly people’s interests 
are advanced.  Discarding that assumption opens up the possibility of compensation.  We can 
compensate someone for his or her lack of political power.  Those people who do not have 
enough political power are harmed insofar as their interests are not advanced to the same degree 
as everyone else’s.  So we give them other benefits (goods other than political power) as a way of 
recognizing and offsetting that harm.  Whatever interests are frustrated by someone’s lack of 
political power should be advanced in some other way.  If someone’s share of power is too small 
to advance his interest in autonomy to the necessary degree, for example, we may exempt him 
from certain public service requirements (e.g., jury duty or draft registration).  This would at 
least lessen the harm of not reaching his sufficiency threshold for political power.  Compensating 
people in this way is possible because having sufficient political power is only one aspect of 
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being treated as a moral equal.  One’s interests can be advanced or frustrated by things other than 
one’s share of political power.  Not being subject to compulsory military service can do just as 
much (if not more) to advance one’s interest in autonomy as having more influence on the 
political outcomes in one’s community can.
 My main argument for sufficientarianism is now complete.  Here is a summary:
1. Everyone should be treated as a moral equal – i.e., everyone’s interests should be 
advanced to the same degree.
2. Everyone has an interest in – everyone’s well-being is affected by – one or more of the 
following values being promoted: accuracy, autonomy, responsibility, fairness, 
solidarity, and economic efficiency.
3. Therefore, these values should be promoted to the degree necessary to advance 
everyone’s interests equally.
4. How well these values are promoted depends on how political power is distributed.  
5. Therefore, political power should be distributed in a way that allows the above values 
to be promoted to the degree necessary to advance everyone’s interests equally. 
6. The distribution of political power that would allow each of these values to be 
advanced to the necessary degree will rarely (if ever) be an equal one.
7. Therefore, political power should be distributed in accordance with a principle of 
sufficiency, not equality.
In other words, there is nothing wrong with some having more power than others, so long as 
everyone has enough.  Sometimes only an equal share is enough; sometimes a less-than-equal 
share is enough; and sometimes only a greater-than-equal share is enough. 
 Note well: Political power does not directly serve the interests of the person who has it. 
Your having more political power does not necessarily lead to your interests being advanced to a 
greater degree.  The relationship between political power and the advancement of an individual’s 
interests is not direct but mediated – mediated by social institutions.  This is my fundamental 
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point of departure from traditional discussions of political power and interests – including, but 
not limited to, those of the political egalitarians we discussed in previous chapters. 
 The reason that institutions play this mediating role is that they have a large effect on 
how well the above values are promoted.  Autonomy is promoted by having a written 
constitution that includes a bill of rights, for example.  Given the fact of moral equality, 
institutions should advance everyone’s interests to the same degree.149  Thus, institutions should 
be structured so as to promote each value to whatever degree is necessary in order to advance 
everyone’s interests to the same degree.  
 As should be clear by now, political sufficientarianism is not an inherently conservative 
view.  Even if achieving a sufficient distribution of political power would not require as radical a 
transformation of ourselves and our institutions as achieving an equal distribution would, the 
transformation would be radical nonetheless.  As a sufficientarian, I strongly support trying to 
eliminate many of the inequalities that trouble political egalitarians.  I think the distribution of 
political power in our society ought to be much more equal than it currently is.  Where I part 
ways with the political egalitarian is on the reason why the present inequalities are troubling and 
on the extent to which they must be eliminated.  For the sufficientarian, the troubling thing about 
the present inequalities is not the inequality itself but rather the fact that so many people do not 
have enough political power.  Unfortunately, we are still a long way away from achieving either 
equality or sufficiency in this area.  And, given the way individuals and society are currently 
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124).
structured, it is probably impossible to bring the distribution of political power into conformity 
with either ideal in the foreseeable future.   
II.
Now that we’re clear on why sufficiency is preferable to equality, we can consider the details of 
my political sufficientarianism.  
 I should begin by explaining how my view differs from most sufficientarian views.  On 
my view, your sufficiency threshold is the amount of political power you ought to have.  You 
should not have any less or any more.  On standard sufficientarian views, it is not possible for 
someone to have too much of the good in question.  I claim that it is possible for someone to 
have too much political power.  It is possible because political power is a competitive good: how 
powerful you are depends on how powerful the people around you are.  Saying that someone 
does not have enough power is just another way of saying that someone else has too much. 
Since I claim that there is an optimum – right or correct – amount of political power for each 
individual, a better label for my view might be an optimum level view.  
 Nevertheless, I do not think it is too misleading to call my view sufficientarianism, for 
few of reasons.  First, talk of an “optimum level”  implies more precision than is warranted.  It 
will often be difficult, if not impossible, to know precisely how much power someone should 
have.  It is easier to make judgments of the form “she probably does not have enough”  or “he 
clearly has too much.”   Second, I accept the central sufficientarian thesis – “what is important 
from the point of view of morality is not that everyone should have the same but that each should 
have enough”  (Frankfurt 1987, p. 134).  Put most simply, my view is that everyone should have 
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enough power to ensure that everyone’s interests are advanced equally.  Third, the sufficiency 
label is helpful for locating my view within the larger equality/priority/sufficiency debate.  Even 
if it is not a traditional sufficientarian view, it is much closer to sufficientarianism than it is to 
egalitarianism or prioritarianism.    
 As with any version of sufficientarianism, the most important issue is the location of the 
threshold.  How much is enough?  I claim that everyone should have whatever amount of 
political power allows everyone’s interests to be advanced equally.  So far, so good.  The hard 
part is figuring out how much power a particular individual ought to have.  What makes it so 
hard is that the moral-equality requirement makes different demands in different contexts. 
People’s interests are not uniform within a society, much less between members of different 
societies.  We may be members of the same society, but our needs, preferences, and skills may be 
very different.  And the cultural, historical, and economic forces that affect people’s interests 
vary widely from society to society.  Suppose I am a twenty-something white American male and 
you are a seventy-something black South African female.  We probably share some interests – 
we both need a good deal of autonomy, say – but that could be where the similarities end.  My 
well-being will be affected in a different way, and to a different degree, if my society began to 
promote solidarity than your well-being would be if your society began to do the same.  Thus, 
insofar as interests are context-sensitive, sufficiency thresholds must be context-sensitive as well. 
And, don’t forget, things are further complicated by the fact that political power is a competitive 
good: since how much power you have depends on how much power the people around you 
have, how much power you ought to have also depends on how much power those people have. 
What all of this means is that thresholds will vary not only from society to society but from 
person to person.  
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 How much power an individual ought to have depends on his context in at least three 
ways.  First of all, it depends on the interests of the people around him – i.e., what role the values 
of accuracy, autonomy, fairness, etc. play in his neighbors’ well-being.  This is because the 
moral-equality requirement applies to everyone, not just to the individual in question.  His share 
of power must be compatible with everyone else’s interests, as well as his own, being advanced 
equally.  Secondly, an individual’s threshold depends on the institutions in place in his society. 
The more effective these institutions are at advancing everyone’s interests, the less power each 
individual needs to advance his own interests.  Thirdly, an individual’s threshold is affected by 
the presence (or absence) of like-minded people around him.  These are people with whom he 
could work to advance his interests.  The more people who are willing and able to advance their 
own and others’ interests, the less power each individual needs.
 So there is an element of relativism in my view, but only a small one.  The fundamental 
commitment is the same everywhere: distribute political power in a way that allows us to treat all 
members of society as moral equals, to advance everyone’s interests equally.  The relativism 
comes in because people’s interests vary.  The same value may matter more in one place than it 
does in another.  It matters more if it plays a larger role in people’s well-being; for example, 
promoting the value of fairness may improve the well-being of one group of people more than 
that of another group.  And the distribution of power that best promotes each of the values in 
question may vary from society to society.  Consider autonomy.  In some societies, autonomy 
may require a (relatively) equal distribution of power; in others, it may require only that no one 
have an absolute lock on power.  In a representative republic, it would be a significant setback to 
ordinary citizens’ interests in autonomy if they had no say in who their next head of state will be. 
In a hereditary monarchy, however, depriving people of a say on this matter may not frustrate 
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their interests at all.  It is not that the people in the former society have stronger interests in 
autonomy than the people in the latter; it is that the circumstances needed to protect people’s 
interests in autonomy vary from place to place.  
 My view is not completely relativistic because I claim that the moral-equality 
requirement has the same force everywhere.  Different values may be more important some 
places than they are in others, but all people are equally important and should be treated 
accordingly.  Treating everyone as moral equals will take different forms in different contexts, 
but the fact that we are morally required to do so is constant.  
 One more note before we discuss the location of thresholds.  The thresholds apply to 
individuals, not groups.  They tell us how much power a particular individual should have.  Now, 
to be clear, I will not try to give an algorithm for determining what any individual’s share of 
power should be.150  I will try merely to show which considerations are relevant to determining 
what an individual’s share of power should be – i.e., how much political power is enough for 
him.     
 What can we say about the location of thresholds?  Is there a minimum threshold, a level 
below which no one should fall?151  In rare cases, someone should be allowed to have no power. 
(A hermit in the mountains of Montana may not need any political power to advance his 
interests.)  But although it is a theoretical possibility that an individual should have absolutely no 
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150 I do not deny that such an algorithm is possible; indeed, on my theory, it must be possible.  But there are so many 
practical barriers – epistemic limitations, dynamic interests, etc. – to realizing this possibility that we can put that 
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151 In what follows, I use ‘minimum threshold’ to refer to the amount of power that no one in a particular society 
should have less than and ‘maximum threshold’ to refer to the amount no one should have more than.  The minimum 
is a floor, the maximum a cap.  Each person has only one sufficiency threshold: there is single level of power where 
she has enough, but not too much.  Suppose the minimum threshold in some society is 5 units of power and the 
maximum threshold is 100 units.  Each individual member’s threshold will fall somewhere between those levels – A 
should have 25 units, B 40 units, C 65 units, and so on.
power, there will almost always be pragmatic reasons to not allow this to happen.152  Even if 
there are cases in which someone should have little or no power, we should be very careful, in 
practice, to not arrive at that conclusion too quickly.  We could be mistaken, and we may not 
realize this till after the fact.  Given that the stakes are so high – we are talking about allowing 
someone to have no ability to influence our collective decisions – and that the potential damage 
could be so difficult to undo, the prudent option will almost always be to ensure that every agent 
has at least some power.  
 For most people, in most circumstances, they should have at least enough power to 
advance their interests to some degree.  Each of us is entitled to this much power because we are 
rational agents of equal moral worth – in the sense that each of us has a life of our own to lead, 
and every person’s life is as important as every other’s.  It is probably too much to expect an 
individual to have enough power to single-handedly advance his interests in the political arena. 
Few (if any) political agents have ever had that much power.  Fortunately, we need not act as 
isolated individuals in our efforts to advance our interests.  Social institutions and other like-
minded people do a lot of the heavy lifting here.  We are able to advance our own interests 
because we are acting within a pre-existing institutional framework and because we are acting 
alongside other people trying to advance their own interests.  
 So, regarding the minimum threshold, we can say that each individual ought to have 
enough power so that, with the help of various social institutions, he can either (i) advance his 
interests himself or (ii) be a member of a group that advances all of its members’ interests.  
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152 My model here is Raz’s “Disagreement in Politics”  (1998).  At the end of the article, after he has argued at length 
against the view that agreement is a necessary condition of legitimacy, Raz lists several reasons for exercising 
restraint in the face of disagreement.  He notes that serious disagreement can undermine stability, for example, and 
that a lack of agreement should lead us to reconsider the possibility that our beliefs are mistaken.  Agreement may 
not be as important as it is traditionally thought to be, but that does not mean that we should not try to achieve 
agreement whenever possible or ignore the views of people who disagree with us.
 Why do we need the second disjunct?  Because we do not want to say that virtually every 
individual falls below her threshold of sufficiency simply because she does not have enough 
power, acting alone, to advance her own interests in the political arena.  We want to say that she 
may have enough power, despite the fact that she needs the help of other people whose interests 
line up with her own.  (We are all members of countless groups, of course.  What is the criterion 
of group membership in this context?  Which groups are relevant to one’s threshold?  The groups 
in which you share at least one interest with all other group members.153)  
 To sum up: the minimum threshold is the amount of power that one needs in order to 
either advance one’s own interests to some degree (with the help of social institutions) or be a 
member of a group that is able to advance the interests of each of its members to some degree 
(with the help of social institutions). 
 The minimum threshold applies to everyone, no matter what interests they or their 
neighbors have.  If you fall below the minimum threshold of political power, political 
participation seems pointless.  You eventually recognize that your actions have no effect, and you 
begin to see politics as an interplay of forces entirely beyond your control, rather than as a 
collective enterprise in which you have a meaningful role to play.
 The location of this threshold – where the floor is, in terms of units of power – is not the 
same for all times and places.  It will vary along with the traditions and current conditions of a 
particular society.  Societies differ not only in that they are composed of different individuals but 
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153 Cf. Goldman 1972, pp. 173-5.
also in that each society has a unique history, culture, and economy.154  (Has governmental power 
traditionally been centralized in a national government or dispersed among more local bodies? 
How much power does the most powerful person now have?)  The location of the minimum 
threshold will not vary too much, however.  One reason for this is that the threshold is so low to 
begin with.  We are talking about the amount of power necessary for an individual’s interests to 
be advanced to some degree.  Not the amount of power that the individual would need in order to 
single-handedly advance some or all of her interests, but rather the amount of power she needs in 
order to advance those interests either on her own or with the help of others, working within a set 
of social institutions designed to facilitate this.  
 Now, one might worry that, even at this level, the minimum threshold is too demanding. 
One might worry that most of us fall below this level most of the time.  But this worry is 
misguided.  It is true that, from one perspective, most of us have very little power – just think of 
how little influence an individual voter has on the outcome of an election.  A single ballot is 
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154  Raz on the moral significance of a society’s history: “Other things being equal, we have reason to respect 
historically set boundaries.  From a normative standpoint, historical settlements are often acknowledged as mere 
modi vivendi, belitting them both for being unstable and liable to be easily unsettled, and because they are 
unprincipled, based on might not on right.  Therefore, while they may represent the best compromise available for a 
time, they are not true ‘solutions’ to the problem….  The stability of historical settlements is contingent and varies a 
good deal over time, but the claim that they lack stability because they are unprincipled and not morally based in 
misguided.…  [A]t the most abstract level morality provides roughly defined parameters such that what falls outside 
them is unjust or immoral, and what falls within them is just or moral.  Many different arrangements fall within 
them, and morality provides that if the institutions and procedures in place in our society conform with the abstract 
principles then they are binding and flouting them is unjust, even though it may involve conduct that in another time 
and place, where other institutions and procedures prevail, may have been unacceptable, or even obligatory” (1998, 
pp. 48-9).
almost never decisive.155  But voting is only one way in which we can influence politics.  There 
are countless others: joining and/or contributing to political organizations, arguing with your 
neighbors, running for office yourself, etc.  Once we recognize that most of us have the ability to 
do many of these things, it is clear that most of us are more powerful than we appear.  (This does 
not entail that most of us are as powerful as we should be, of course.  Keep in mind that the 
threshold I am talking about here is the minimum threshold – the amount of power that no one, 
under any circumstances, should fall below.  The minimum threshold is the sufficiency threshold 
for very few people.)
 Let us now shift our focus from the level that no one should fall below to the reasons why 
most of us should be well above this level.  There is nothing surprising here.  The justification of 
one’s proper share of power will involve the same values we have been dealing with in this and 
the previous section.  How much power one should have – how far above the minimum one 
should be – is a function of several factors: one’s own interests and skills, the interests and skills 
of one’s neighbors, and the social institutions among which one lives.  To see how these factors 
interact, we will imagine three very different societies and consider how political power should 
be distributed in each.  We will see the impact that different configurations of skills and interests 
have on how much each value should be promoted so that everyone’s interests are advanced 
equally.  Admittedly, these are simplified examples.  In the real world, it will very difficult to get 
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155 This is especially true in presidential elections, where “the probability that your vote is decisive is equal to the 
probability that your state is necessary for an electoral college win, times the probability the vote in your state is 
tied, conditional on your state being necessary” (Gelman et al. 2010, p. 1)  According to Gelman et al., the average 
voter in a U.S. presidential election has about a 1 in 60 million chance of determining the outcome.  (See also Edlin 
et al. 2007, pp. 308-9, and Brennan 2011a, pp. 18-20, and 2011b, pp. 709-10.  The classic statement of the argument 
that voting is irrational because of the vanishingly small probability that any one vote will make a difference comes 
from Anothony Downs (1957, Ch. 14).
all the relevant information.  I am just trying to give a sense what determines the location of the 
sufficiency threshold for different people in different contexts. 
 Note well: I do not take a stand on how important the various values are.  I do not hold 
that autonomy is more important than fairness, for example, or that solidarity is more important 
than accuracy.  My aim is not to show that any particular configuration of values is the right one; 
rather, it is to show the implications for the distribution of political power if the values were 
configured in a particular way.  We will look at different possible configurations of values and try 
to figure out how political power should be distributed if this or that configuration were in fact 
the actual one.   
 In the first society, skills are uniform but interests are not.  Everyone is equally skilled on 
all the relevant dimensions – moral competence, rhetoric, etc.  But half the people share one 
constellation of interests (they have strong interests in their society’s collective decisions being 
as accurate as possible and weak interests in the rest of the values), while the other half of the 
people share another (they have strong interests in fairness and weak interests in the rest of the 
values).  The interests of the first half of the population are advanced by the promotion of 
accuracy, and the interests of the second half of the population are advanced by the promotion of 
fairness.  On my view, political power should be distributed equally in such a society.  Why? 
Because the interests of the people place accuracy and fairness above all other values.  And in a 
society where everyone is equally skilled, the values of accuracy and fairness both point toward 
everyone having the same share of power.156  An equal distribution of power would both lead to 
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156  If everyone were equally good at decision-making, wouldn’t the decisions be equally accurate no matter how 
political power were distributed?  Not necessarily, because even though everyone is equally skilled, they are not all 
the same person.  They have the same skill level, not the same skills. 
the most accurate decisions and be the most fair.  For the sake of comparison, let’s say that 
everybody in this society should have 50 units of power.  
 In the second society, interests are uniform but skills are not.  Everyone’s interests are 
advanced much more by the promotion of accuracy than by the promotion of any other value. 
But everyone is not equally competent: some (“the few”) are highly competent; the rest of the 
people (“the many”) are minimally competent.  In this society, the few should have more 
political power than the many.  Each individual member of the few should have more power than 
any member of the many.  Why?  Because everyone’s interest in accuracy points to allocating 
power in proportion to competence: giving more power to the more competent will produce the 
best decisions, which will make everyone better off.  How much more powerful than the many 
the few should be depends on how much more competent the few are than the many, and how 
much more important the value of accuracy is than the rest of the values.  But, importantly, the 
many should still have a significant amount of power – after all, they are not totally incompetent. 
Suppose the minimum threshold in this society is 20 units of power, the maximum 85.  The 
average member of the few should have between 60 and 70 units of power, and the average 
member of the of the many should have between 30 and 40 units.  There will be variation in the 
precise location of individual thresholds even within the few and the many, of course.  The most 
competent and the most politically active member of the few should have more than any other 
individual member (between 75 and 85, say), while the least competent and active member of the 
many should have less than the others (between 20 and 30, say).157    
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157 Why not give all the power to the most competent individual or group within the few?  Because, above a certain 
level, epistemic factors other than competence are most important.  As long as everyone is pretty highly competent, 
we gain more in accuracy from having multiple perspectives than we do by distributing power strictly in proportion 
to competence. 
  In the third society, neither interests nor skills are uniform.  Autonomy matters most to 
some people, accuracy matters most to others, and so on for all the other values.  Likewise with 
competence: some people are highly competent; others are not.  As in the previous society, 
political power should not be distributed equally here.  This does not tell us much about how 
power should be distributed.  But we can say a few things: that those whose interests would not 
be advanced by political engagement should be allowed to have less political power than their 
neighbors who would benefit from political engagement; that those who are highly competent 
should have greater-than-equal shares of power because this will increase the quality of society’s 
collective decisions; and that those with a strong interest in autonomy should be allowed to have 
a less-than-equal share of power if they so choose.  Consider two individuals: Joe and Kim.  The 
only difference between them is how much the promotion of solidarity affects their well-being. 
Solidarity plays no role in Joe’s well-being.  (He has no contact with his neighbors, so he has no 
stake in how strong the feelings of solidarity are among them.)  Kim’s well-being, by contrast, is 
increased significantly by the promotion of solidarity.  (As a community organizer, she has a 
large stake in the sense of solidarity among her neighbors.)  If Kim had more power, she would 
work to increase the sense of solidarity in this society, thereby advancing the interests of 
everyone who had some interest in solidarity.  Therefore, if enough other people have an interest 
in solidarity and increasing solidarity does not come at the cost of undermining any other 
important value, Kim ought to have more power than Joe.  
 Before moving on, a brief recap.  How much political power a person ought to have – his 
sufficiency threshold – depends on several factors: 1) the interests of the individual himself 
(specifically, how his well-being is affected by the promotion/frustration of the various values at 
stake in the political arena); 2) the interests of the people around him; 3) the skills of the 
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individual (how knowledgeable he is about which outcomes are best, and how effective he is at 
achieving the outcomes he is aiming at); 4) the skills of the other members of society; and 5) the 
effect that the social institutions in place have on everyone’s interests.        
 There are still many gaps in the theory that need to be filled in.  For instance, is the 
threshold narrow or broad?  This question arises in the context of trying to find a threshold that is 
neither too high nor too low.158   The worry is that no single threshold can have the moral 
significance that sufficientarians attribute to it without being either unreachably high or trivially 
low.  If it is high enough so that no one who meets it needs any more power, then it must be very 
high – so high, in fact, that very few people could ever reach it.  And if we lower the threshold to 
a point where more people could actually reach it, then the claim that no one should have any 
more than that seems implausible.   
 I think the best response to this worry is to adopt a broad, rather than narrow, 
threshold.159  Rather than say that someone ought to have 20 units of power, for example, we 
should say that she ought to have between 10 and 30 units.  This would reduce the worry about 
placing too much significance on the threshold because it lets the sufficientarian avoid saying 
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158 Paula Casal argues that this difficulty is insurmountable: “The suspicion arises…that sufficientarianism maintains 
its plausibility by remaining vague about the critical threshold and that once we ask whether the threshold is high or 
low, its plausibility plummets” (2007, p. 316).  And: “It is…unsurprising that sufficientarians should find great 
difficulty in defining a threshold.  Conversely, it is surprising that they attach such importance to a threshold when 
they are so uncertain about its location.  The sufficientarians’ indifference to what happens to those who are sure to 
remain above, and perhaps even below, their mysterious line contrasts rather unappealingly with their single-minded 
obsession with crossing the threshold.  How could it be so important for individuals to reach such a threshold as to 
warrant enormous opportunity costs for others yet unimportant how far above the line they are when deciding how 
much to benefit them further?  A threshold cannot be so low and so high at the same time.  In sum, it seems unlikely 
that a single threshold, high or low, could lend plausibility to all the sufficientarians’ claims” (ibid.).  Richard 
Arneson expresses similar doubts (2006, pp. 27-8). 
159  Another way to avoid this difficulty is to opt for multiple thresholds rather than one.  But I do not like the 
multiple-thresholds move.  Not only is this move blatantly ad hoc, it forces us to answer many difficult questions. 
(How much priority should we give to lifting someone above the lower threshold(s)  as opposed to the higher one(s)? 
What about people who are in between two thresholds?  Are each of these thresholds narrow or broad?)
things like, “This person should have exactly three more units of power than she does now – not 
two, not four, three,”  and instead say things like, “This person should have significantly more 
power than she does now, but not so much as to be able to strong-arm her neighbors.”   To be 
sure, this would only reduce the worry, not remove it.  No matter how broad we make the 
threshold, there will always be borderline cases – people who fall just above or below the 
threshold.   
 Next, we must choose our primary units of concern.  Do thresholds apply to an 
individual’s entire life or episodes within a life?  Should we care only about how much power 
you had over the course of your life, or about how much power you have at various points along 
the way?  Although many160 have argued that entire lives are the proper unit of concern in other 
contexts, I think we should reject the entire-lives approach in the context of political power.  As 
one’s circumstances change over time, so will the amount of power one needs in order to be 
treated as a person of equal moral worth.  Someone might completely ignore politics in his 
twenties but be very politically active by the time he reaches forty.  Thus, it makes sense to focus 
on how much power one has at particular times, rather than across one’s entire life.  On the 
entire-lives approach, how much power you have at any time only matters insofar as it affects 
your overall total or average.  This is counter-intuitive because your interests at every point of 
your life are equally important.  Being an absolute dictator for six months would not offset the 
badness of being a slave for decades.
 Another remaining gap in the theory is an account of what role (if any) group 
membership should play in the distribution of political power.  Each individual belongs to many 
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160 Rawls (1971), Parfit (2002, pp. 101-3), Nagel (1991, p. 69), Anderson (1999, p. 319), and Arneson (2006, p. 24)  
favor the entire-lives approach in various contexts.  For some worries about this approach, see McKerlie (1989).  
different groups.161   The groups could be anything from a lobbying firm to a demographic 
category (e.g., Baby Boomers).  This raises many questions.  Is the collective power of a group 
simply the sum of the power held by each of its members?  What are the relevant differences 
between well-organized, hierarchical groups such as corporations and informal, unorganized 
groups defined in terms of demographic categories?  Should members of certain minority groups 
have more power per individual than members of other groups?  Should an American Indian, for 
example, be entitled to more power than he otherwise would be simply because he is a member 
of a community that historically has been deprived of a sufficient share of power?  Or is he 
entitled to some extra power so that he can prevent his group from being entirely swamped by all 
others?     
 To answer such questions about group power, we need to better understand the 
relationship between group power and individual power.  Much talk of group power is actually 
talk of individual power in disguise.  As Peter Morriss notes: 
When we consider the power of (say) a racial minority within this country we are 
sometimes, it is true, discussing the power of this group as a group, but perhaps 
more often we are comparing the power of a (typical) individual who is a member 
of this group with the power of a (typical) individual who is a member of some 
other group, or an individual in some way typical of the general society.  Or again, 
women often complain about their inability to walk about unmolested at night. 
But that does not mean that women as a group cannot walk unmolested: it means, 
specifically, that a woman on her own cannot do this.  But this lack of individual 
power occurs because the person is a member of a group, and we can say that this 
group is discriminated against (or, at the least, able to do less than another group – 
in this case, men).  Or, in class terms, a group can be said to lack power because 
the life-chances open to an average member of that group are less than the life-
chances open to an average member of society as a whole.  Saying that it is the 
group that lacks power is simply a shorthand (sometimes a confusing one) for 
saving that individual power is distributed along group lines. (2002, pp. 112-3)   
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161 Both Anderson (2007, p. 599) and Sen (2009, pp. 246-7) make this point.  
In other words, we often do not care about group power as such, but rather about the power of 
individual members of a group.  But this does not mean that all talk of group power is just 
shorthand for talk of individual power.  Sometimes we are interested in group power as such; we 
want to know why some lobbying group has so much influence in Washington, D.C., for 
instance.  And that it is why it is worth getting clear on what group power is. 
 The first thing to notice is that if we want to know how powerful a particular group is, we 
cannot simply add up the power of all the individual members of the group.  This is because 
groups have certain properties that no individual does – organization and cooperation.162  How 
much power a group has is a function not only of how much power its individual members have 
but also of how well they work together.163  We measure a group’s power by determining what (if 
anything) would happen if all of its members worked together to achieve some outcome.  A very 
small group can be powerful if it is well organized, and, on the flip side, some very large groups 
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162  “In collective action toward a common goal, coordination is usually required in the selection of mutually 
supportive sequences of acts.  For me to choose an appropriate sequence I may have to know what other members of 
the group are going to do; and similarly for each of them.… It is (partly) the need for coordination…that makes the 
degree of organization or structural delineation of a group contribute to its power.  An established pattern of division 
of labor facilitates the mutual selection of appropriate courses of action.  The political power of lobbies and pressure 
groups, as opposed to that of random collections of individuals…is partly a function of this factor” (Goldman 1972, 
p. 171).
163 Alvin Goldman offers the following two examples: “Suppose that a small group of bandits are holding up a train 
containing a large number of passengers.…Suppose that the bandits ‘have the drop’ on the passengers, but that there 
is a set of sequences of acts, a sequence for each passenger, such that if they performed these sequences of acts, they 
would disarm the bandits (with no harm to themselves) and foil the robbery.  Assume further that each passenger 
knows which acts would be the most appropriate ones for him to perform as a means to foiling the robbery.  This is 
not enough to ensure that all would perform these acts if all wanted the robbery to be foiled.  The rub, of course, is 
that each passenger has little reason to believe (indeed, has strong to reason to disbelieve)  that enough other 
passengers will do their part.  Since, for each passenger, it would be very costly if he did part (e.g., started to disarm 
the bandit nearest him) while few others did theirs, each passenger would refrain from doing these acts, and the 
robbery would succeed.  A similar problem arises in assessing the power of a large group of slaves over a small 
group of masters.  If all the slaves acted in unison, they would overwhelm their masters.  But it does not follow that 
they have much (or any) collective power over their masters.  Like the train passengers, the problem for the slaves is 
that each is insufficiently confident that rebellious action on his part would be supported by others” (1972, p. 172). 
For a helpful discussion of the relationship between individual power and group power, see Goldman 1972, pp. 
168-75.
have virtually no power.  A five-person group lobbying for a specific piece of legislation could be 
more powerful, due to its high level of organization, than than the millions of people between the 
ages of 18 and 25.  
 What follows about the distribution of political power?  On my account, the power of 
groups matters only insofar as it affects the power of individuals.  How much power a particular 
group ought to have depends on how much power individuals inside and outside the group ought 
to have.  The only reason to think that a particular group has too little or too much power is that 
some individual has too much or too little power.  Hence, with perhaps a few exceptions (e.g., 
neo-Nazis and terrorists164), every group should have at least enough power to advance its 
members’ interests to the same degree as everyone else’s, but not so much power that other 
people’s interests are neglected.  
 In the case of small groups, the only way to achieve this may be to give the individual 
members more power than members of larger groups.  The number of people who share some of 
the individual’s interests – namely, those interests that are related to his membership in the group 
– is relatively small.  This means that members of small groups, even if they work well together, 
are at greater risk of having their interests neglected by the larger group.  We can increase the 
power of a group by making it more organized – i.e., by making its members work better 
together.  Beyond that, however, the only way to affect the power of a group is to affect the 
individual power of (some of) its members.  Thus, in many cases, a member of a small minority 
group should have proportionally more power than an individual member of larger groups 
because this is necessary to advance his interests equally.     
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164 Why should the interests of these groups not be protected the same as everyone else’s?  Because doing so would 
be too risky in terms of other people’s interests.  If allowed to be autonomous, for example, these groups would seek 
to do serious harm to other groups.   
 Although we will return to questions involving group power below, I want to make it 
clear at this point that there is a limit to how much more power individual members of small 
groups should have.  No matter how small the group, no individual should have a near-total lock 
on power.  His share of power must be consistent with the interests of everyone else being 
advanced equally.  

In this section, I have sketched what a sufficientarian approach to the distribution of political 
power would look like.  On any sufficientarian view, the main objective is to get as many people 
as possible to their sufficiency threshold.  On my version of sufficientarianism, an individual’s 
sufficiency threshold is the amount of power he needs so that everyone’s interests can be 
advanced equally.  Individuals need not consciously advance their own interests and the interests 
of their neighbors.  Advancement of individuals’ interests is largely the business of groups and 
social institutions.  Hence, the location of someone’s sufficiency threshold depends on several 
factors: 1) his own interests; 2) the interests of the people around him; 3) how skilled he is at 
advancing his own and other people’s interests; 4) how skilled the people around him are at 
advancing their own and other people’s interests; and 5) the effect that the social institutions in 
place have on everyone’s interests.  Given that these factors are not static but dynamic, the 
thresholds will be broad rather than narrow.  The thresholds tell us how much power the 
individual should have at a particular period within his life, not throughout his entire life.  And 
the members of certain minority groups may have higher thresholds than most other people.
III. 
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Saying that sufficiency is the distributive ideal for political power leaves open many questions 
about how to achieve that ideal in the real world.165  I will close this chapter, therefore, by 
considering some of the practical prescriptions that fall out of my view.  Given that I am neutral 
on the question of what people’s interests actually are and that the relationship between interests 
and institutions is too complicated to go into here, I cannot give detailed recommendations for 
the structure of social institutions.  But I can make some general observations about how 
institutions can serve the various interests at stake in the political arena.  While perfect 
conformity to the sufficientarian ideal is likely unattainable, there are steps we can take to 
improve the distribution of political power. 
 Up till now, I have been talking as though everyone occupies a single, amorphous role – 
citizen.  That is clearly not true, however.  We all occupy many different roles – student, 
employee, public official, and so on.  Each of these roles comes with different amounts and types 
of power.  Each has its own privileges and obligations.  The standard for morally acceptable use 
of political power as an average voter is lower than that for a U.S. senator.166  This is because a 
senator has so much more power than an average voter.  The more power you have, the more you 
can get done (for better or for worse), and the more you can get done, the more important it is for 
you to do good rather than bad.  This raises a further set of questions about the balance of power 
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165  Dworkin makes the same observation about saying that a government should be democratic: “Democracy 
requires that officials be elected by the people rather than chosen through inheritance or by a small group of 
prominent families or electors.  But that abstract statement does not decide which officials if any should be chosen 
not by the community as a whole but by sections or groups within it, how powers should be distributed among 
officials chosen in these different ways, how far elected officials should be permitted or required to appoint other 
officials to exercise some of their powers, which responsibilities should be held by elected and which by appointed 
officials, how long officials of either sort should serve, whether their terms of office should be fixed or subject to 
early termination by those who elected them, how far elected or other officials should themselves be free to change 
the constitutional arrangements under which officials are elected, whether a constitution should set limits to the 
powers of officials, so that the officials cannot themselves alter these limits, and so forth” (2000, p. 185).
166 To say that the standards are lower is not to say that they are non-existent.  For a discussion of the duties of 
voters, see Brennan 2011a. 
between public officials and private citizens.  What effect (if any) should the means by which an 
official attained her office have on her threshold?  Should elected officials have more power than 
appointed officials, or vice versa?  Should the terms of all officials be limited?  Should all 
officials be subject to recall votes?167  
 Put simply, the question is this: In a complex society such as our own, what does it mean 
to say that an individual has enough political power?  What justifies this person having this much 
power?  Why not more?  Why not less?  
 It all comes back to the effect that the distribution of political power has on individual 
well-being.  Political power should be distributed so that everyone’s interests are advanced 
equally.  That sounds nice, but how could we even begin to put this into practice?  Where and 
how should we attempt to implement the sufficientarian ideal?  Should it structure only the basic 
institutions of society, or should it extend to the workplace, the family, and other areas?168  For 
now, I will focus on the level of the basic institutions of society – e.g., the political and economic 
framework within which society operates.169  The structure of these institutions goes a long way 
toward determining how political power is distributed.  (The relationship between institutions 
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167  The longer someone’s term and the more difficult it is to remove her before the end of that term, the more 
powerful she is.  More powerful because less constrained by the will of others.  Someone with a lifetime 
appointment can safely ignore the preferences and opinions of (almost) everyone else in her society.  As an official’s 
job security decreases so does her power.  The more often an official must stand for election or go through an 
appointment process, the more accountable she is – i.e., the more power shifts away from her and to her 
constituents.  In the United States, elected officials serve fixed terms (of two, four, or six years); they cannot be 
removed from office before the end of a term simply because they become unpopular.  In many countries, new 
elections can be held at any point.  Unpopular leaders and/or parties are not guaranteed a hold on power for a 
specific amount of time.
168 This is often framed as a question about the proper site of distributive justice.  G.A. Cohen (2008, Ch. 3), Walzer 
(1983, pp. 291-303), Dahl (1989, pp. 324-32), and Brighouse and Fleurbaey (2010, pp. 153-5) argue that the 
demands of distributive justice apply to businesses as well as to other voluntary private associations.  For some 
doubts about such arguments, see Arneson (1993, pp. 138-43).
169 See Rawls 1971, § 2.
and political power is reciprocal.  The institutions shape the distribution of power, and the 
distribution of power shapes institutions.)   
 Which brings us to the question of institutional design.  If we want a sufficientarian 
distribution of political power, how ought we to structure the basic institutions of our society? 
We ought to structure them with an eye toward promoting the values of accuracy, autonomy, 
fairness, etc.  The ultimate goal is to promote each of these values to whatever degree is 
necessary in order to advance everyone’s interests equally.  In practice, this will usually mean 
promoting each value as much as we can without undermining any of the others.   
 What might this look like in regards to the value of autonomy?  At the level of basic 
institutions, we can promote autonomy by establishing a democracy with a written constitution.  
 Consider first the connection between autonomy and democracy.  Democracy promotes 
autonomy because any non-democratic form of government gives too much power to some 
person(s) or group(s).170  In a non-democratic system, some people – namely, those who do not 
have full rights of political participation (e.g., freedom of speech and assembly, the right to vote, 
the right to run for office) – do not have an adequate quality or quantity of options to participate 
in the political process as a rational moral agent.  These people are treated as though they were 
either not able or not worthy to participate in the political process.  
 So, one way to institutionalize a concern for autonomy is to set up a democratic 
government.  Inherent in democracy, however, is one of the most serious threats to autonomy: 
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170 I use ‘democracy’ here in a substantively neutral way – i.e., I do not presuppose anything about the distribution of 
resources or rights in a democratic society, except for rights of political participation.  A society is democratic 
insofar as everyone has the same rights of political participation.  This is a thin conception of democracy.  Thin, not 
empty.  It excludes many systems of government, from hereditary monarchy or aristocracy (where full political 
rights – specifically, the right to hold the highest office in government – are available only to a small subset of the 
population) to oligarchy (where only those with wealth have access to the most powerful positions).
majority tyranny.  Philip Pettit describes the threat that unconstrained majority will poses to 
autonomy as follows: 
Majorities are easily formed––they easily become actual rather than virtual agents––
and majoritarian agents will exercise more or less arbitrary power if their will is 
unconstrained.  Let the laws be subject to ready majoritarian amendment, then, and 
the laws will lend themselves to more or less arbitrary control; they will cease to 
represent a secure guarantee against domination by government.  Most of us belong to 
a salient minority in some respect and most of us, therefore, have an interest in seeing 
that we do not live at the electoral mercy of the corresponding majority. (1997, p. 
181)171 
 
Because the threat of majority tyranny is ever-present in a democracy, a democratic society that 
takes autonomy seriously must place some constraints on majority will.  For some issues at least, 
the fact that a majority supports one side should not be enough to settle the matter.
 One way to constrain majority will is to opt for representative, rather than direct, 
democracy.  (In a direct democracy, citizens participate directly in the decision-making process 
of government – through public referenda, say.  In a representative democracy, by contrast, most 
citizens’ power is mediated through their representatives; they participate directly only when 
they choose who will represent them.)  In a pure direct democracy, there is nothing to stop the 
majority of voters from enacting laws that deprive minorities of some of their rights.  And while 
a direct democracy could adopt some anti-majoritarian institutions (a written constitution, a bill 
of rights, etc.), the threat would remain.  So long as every decision has to be approved by the 
public, the majority always could (even if it never did) stampede everyone else.  
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171 Mill puts it this way: “Society can and does execute its own mandates; and if it issues wrong mandates instead of 
right, or any mandates at all in things with which it ought not to meddle, it practices a social tyranny more 
formidable than many kinds of political oppression, since, thought not usually upheld by such extreme penalties, it 
leaves fewer means of escape, penetrating much more deeply into the details of life, and enslaving the soul itself. 
Protection, therefore, against the tyranny of the magistrate is not enough; there needs protection also against the 
tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling. against the tendency of society to impose, by other means than civil 
penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them; to fetter the development 
and, if possible, prevent the formation of any individuality not in harmony with its ways, and compel all characters 
to fashion themselves upon the model of its own” (Mill, On Liberty, Chapter 1). 
 Consider next the connection between autonomy and the constitution.  I said that, if we 
want to promote autonomy, the constitution should be written.  It should be written because a 
written document is harder to ignore than an unwritten one.  When the rules are fixed and 
publicly accessible, there is less room for the arbitrary will of any individual or group. 
Obviously, the presence of a written constitution is no guarantee that autonomy will thrive – 
history is full of powerful leaders who simply ignored the constitution of their countries – but it 
does increase the likelihood that citizens will have a certain amount of autonomy.  
 Let us now consider a different value: accuracy.  To promote the accuracy of our 
collective decisions, we need to have as much information as possible about people’s interests 
and skills, and we need to use that information effectively.  This means that (almost) everyone 
should have some power, and that those who are more competent should have more power.  So 
we need institutions that not only make it difficult to ignore the interests of any individual or 
group but also give us some means of distributing power in proportion to competence – 
institutions such as universal adult suffrage and judicial review of legislative and executive 
decisions.
 Since so many of our collective decisions take the form of elections, improving the 
accuracy of our electoral processes is an obvious way of promoting accuracy.  One thing we have 
to decide in this context is who should be eligible to vote.  I claim that, if increasing the accuracy 
of our collective decisions is the goal, all sane adult citizens and long-term residents should be 
eligible to vote.  In other words, we should extend suffrage to two groups that are often excluded: 
non-citizens and convicted felons.
 The accuracy-based argument against giving non-citizens the right to vote runs as 
follows: non-citizens should not be allowed to vote because they do not have as large a stake in 
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this country as citizens do.  Their interests are less tied up with the interests of this country than 
the interests of citizens are.  Non-citizens thus do not have a strong enough incentive to make 
informed decisions about the long-term interests of this country.  Therefore, if we allowed non-
citizens to vote in our elections, the outcomes would be distorted by these uninformed, 
uninterested voters. 
 I have two problems with this argument.  First, I think it overstates how much citizens 
know about, and how much reason they have to know more about, the politics of their countries. 
Many citizens are ignorant about political issues, and rationally so.172  Second, I think the above 
argument ignores some of the incentives facing non-citizens.  Many non-citizens have lived, and 
plan to remain, in a country long enough to have just as much stake in its politics as most citizens 
do.  There is no reason to believe that giving such people the right to vote would lessen the 
quality of collective decisions.  If anything, extending suffrage to long-term residents would lead 
to better decisions by making the system more responsive to the interests of a segment of the 
population that is often ignored.  
 When I say that non-citizens should have the right to vote, I am talking only about the 
subset of non-citizens who meet certain requirements – those who have lived in the country for a 
number of years, say.  Why these and not others?  Because the political system of the country in 
which they live affects their lives just as much as it affects the lives of citizens, and it does not 
affect the lives of people who just moved there or who live in other countries to nearly the same 
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172 “[C]itizens are rationally ignorant.  Individual citizens have almost no power over government, and individual 
voters have almost zero expected utility.  Thus, political knowledge does voters little good.  Acquiring knowledge is 
costly and difficult.  If you knew that your vote were likely to be decisive, then you would invest time and effort into 
acquiring political knowledge.  However, when you realize that your vote makes no difference, you probably decide 
not to bother.…For many citizens, the cost of acquiring political knowledge outweighs the expected benefit of 
having this knowledge” (Brennan 2011a, p. 165).
degree.173  Ultimately, I think that geographical location is morally irrelevant.  Any government 
whose actions have a significant impact on your interests is a government over whose decisions 
you should have some power.        
 What about convicted felons?  Convicted felons are often ineligible to vote, usually for 
the rest of their lives.  The accuracy-based justification for this practice runs as follows: being 
convicted of a crime shows that you lack the moral competence necessary to exercise political 
power well; therefore, depriving you of the right to vote will increase the competence of the 
group of people making the decisions.174  
 But this justification is problematic for several reasons.  To begin with, being convicted 
of a crime is not necessarily proof of a deficit of moral competence.  (You could have been 
wrongly convicted.  You could have known very well that what you were doing was morally 
wrong but unable to stop yourself.  Or the law you violated could itself have been immoral.) 
Moreover, moral competence is only one aspect of political competence.  Even if someone’s 
moral competence were lacking, he could more than make up for this by extensive knowledge of 
history and political science, say.  Finally, depriving criminals of the right to vote may actually 
lead to less accurate decisions.  The social stigma attached to being a convicted felon puts felons 
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173 An alternative approach that would likely have the same effect as allowing long-term residents to vote would be 
to make it easier to become a citizen.  One of the main reasons that many long-term residents in the United States do 
not become citizens is the cumbersome process one must go through to attain citizenship.
174  There are other justifications of this practice, of course.  Excluding criminals from the electorate is often 
defended by appealing to the expressive value of punishment: by not allowing criminals to vote, society expresses 
its willingness to hold individuals responsible for their actions and its disapproval of certain types of action.  This 
justification is more plausible than the first; it is not self-undermining.  Nevertheless, I doubt that the benefits (in 
terms of responsibility) of the practice outweigh the costs (in terms of accuracy, autonomy, and fairness).  We have 
already noted the cost in terms of accuracy.  The cost in terms of autonomy is that depriving felons of the right to 
vote deprives them of an important part of an autonomous life; namely, the option of participating directly in 
political process by casting a ballot.  (Voting may not be a major part of an autonomous life in all societies, but it is 
in a democracy.)  The cost in terms of fairness is that whatever unfairness there is in the enforcement of the criminal 
law also infects the electoral process.
at greater-than-average risk of being neglected by the political process.  Politicians and public 
employees have little incentive to protect the interests of this group.  Thus, if criminals do not 
have the ability to protect their own interests through the ballot box, our collective decisions will 
be distorted to the degree that an entire segment of the population is ignored.  
 A likely objection to my arguments about non-citizens and felons is that they prove too 
much.  If we extend the right to vote to those groups for the reasons I have suggested, how can 
we consistently say that children or the mentally-handicapped should not be allowed to vote? 
And since it is obviously absurd to allow children and/or the mentally handicapped to vote, my 
argument must be rejected.
 In response, I would note, first of all, that we should not dismiss as absurd the prospect of 
children and/or the mentally handicapped voting.  People of all ages and levels of cognitive 
ability are affected by the political activities of their societies, so there is at least an initial 
plausibility to the claim that they ought to have some direct influence on those activities. 
Nevertheless, I do not think that either of these groups should be allowed to vote.  Why not? 
Because the costs (in terms of accuracy) outweigh the benefits (in terms of autonomy, perhaps). 
Most people under 18 years of age or with a mental handicap are not capable of leading 
autonomous lives; indeed, they will usually be better off if someone else makes their most 
important decisions for them.  Thus, depriving them of one aspect of a fully autonomous life (the 
right to vote) would not, as it would with a normal adult, decrease their well-being significantly. 
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Assuming that extending the right to vote to children and the mentally handicapped would 
significantly decrease the accuracy of our collective decisions, then, we should not do so.175  
 The final institutional mechanism for promoting accuracy that we will consider is judicial 
review.  Judicial review is the practice of a court having the final say on the question of whether 
an action taken by some government agent(s) conforms to the constitution.  My claim is that, at 
least for those decisions in which the criterion for accuracy is fidelity to the constitution, judicial 
review leads to more accurate decisions.  Why think this?  Not because judges are necessarily 
more competent than non-judges on these matters, but because they are not as susceptible to 
various non-epistemic factors as many other public officials are.  Judges are in a better position 
to make accurate decisions because judges have less incentive to cater to popular opinion than do 
other officials.176  (This is clearly true of judges who are not elected, and who have either 
permanent tenure or lengthy, guaranteed single terms.177  These judges do not have to please any 
particular constituency to remain in office.)  A constitutional court’s role is to ensure that the 
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175  There are, no doubt, some people younger than 18 who are more politically competent than some people well 
above 18.  But we must place the cut-off somewhere (surely there is some age below which no one is competent 
enough to vote), and 18 years is a natural place to start (at least in countries where it is the conventional boundary 
between childhood and adulthood).  If we had evidence that lowering or raising the cut-off would lead to better 
quality decisions, then we would have to consider it.
176 As Dworkin puts it: 
In some cases…the public that elects legislators will be in effect a party to the argument whether 
someone has a right to something, because that public’s own interests oppose the concession of a 
right.  That will typically be true when the argument lies in a politically sensitive area, like that of 
race relations.  Politically powerful groups may prefer that political clubs discriminate, and no 
countervailing force, except the politically impotent minority itself, may very much care.  It would 
be wrong to assume that in such circumstances the legislators will lack the independent judgment to 
identify the right at stake or the courage to enforce it.  But it is nevertheless true that in such cases 
legislators are subject to pressures that judges are not, and this must count as a reason for supporting 
that, at least in such cases, judges are more likely to reach sound conclusions about rights” (1985, 
pp. 24-5).
177  The constitutional courts of both Germany and the United States have this feature.  In Germany, members of the 
Constitutional Court serve a single 12-year term.  In the United States, members of the Supreme Court are appointed 
for life.
executive and legislative branches act within the boundaries laid down by the constitution.  The 
(un)popularity of the actions should play no role in the court’s decisions.178
 Finally, let us look at how our social institutions could be set up to promote 
responsibility.  Responsibility calls for people to be held accountable for their actions.  People 
should bear (at least some of) the consequences of their actions.  At the level of basic institutions, 
responsibility is promoted by the separation of powers in government, a mechanism for 
removing officials who overstep their authority, and a system of civil and criminal law that 
punishes people who act wrongly.   
 The separation of the executive, legislative, and judicial powers of government into the 
hands of different agents is an effective tool for holding public officials accountable.179  The 
reason for keeping the executive, legislative, and judicial powers separate is simple: if anyone 
were to control two or more of the branches of government, he would be shielded from the 
(negative) consequences of (some of) his actions.180
 The most familiar mechanism for making public officials responsible for their actions is 
the holding of regular elections.  Elections allow voters to reward officials for good behavior and 
punish officials for bad behavior.  An official who abuses his power during his first term will 
probably not get a second.  Other such mechanisms include term limits (caps on how long 
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178 For some doubts about just how insulated from politics judges really are, see Walzer 1981.  For instance: “Judges 
are in an important sense members of the political community.  Most of them have had careers as officeholders, or as 
political activists, or as advocates of this or that public policy.  They have worked in the arena; they have 
participated in debates” (p. 10).
179 Exactly how these powers should be separated is a surprisingly controversial question, which I leave for another 
time. For some interesting variations on the American institutional mechanisms of separation of powers, see 
Ackerman 2000.  For some doubts about the effectiveness of separation of powers as traditionally conceived (i.e., as 
the functional separation of executive, legislative, and judicial powers)  at achieving this goal, see Brennan and 
Hamlin 1994.  They argue instead for a competitive separation of governing power between two or more parties.
180 “A consolidation of functions in the hands of one person or group would…mean that they could play around with 
the law in a relatively unfettered way” (Pettit 1997, p. 177). 
anyone can hold a particular office) and recall elections (in which voters decide whether to 
remove an official before his term has expired).
 Of course, if we care about promoting responsibility, public officials are not the only 
people who should be held accountable.  We also we need a system of punishment and rewards 
that applies to private citizens as well as public officials.  On the punishment side, we need a 
system of civil and criminal law that makes people pay for violating certain rules.181  As for 
rewarding people who act rightly, the most effective reward is probably the praise and admiration 
of one’s family, friends, and neighbors.  But there are ways of institutionalizing such things – 
e.g., tax credits for charitable donations.
    
In this section, we have looked at a few examples of how social institutions can promote the 
values that political sufficientarianism calls for us to promote.  My hope is that this has shown 
that efforts to bring the actual distribution of political power closer to the sufficientarian ideal are 
not hopelessly utopian.  Most of the institutions we considered are already in place in many 
countries around the world.  
 As I have already said, I do not make any assumptions about the relative importance of 
any of the above values.  But I do assume that, in almost every society, every one of them 
matters somewhat.  What should we do when the institutional demands of multiple values 
conflict with one another?  What if, say, we want to promote both economic productivity and 
solidarity, but the free market that promotes the former undermines the latter?  That depends on 
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181 To say what such a system should look like would require a theory of moral responsibility, which is, thankfully, 
beyond the scope of this project.  All I will say is that the view of responsibility presupposed by a society’s legal 
system must track the people’s beliefs about responsibility relatively closely, or else the legal system will cease to 
promote the value of responsibility within that society.  The legal system would be seen as serving a purpose 
unrelated to responsibility.
the relative importance of each value in our society.  If the interests of the people here are 
advanced greatly by the promotion of solidarity and very slightly by the promotion of economic 
productivity, then we should do everything we can to promote solidarity, except where doing so 
would keep the free market from working at all.  But if people’s interests were reversed – i.e., if 
the promotion of economic productivity were much more important than the promotion of 
solidarity – then we should let the free market reign, unless this would eliminate any sense of 
solidarity within our society.  As the relative weights of the values converge, of course, it 
becomes more difficult to strike the right balance between them.  (Should we opt for a little more 
productivity or a little more solidarity?)  And it may not always be possible to promote all the 
values that matter at the same time – suppose economic productivity and solidarity are 
incompatible in some way.  We may have to make unwelcome trade-offs at the level of 
institutional design.    
IV.
In the previous two chapters, we looked at arguments for political egalitarianism.  Central to 
most of these arguments is the claim that a person cannot be treated as a moral equal unless he 
has an equal share of political power.  This claim is implausible, I argued, because the demands 
of moral equality vary from person to person and place to place; they vary because the interests 
of the people involved and the broader social context vary.  In this chapter, I presented an 
argument for political sufficientarianism – the view that, so long as everyone has enough political 
power, there is nothing wrong with some having more than others.  My argument is that, once we 
take into account all the relevant values, we see not only that people can be treated as moral 
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equals without having an equal share of political power but also that, in many cases, a person 
will actually be better off for having an unequal share of power. 
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 Chapter 5: Objections and Replies
The principle of sufficiency has taken a beating in recent years.182  The objections have come 
from many directions, and I cannot possibly respond to all of them.  Indeed, I think that some of 
the objections are compelling.  If we are distributing welfare or health care resources, for 
instance, equality, priority, or some combination of the two is more attractive than sufficiency. 
My primary aim in this chapter is to respond to the most serious objections to adopting 
sufficiency as the distributive ideal in the sphere of political power.
I.
Objection: Why have any distributive ideal for political power?  Even if we reject equality as the 
distributive ideal for political power, it is not obvious that something else should take its place. 
There are some areas in which it is simply too intrusive for society to try to enact any principle(s) 
of distribution.  This is Dworkin’s (2000) position.  Dworkin claims that there is something 
incompatible between seeing oneself and others as members of a community of moral equals and 
trying to maintain any distributive ideal in the sphere of political power: 
If a community is genuinely egalitarian in the abstract sense––if it accepts the 
imperative that a community collectively must treat its members individually with 
equal concern––then it cannot treat political impact or influence as themselves 
resources, to be divided according to some metric of equality the way land or raw 
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182 For extended criticisms of sufficientarianism, see Arneson (2002), Casal (2007), and Holtug (2007).  Otsuka and 
Voorhoeve (2009) claim to show that all anti-egalitarian principles have seriously counter-intuitive implications.
materials or investments might be divided.  Politics, in such a community, is a 
matter of responsibility, not another dimension of wealth. (2000, pp. 209-10)
In other words, we cannot be members of a truly egalitarian community if we are constantly 
trying to achieve or maintain a particular distribution of political power.  
Reply: If true, this claim would obviously be a serious problem for my view.  But it is misguided, 
for at least two reasons.  First of all, people will make interpersonal comparisons of power (and 
any other good) no matter what society does or does not do.  That is part of human nature, not a 
consequence of pursuing a particular distributive ideal.  And such comparisons need not have the 
deleterious effects that Dworkin claims.  Dworkin’s argument would be persuasive if (i) 
conforming to a distributive principle required everyone to consciously conform to it and (ii) 
everyone knew not only how much political power everyone has but also why they have as much 
as they do.  If both of these conditions held, then trying to attain a particular distribution of 
political power may indeed undermine people’s ability to interact with one another as moral 
equals.  But neither (i) nor (ii) is true.  Achieving or maintaining a particular distribution of some 
good does not necessarily require conscious effort.  The distributive pattern of the good could 
approximate an ideal completely by accident.  Take happiness, for example.  Absent any effort to 
reach an equal distribution, every member of a society could be equally happy.  (Perhaps this was 
the result of inequalities in other spheres – wealth, skills, preferences, etc. – offsetting each 
other.)  Similarly, the second condition is not met because we do not walk around with our share 
of political power (and our degree of responsibility for it) stamped on our foreheads.  It is very 
difficult to know how much power anyone else has, and even more difficult to know why he has 
that much.  
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 There is a more fundamental problem with Dworkin’s argument, however.  It is that we 
cannot avoid distributing political power.  Our social institutions have to be structured in some 
way (even if there are no conscious designers of them), and how they are structured will have a 
significant effect on how much political power various individuals and groups have.  Rather than 
ignore this fact, we should acknowledge it and try to distribute power as well as possible.
Objection: Fine.  But even if we accept that we need some distributive ideal for political power, 
there is good reason to doubt that sufficiency has any advantage over equality.  In fact, it looks 
like sufficientarianism collapses into egalitarianism in this context.  This is because political 
power is a competitive good – how much one has partly depends on how much others have.  So, 
the only way to raise someone up to her sufficiency threshold is to bring down someone who is 
already above her threshold.  Thus, a sufficient distribution will end up being a (roughly) equal 
distribution.  And if that is right, then sufficiency is not distinct from equality as a distributive 
ideal for political power.    
Reply: This is a potentially fatal objection to my view.  As with the previous one, however, it 
rests on a confusion.  True, raising some to the level of sufficiency – giving them enough 
political power – will lead to greater equality.  But, on a sufficiency view, this tendency toward 
equality is merely an accidental by-product, not something of ultimate moral importance.  When 
it comes to the distribution of a competitive good like political power, a sufficientarian must pay 
attention to inequalities.  (A large difference in power between two people could be an indication 
that one of them does not have enough.)  What makes a sufficientarian view distinctive is that 
(in)equality has no intrinsic moral importance; it is relevant only insofar as it impacts sufficiency. 
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If B has 10 units of power and C has 1 unit, that is bad.  A more equal distribution would be 
better – not because an equal distribution is the ideal, but because C does not have enough 
power.  If C’s power were increased to 4 units, it would be an improvement on either an 
egalitarian or a sufficientarian view.  But, unlike the egalitarian, the sufficientarian is open to the 
possibility that there is no need to make the distribution any more equal than, say, B having 7 
units and C having 4.  Depending on what B and C are like, there may be nothing morally 
objectionable about this remaining inequality.  The egalitarian says that nothing less than equal is 
enough; I claim that something less than equal often is enough.  Even if, in the end, everyone 
ought to have an equal share of power, my explanation of why this is so is very different than an 
egalitarian’s explanation.
Objection: But there are insurmountable epistemic barriers here.  In discussing the location of 
thresholds, for example, you have been talking as though we have access to all the requisite 
information about people’s interests.  Obviously, this is not true in the real world.  We will rarely 
(if ever) know all things we would need to know in order to implement your sufficientarian 
approach – what everyone’s interests are, how competent they are, etc. 
Reply: One reaction to these epistemic barriers is to give up on the project of trying to make the 
distribution of power conform to a specific ideal.  (If we cannot know precisely how much 
anyone actually has or should have, how can we possibly improve the distribution of power in a 
significant way?)  Another is to adopt a simple distributive ideal (equality, say).  I think we 
should resist both of these reactions, however, because the moral costs of acting on either would 
be too high.  The distribution of political power directly affects how well people’s lives go.  If 
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someone has too much power, this is bad for the people around him, and perhaps even for the 
person himself.  Conversely, if someone has too little power, this is bad for the person himself, 
and perhaps even for those around him.  Therefore, we should not allow people to have too much 
or too little power simply because achieving a better distribution of power would be difficult.  
 I admit that there are many barriers (epistemic and otherwise) to achieving perfect 
conformity with the ideal of sufficiency in the sphere of political power.  But this is no reason to 
accept the status quo or a more simple distributive ideal; it is a reason to re-calibrate our 
expectations for how close we can approximate an ideal in the real world.  Instead of trying to 
make precise judgments about how much power every individual or group should have, we 
should set up our institutions in a way that gives more power to those who should have more and 
less to those who should have less.  Although there is a lot that we cannot know, there is some 
that we can.  We cannot say that a particular federal bureaucrat has 62 units of power and should 
have only 56, or that this ordinary citizen has 18 units and should have 22.  But we can say that 
the federal bureaucrat is too powerful (because she cannot be punished by anyone for ignoring 
certain regulations, perhaps), and that the ordinary citizen is not powerful enough (because she 
does not have any free time or money to contribute to political campaigns, perhaps).  And the 
judgments we can make are good enough for most of the practical questions that we have been 
talking about.  Mechanisms such as basic social institutions cannot make very fine-grained 
distinctions.  A federal constitution, for instance, is not able to allocate political power with much 
precision.  It may be able to ensure that certain types of people tend to have more power than 
others, but it cannot ensure that A will have 55 units of power while B has only 40. 
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Objection: You admit that the sufficientarian ideal may be unattainable in the foreseeable future. 
And, if that’s true, then we should be prioritarians rather than sufficientarians.  Giving priority to 
the worse off is a useful triage principle.  It tells us how to proceed in the far-from-ideal actual 
world: give the most weight to the interests of those who are worst off, and progressively less 
weight to the interests of those who are better off.  
Reply: This is a less serious objection; it does not seek to undermine my view at the conceptual 
level.  Yet, at first blush at least, it does seem to be an unwelcome implication of the arguments I 
have given.  After all, it looks like there is no room for short-term priority principles within my 
sufficientarian view.  That is not true, however.  Given that we are so far from attaining a 
sufficientarian distribution of power, we need not choose between sufficiency and priority at this 
point.  Acting on priority principles in the short term is compatible with accepting sufficiency as 
the distributive ideal.  A sufficientarian needs to decide how to deal with people who are either 
below or above their threshold.  One way to incorporate priority principles into my view is to 
apply them to people below the sufficiency threshold: among those with less power than they 
ought to have, give priority to increasing the share of those with the least power.  The further 
below your threshold you are, the more important it is to lift you up.  And for those with more 
power than they ought to have, we could adopt “inverse prioritarianism”: among the people with 
too much power, we give priority to decreasing the power of those with the most power.  The 
further above your threshold you are, the more important it is bring you down.  We could use 
such prioritarian reasoning without abandoning sufficientarianism.  
 This is not to deny that  sufficiency and priority can pull in opposite directions.  At some 
point, we will have to choose between maximizing sufficiency and giving priority to certain 
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people’s interests.  (On this point, I agree with Arneson (2006) and Casal (2007).)  But we need 
not make this choice anytime soon.  So many people are below their thresholds that giving 
priority to increasing their power is (and will remain for quite a while) the best way to increase 
sufficiency.
Objection: Prioritarian or not, your view perpetuates injustice.  It does not permit us to give more 
weight to some people’s interests than we do to others’.  You insist on the equal advancement of 
everyone’s interests now and in the future, and this would prevent us from favoring some 
people’s interests as a means of compensating for past injustices, for example.  We could not 
give their interests more weight now, even though their interests were unjustly frustrated in the 
past.
Reply: While it is true that I do not support giving anyone’s interests more weight than anyone 
else’s, this does not mean that I cannot justify things like compensating people for past injustices. 
On my view, we could justify giving one person more power than another on the grounds that the 
former is a victim of past and/or present injustices.  We could say that he needs more power to 
further advance his interests now and in the future – not because his interests are more important 
than anyone else’s but because he is currently worse off than most others and he needs to catch 
up.  Once his interests have been advanced to the same degree as the people around him, then we 
can lower his threshold closer to theirs.
Objection: There is a more serious worry about your arguments for sufficientarianism.  It has to 
do with your claim that competence should play a role in the distribution of political power. 
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Even if some people are better than others at making political decisions, this does not entail that 
they should have more power.  To think that it does is to commit what Estlund calls the expert/
boss fallacy: 
[A]uthority does not simply follow from expertise.  Even if we grant that there are 
better and worse political decisions (which I think we must), and that some people 
know better what should be done than others (we all think some are much worse 
than others), it simply does not follow from their expertise that they have 
authority over us, or that they ought to.…You might be correct, but what makes 
you boss? (2008, p. 3) 
In short, truth grants no political authority.  Just because you are right does not mean you have 
the right to rule.183  
Reply: This is a serious, perhaps the most serious, objection to my view.  Estlund is right to say 
that truth (and, by extension, competence) does not entail authority.  Thus, it looks like what I 
have presented as one of the main advantages of sufficientarianism – its ability to justify 
distributing power in proportion to competence – is actually a disadvantage.  If competence has 
no justificatory force in this context, then my case for sufficientarianism begins to look quite 
weak.  So why do I not think that this objection is fatal to my view?  First of all, because I am 
not Plato; I do not claim that the wisest among us should have all (or even most of) the political 
power.  I claim that, in certain circumstances, those who are more competent should have more 
power than those who are less competent.  I am willing to concede that there are cases in which 
accuracy (and, by extension, competence) has no justificatory force.  In a society where fairness 
trumps all other values, for example, someone with better-than-average competence should not 
have a greater-than-average share of political power.  Secondly, and more importantly, I would 
challenge the idea that the inference from competence to authority is always fallacious.  In some 
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183 This is essentially Walzer’s (1981) complaint against judicial review.
cases, it is; in others, it is not.  The inference is fallacious in societies where accuracy plays no 
role in the well-being of individuals, but it is not fallacious in societies where accuracy does play 
such a role.  If people have an interest in accuracy, then competence does carry with it a certain 
amount of authority: a necessary condition on the justice and/or legitimacy of a political 
institution would be its tendency to distribute power in a way that leads to more accurate 
collective decisions.  Also, as I say above (p. 151, fn.), there are accuracy-based reasons for not 
giving any individual or group a complete lock on power.  At some point, the epistemic benefits 
of having multiple perspectives outweigh any differences in competence among the highly 
competent.
Objection: Putting aside the issue of justification for the moment, what about the factual question 
of whether people really do differ in political competence?  It seems plausible that on the 
dimensions that matter – e.g., knowledge of their own interests and how to advance these 
interests in the political arena  – people are, for all practical purposes, equal.    
Reply: I do not see how this line of argument can be sustained.  I agree that if people were 
equally competent about something, it would be about their own interests and how to advance 
them.  But I doubt that people are equally competent about this.  As a matter of fact, even the 
most committed democrat recognizes (at least implicitly) that political competence is not evenly 
distributed throughout society, that some are better qualified than others to participate in the 
political arena.  Why are children are not allowed to vote, for example?  Because they are not 
competent, or at least not as competent as an average adult.  Therefore, unless you want to say 
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that everyone (including children) should have an equal share of political power, you cannot 
object to making some judgments about the (in)competence of some people.184  
 Of course, excluding children is one thing, giving some adults more power than others is 
quite another.  The latter is more controversial, but I think it is still justified.  Beyond anecdotal 
evidence of differences in the moral and technical competence within any population, there is a 
great deal of social-scientific research showing that people are not equally adept at looking after 
their own interests (not to mention the interests of others) in the political arena.185  If the ultimate 
goal is to advance everyone’s interests equally, therefore, giving them all an equal share of 
political power would be a mistake.  The more competent members of society should have 
somewhat more power than their less competent neighbors. 
Objection: Even if people are not equal in competence, each person is still better situated than 
anyone else to know what is in his own interest.  Since, as you admit, we may not know for sure 
how competent someone is, we should simply presume that each person can advance his own 
interests better than anyone else can.  Thus, the best way to advance a person’s interests is to let 
the person do so himself.
Reply: I think this is false.  As I said above (Chapter 3, Section II), some people are deeply 
confused about what is in their own interests.  When we are dealing with such a person, it is 
possible that someone else has a better idea of what is in his interest than he himself does, and 
thus that the best way to advance his interests is to let someone else advance them for him.
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184 This example comes from Brennan 2011b, pp. 718-9.
185 See Brennan 2011a (Ch. 7), Larry Bartels (Chs. 3 and 4), and Bryan Caplan 2007.
Objection: Even if there are differences in competence, any public recognition of such 
differences will be disrespectful and demeaning to those who are labeled (relatively) 
incompetent.  You say that competence should play a role in the distribution of political power, 
and this means that you must make judgments about the (in)competence of your neighbors.  You 
cannot do that without insulting those whom you label as less competent than others.186
Reply: This is a more serious objection.  It gets back to the problem of invidious comparisons, 
which we discussed in Chapter 3, section III.  Rather than merely repeat what I said there, I will 
explain why, in practice, the problem of invidious comparisons may not be as serious as it 
initially appears.  We make judgments of differential competence all the time.  Consider the 
qualification requirements for many jobs and offices.  You cannot practice law or medicine, for 
example, without the proper accreditation.  Such requirements are imperfect filters, but they are 
necessary: we simply do not have the time or the ability to determine ex ante whether each 
prospective lawyer or doctor would be a good one.  So we rely on professional schools, licensing 
boards, and other institutions.  They help us to weed out the people who lack the requisite skills 
to do the job well.  We justify qualification requirements by appealing to the relative competence 
of different members of our society – we assume that someone with the degrees, licenses, etc. is 
more competent than someone without them.  Are all qualification requirements morally 
objectionable for this reason?  Surely not.  I concede that there is room for deception and 
manipulation within the system, and that someone could protest (quite plausibly) that she would 
be an excellent lawyer despite the fact that she never took the bar exam.  But this does not show 
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186 Christiano offers a similar argument for the claim that political power should not be distributed in proportion to 
citizens’ knowledge of moral and political matters (2008, pp. 116-28).
that there is anything disrespectful or demeaning about qualification requirements.  We say to the 
non-accredited applicant: “We’re sorry, but you do not have the necessary qualifications to be 
considered for this position.  The requirements are the same for everyone.  No exceptions.”   Now 
imagine that there were a system of political accreditation – setting aside for now the details of 
what such a system would look like.  We could then say to all citizens: “In order to get a greater-
than-average share of political power (the ability to run for office, say), you need a political 
competence certificate.  All potential candidates have to complete this requirement.  No 
exceptions.” 
Objection: Wait a minute.  There are major obstacles to implementing any system of “political 
accreditation.”   To begin with, it would inevitably be controlled by various power-hungry groups 
– e.g., political parties.  These groups are not motivated out of a concern for the accuracy of our 
collective decisions but out of a desire to advance their own interests.  There will be strong 
incentives to get one’s supporters on the ballot, say, and keep one’s enemies off it.  And, as long 
as that’s the case, any political-competence-certification process will be worse than useless.187 
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187 In J. Brennan’s words: “In practice, the competence exam is ripe for abuse and institutional capture.  Competence 
exams would likely be used to disenfranchise people who might vote against the party in power.  Special interest 
groups would fight to control the agency overseeing the exams.  Even if the exam were fair and just in principle, it is 
unlikely that the exam would be administered in a fair and just way in practice.  If we are looking for a practical 
policy instrument to improve actual democratic decision making, then we need not examine whether competence 
exams are unjust in principle.  We can expect them to be unjust in practice” (2011a, p. 108).  John Stuart Mill makes 
a similar point in Chapter 8 of his Considerations on Representative Government: “It would be eminently desirable 
that other things besides reading, writing, and arithmetic could be made necessary to the suffrage; that some 
knowledge of the conformation the earth, its natural and political divisions, the elements of general history, and of 
the history and the institutions of their own country, could be required from all electors.  But…[there does not] exist 
any trustworthy machinery for ascertaining whether they have been acquired or not.  The attempt, at present, would 
lead to partiality, chicanery, and every kind of fraud.”
Reply: I agree, but this is not a threat to my view.  There will always be strong incentives for 
corruption, deception, and so forth.  This should not lead us to do away with all efforts to put 
more power into the hands of the more competent, however.  It should merely remind us that we 
have to be vigilant about limiting corruption and other types of abuse.  Think of how politicized 
the process of getting on the ballot is now.  In most cases, it requires a potential candidate to 
collect a large number of signatures or be nominated by a party that has already secured a place 
on the ballot.  There is ample room for corruption here.  Should we institute a different procedure 
for gaining ballot access?  Not necessarily.  The benefits of this system – most notably, its 
effectiveness at keeping non-serious candidates off the ballot – may outweigh the (risk of) 
corruption.  We should do everything we can to limit corruption, not do away with any system 
that could possibly be corrupted.  Of course, this is easier in some cases than in others, and 
competency tests seem to be one of the hardest cases.  But I am not proposing that we implement 
a system of political competence testing: I think that the corruption-type worries are strong 
enough to dissuade us from any such enterprise.  With rare exceptions, the most we should do to 
try to increase the accuracy of our decisions is to offer citizens the means to increase their 
competence (e.g., classes and informational campaigns) and to not intervene when inequalities of 
political power arise from differences in competence.
Objection: The most important practical obstacle to distributing political power in proportion to 
competence is that there are no reliable tests of political competence.  You describe political 
competence as a combination of moral competence and technical competence.  There are so 
many different factors that affect one’s competence along both of these dimensions – e.g., formal 
training, empathy, altruism – that we will never know how politically competent most people are. 
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No test (written or otherwise) can measure a person along all of these dimensions.188  And, as 
Richard Arneson says, “when no reliable procedure is available to distinguish more competent 
from less competent citizens for the purpose of tailoring one’s power to one’s competence, no 
unreliable procedure should be instituted to this end”  (1993, p. 138).  So, trying to distribute 
power in proportion to competence is a hopeless task.  
Reply: If there were indeed no way of testing political competence, this would be a problem for 
my view.  It would not be a fatal problem, since competence is only one of the factors that I think 
should affect the distribution of political power, but a problem nonetheless.  Fortunately, I do not 
think that getting a rough idea of how politically competent people are is as difficult as the 
objection suggests.  We need not administer political-IQ tests to identify those with high or low 
levels of political competence.  We already have some built-in filters that prevent the least 
competent from wielding too much political power.  As Jason Brennan notes: “Many positions of 
power require certain qualifications from applicants in order to obtain that power.  We do not 
make just anyone a police officer, nor can just anyone run the Fed.  Judges must have law 
degrees, and even politicians are often subject to requirements [e.g., confirmation 
hearings]”  (2011b, p. 707).  And, don’t forget, we can get some benefits (in terms of the accuracy 
of our collective decisions) without deliberately structuring institutions so as to give more power 
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188 “Even if the exam system were free of corruption, there might be no way to design an exam that could track the 
morally relevant qualifications.…How could we punish or reward people for making bad or good choices about civil 
rights?  If we try to test knowledge, what should we test?  A good voter does not need to know trivia, such as how 
many U.S. states there are, or how many voting members of Congress there are.  Consider this relatively modest 
proposal: a good voter should know basic textbook economics (even if she disagrees with it) and should be able to 
identify one or two platforms of the candidates for which she votes.  However, even this kind of knowledge is not 
necessary to be a good voter.… You might be completely ignorant about the candidates and about social science, but 
know that candidate A is supported by people who deserve your trust and deference, and thus be justified in voting 
for A on those grounds.  We cannot design a written test to check for justified deference to experts.  So, even if 
exams are acceptable in principle, it is not clear whether we can design an acceptable one” (Brennan 2011a, p. 109).
to citizens or groups of citizens with higher-than-average levels of competence.  Absent any 
intervention, those with more competence will tend have more power than most others.  Part of 
being politically competent is knowing how to get things done.
Objection: There is a final, more pragmatic concern.  An unequal distribution of political power 
will lead to greater (risk of) abuses of power (corruption, coercion, exploitation, etc.).189  The 
powerful will be able to enrich and further empower themselves and their friends at the expense 
of the relatively powerless.  
Reply: I admit that an unequal distribution of political power may increase the risk of abuses of 
power, but I do not think that this is a serious problem.  First of all, on my sufficiency view, the 
risk of abuse cannot increase too much, because no individual or group should have so much 
power that they cannot be held accountable for their actions.  If someone can act with impunity, 
then he has too much power – he is above his threshold.  The people who cannot (individually or 
collectively) prevent him from lying, cheating, and stealing do not have enough power – they are 
below their thresholds.  Secondly, the potential for abuse of power is always present, even under 
a regime of political equality.  Even if everyone has the same amount of political power, it is still 
possible for some to abuse their power – by buying votes, say.
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189 This is one of Michael Walzer’s main worries about unequal distributions of political power: “[P]olitical power is 
a special sort of good.  It has a twofold character.  First, it is like the other things that men and women make, value, 
exchange, and share: sometimes dominant, sometimes not; sometimes widely held, sometimes the possession of a 
very few.  And, second, it is unlike all the other things because, however it is had and whoever has it, political power 
is the regulative agency for social goods generally.  It is used to defend the boundaries of all the distributive spheres, 
including its own, and to enforce the common understandings of what goods are and what they are for.  (But it can 
also be used, obviously, to invade the different spheres and to override those understandings.)” (1983, p. 15, 
footnote).
To sum up: in this section, I have tried to defend my view against the most serious objections to 
it.  If nothing else, I hope the above discussion helps to identify which bullets the political 
sufficientarian has to bite.  
II.
Now that we are at the end, we should take a step back and recall where we have been.  We 
began, in Chapter 1, by looking for a workable conception of political power.  According to the 
conception we settled on, political power is the ability to get what you want in the political arena; 
more precisely, it is the ability to make political outcomes conform to one’s will, even in the face 
of resistance.  We then considered several arguments for the view that political power ought to be 
distributed equally – the view I call political egalitarianism.  I divided the arguments for political 
egalitarianism into two groups: arguments from moral equality and arguments from legitimacy. 
The arguments from moral equality, which were the focus of Chapter 2, claim that everyone is 
owed an equal share of political power simply by his or her status as a person of equal moral 
worth.  My problem with this claim is that achieving an equal distribution of political power can 
actually prevent us from treating everyone as a person of equal moral worth.  The arguments 
from legitimacy, which were the focus of Chapter 3, are problematic for other reasons.  These 
arguments have two steps.  The first is a theory of legitimacy – a political institution is legitimate 
if it promotes the relevant value(s) to a sufficient degree.  The second step is the claim that the 
best way to promote the relevant value(s) is to achieve an equal distribution of political power.  I 
questioned both steps.  Not only do I have worries about the theories of legitimacy upon which 
these arguments rely, I doubt that an equal distribution of political power is the best means of 
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promoting the value(s) they invoke.  I then presented, in Chapter 4, my argument for political 
sufficientarianism – the view that it does not matter if some have less power than others, so long 
as everyone has enough.  I argued that, in the context of political power, sufficiency is a more 
attractive distributive ideal than equality because it is more consistent with the demand that we 
treat all members of society as persons of equal moral worth.  Advancing everyone’s interests 
equally will require us to promote each of the relevant values to some degree.  (I assume that the 
interests of at least one person would be advanced by the promotion of each value.)  Promoting 
any one of these values would justify some inequalities of political power.  And the more values 
we need to promote, the greater the inequalities of political power that are necessary. 
Sufficientarianism can justify such inequalities; egalitarianism cannot.  
 As with most projects, this one raises more questions than it answers.  Much more work 
needs to be done before my view is even close to complete.  I will close with a brief survey of 
questions that remain open. 
 Many of these questions have to do with the concept of ability.  I say that political power 
is an ability, but I do not say what exactly an ability is.  Must we resort to talk of dispositions and 
possible worlds when cashing out our ability-talk, or can we say everything we need to in terms 
of statistical regularities?  Our answer to this question has major implications for the issue of 
measurement.  Any prescription for how political power ought to be distributed presupposes that 
it is possible to measure how political power is in fact distributed.  Thus, assuming that political 
power is an ability, my theory will eventually have to include a method for measuring ability.  I 
sketch the framework of such a method in Chapter 1 (pp. 28-34), but it is no more than a sketch.
 There are plenty of issues regarding the implementation of my view as well.  As I have 
said before, it will be difficult to collect the necessary information about people’s interests and 
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skills.  Supposing it is possible, is it morally acceptable?  Can we overcome some of our 
epistemic barriers without violating people’s autonomy, for instance?
 This brings us, finally, to questions of institutional design.  We need to understand how 
various social and political institutions affect people’s interests.  What system of taxation would 
best promote fairness?  How often should elections be held if we want to promote responsibility 
among public officials?  Which voting procedure would lead to the most accurate collective 
decisions?  How can the education system promote solidarity among the population?  
 None of these questions are simple.  But they are important, whether one accepts my 
overall argument or not.  They must be answered before we can bring the actual distribution of 
political power into conformity with the ideal of equality, sufficiency, or anything else.
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